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The Economic Virtues of SRI and CSR
Financial markets and company managers are increasingly acknowledging
the concepts of socially responsible investing (SRI) and corporate social
responsibility (CSR), but not without reservations. These hesitations
are largely attributable to ongoing debates about a potential conflict
between social responsibility goals and the traditional financial objectives
of investors and companies. This thesis bundles six empirical studies
that deepen our understanding of the economic value of SRI and CSR.
Several empirical questions underlie these studies, such as: do CSR
practices improve a firm’s profitability? Do financial markets value
corporate social responsibility? Do SRI criteria constrain investment
portfolio optimization, or do they help investors in their hunt for
underpriced securities? This thesis shows that SRI and CSR can be
studied in new ways to answer these questions. We examine unique
SRI stock portfolios with superior return/risk profiles, and provide a
fresh look at strategies for investors in SRI mutual funds. By analyzing
a wide range of pathways that lead CSR to interrelated measures of
corporate financial performance, we further explain whether CSR carries
value-relevant information. Taken together, the six studies discuss the
channels of transmission from CSR to operating performance, the cost
of capital, firm value, analysts’ earnings expectations, and stock return.
The conclusions from this dissertation are that (i) integrating SRI criteria
into portfolio construction does not negatively affect investment per-
formance; (ii) investors can use information on firms’ eco-efficiency
to make investment decisions that improve the return/risk profile of
their portfolios; (iii) common CSR attributes, such as corporate environ-
mental responsibility, and human capital management, have a significant
association with traditional measures of corporate performance. We
recommend making CSR salient to investors in the form of extra-
financial information, with an emphasis on environmental, social, and
corporate governance themes.
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Preface 
 
 
This PhD. dissertation bundles six empirical studies on the topic of socially responsible 
investment (SRI) and on the related discipline of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Over the last decades, scholars and practitioners have increasingly acknowledged these 
concepts, but not without reservations. Although in recent times many pension funds and 
institutional asset management firms have publicly expressed their growing dedication to 
investing with SRI principles in mind, they still seem to struggle with the question whether 
SRI aligns with their fiduciary responsibilities. Despite heightened academic attention in 
this field, a thorough understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with investing 
based on social investment criteria is still lacking. At the company level, managers seek to 
understand whether (and how) CSR can be operationalized not only to meet social 
responsibility goals but also to act in the interests of shareholders.  
 Several features underpin the contribution of this doctoral dissertation. We first 
provide a new and global comparison of SRI equity mutual fund performance vis-à-vis 
mainstream fund performance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are differences both 
within and across countries in the way SRI is defined and implemented. It is an open 
question whether current related evidence, most of which stems from the U.S. and U.K 
markets, is sample-specific and sensitive to the choice of SRI screening methodology. We 
address these possibilities in greater detail. In addition, the evidence to date almost 
exclusively revolves around equity markets. This thesis provides new evidence on the 
potentials of social investing for other asset classes by examining SRI fixed-income fund 
performance.   
 The thesis then extends the research scope beyond mutual funds. We draw on the 
view that the financial consequences of SRI and CSR as such are almost impossible to 
portray because these concepts are too broad and multidimensional. Because SRI and CSR 
are “container” concepts, any relation they show to a financial performance measure is 
ultimately the net effect of those displayed by its constituents. Since SRI mutual funds 
make investment decisions based on a mixture of different SRI and non-SRI criteria, a 
study of mutual funds for the purpose of testing the economic value of CSR exacerbates 
this aggregation problem.  
We first demonstrate the importance of disaggregating CSR by building and 
evaluating SRI equity portfolios based on unique, firm-level, rating data that measure only 
a subset of firms’ CSR performance: eco-efficiency. Contrary to mutual funds, a 
comparison of self-composed SRI and non-SRI portfolios more accurately uncovers return 
differences (premiums) associated with SRI criteria, because these portfolios can be 
designed to be truly mutually exclusive and different in terms of a specific SRI criterion.  
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 Moreover, studies have differed widely in their choice of financial performance 
measure in their hunt for an association between CSR and “financial performance”, but the 
use of different financial measures makes a comparison of studies a complicated task 
because these measures may rest on different theories. To overcome this problem, we 
make use of a framework that systematically helps us to understand the wide range of 
pathways between CSR policies and different measures of financial performance. We use 
this framework to single out both the eco-efficiency component of CSR (Chapters 3 and 4) 
and the human capital management dimension (Chapter 5). We investigate the possible 
channels of transmission from these CSR dimensions to operating performance, firm 
value, investors’ earnings expectations, and ultimately, stock market performance.  
 In Chapter 6, we move one step further with disentangling CSR-financial 
performance relationships by isolating the cost of capital component inherent in valuation. 
We provide various theoretical scenarios in which the social responsibility attributes of 
firms account for cross-sectional variation in firms’ cost of equity. We then offer empirical 
evidence on the association between CSR and the cost of equity capital implied in 
contemporaneous stock prices. Studying this connection is important for understanding 
whether investors are attentive to CSR attributes and whether markets are potential 
catalysts for corporate reform. 
 The reader should note that recent years have witnessed a surge in new but similar 
concepts. As alternatives to SRI, for example, the terms “sustainable investing” and 
“ethical investing” have primarily been used by scholars and practitioners in continental 
Europe and the United Kingdom. More recent concepts embraced by a set of important 
institutional investors are “ESG investing” (Environmental, Social, Governance), which 
more explicitly involves corporate governance issues, and “extra-financial investing”, 
which more strongly relies on the view that corporate sustainability criteria are relevant to 
investors because they complement mainstream financial criteria in understanding the risk 
and return opportunities of investments. While there are some theoretical differences 
among these concepts, SRI and CSR will be the lead terms throughout the six studies for 
the sake of brevity and consistency. Their association with the ESG concept and their 
usefulness as extra-financial factors are discussed in the concluding chapter. 
This work could not have been completed without the help and comments of 
many colleagues at the Financial Management Department at RSM Erasmus University, 
who I thank for their support. A number of colleagues deserve some special credits for 
their roles over the last three years. Obviously, I am indebted to Professor Dr. Kees 
Koedijk, my promotor, who has been so kind to give me the opportunity to explore a 
widely debated research topic in finance. I also appreciate the helpful comments provided 
by my dissertation committee members, Professor Dr. Sylvester Eijffinger, Professor Dr. 
Johan Graafland, and Dr. Ronald Mahieu. I owe much to Nadja Guenster, who has been a 
great research collaborator, and who is partly responsible for the papers incorporated in 
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Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. Also, I thank Rob Bauer, who has laid the 
groundwork for the academic road I have pursued ever since I obtained my Master’s 
degree under his supervision at Maastricht University. I look forward to working with you 
on new topics and on making our new research centre a success. I thank Patrick 
Verwijmeren for his contribution to research that in part resulted in Chapter 6. 
Many thanks also go out to Joop Huij, Christian Huurman, Francesco Ravazollo, 
Chen Zhou, Michiel de Pooter, and all my off-campus friends, all of whom have made sure 
that long hours, and some demanding nights, of academic research can easily be combined 
with good pizza, movies, street soccer, and laughs and drinks at bars. Last but not least, I 
am grateful to ERIM for having generously provided the resources necessary to complete 
this dissertation. 
 
 
Jeroen Derwall 
Rotterdam, January 2007 
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Chapter 1 
SRI Mutual Fund Performance around the World1 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For several decades, socially responsible investing (SRI) has attracted the attention of 
scholars, policy makers, and the world’s largest investment firms and pension trusts. 
Almost all large investment firms and pension funds report their involvement in socially 
responsible investing. Examples are Goldman Sachs, State Street Global Advisors and 
CalPERS in the U.S., the Norwegian Petroleum Fund, the Swedish AP funds, and ABP 
and PGGM in the Netherlands.2 Paradoxically, even though a sizeable number of 
(institutional) asset managers now publicly express their devotion to ethical issues, the vast 
majority of these investors do not employ SRI as a mainstream investment vehicle. Despite 
mounting academic work on SRI, there is still much disagreement about the financial 
implications of corporate social responsibility screens. Does adding an ethical dimension 
to investment decisions conflict with the fiduciary duties of portfolio managers in terms of 
the return-risk ratios they are expected to deliver? Anecdotal evidence indicates that the 
money management industry has its reservations about SRI due to concerns that social 
screening significantly constrains portfolio optimization.  
Most previous studies have helped to understand the risk and return 
characteristics of SRI by evaluating the performance of socially responsible mutual funds, 
which are representative of practical investment portfolios and for which data are easily 
accessible.3 Empirical evidence by Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005), Gregory, Matatko 
and Luther (1997), Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993), and Statman (2000) suggest that the 
returns of socially responsible funds are no worse than the returns earned by conventional 
portfolios of similar risk. However, studies up to this point leave several questions 
unexplained. The existing body of evidence largely involves the U.S. and U.K. retail 
markets and may not be robust to different methodologies and small-sample problems.  
The contributions of our study are threefold. First, we first show that there are 
various theoretical predictions concerning socially responsible investment returns beyond 
the widely cited logic that SRI-driven investment constraints impose a diversification 
                                                          
1 This chapter is an abridged and modified version of Derwall, J., R. Bauer and K. Koedijk (2006), 
“SRI Performance: Survey and Global Evidence”, Working Paper. Further, a subset of this chapter is 
available as Bauer, R., J. Derwall and R. Otten (2006), “The SRI Mutual Fund Performance Debate: 
New Evidence from Canada”, Journal of Business Ethics. 
2 These developments have been joined by regulatory changes designed to promote corporate social 
responsibility.  For instance, an amendment to the 1995 Pension Act in the UK, which was enforced 
in 2000, requires pension funds to disclose how they consider social and environmental issues. 
3 In the mid-nineties, Kurtz (1997) provided a thorough review of SRI literature up to that point.  
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penalty on social investors. We present a number of theories on the expected returns of 
SRI that have their antecedents in mainstream literatures on asset pricing and capital 
markets. These theories lay the foundations for tests on SRI returns.  
Second, this study tests SRI fund performance in many countries around the 
world, using samples and performance evaluation models that are more comprehensive 
than those observed hitherto. Our international database of mutual funds has several 
attractive features, from both an economic and statistical point of view. It covers a much 
larger time horizon than did prior studies, which helps to improve the statistical power of 
asset pricing tests. It also helps to address the critical view that SRI returns seem 
competitive because most evidence predates the last bear market (e.g., Entine (2003)). For 
several countries, our data covers seventeen years of monthly fund returns. We can also 
investigate whether SRI fund performance is country-specific. Compiling global evidence 
is relevant because the performance of SRI portfolios could be a function of the way 
socially responsible investment universes are determined. Our global perspective is 
motivated by reports of social investment forums, including SIF (2003) and Eurosif 
(2003), which point out that countries might differ in defining and implementing SRI. 
Given these differences, it is unclear whether current views on SRI fund performance hold 
up on a worldwide scale.  
Third, we also improve on studies that examine SRI funds at the aggregate level. 
The approach adopted by most fund portfolio studies on SRI, such as Bauer, Koedijk and 
Otten (2005), is to report ex post risk-adjusted returns of an equally weighted portfolio that 
comprises all SRI funds in a given country. This method might be of limited practical 
relevance because of its implicit assumption that all investors in socially responsible 
mutual funds will hold the same composite of all SRI funds in a given country. Moreover, 
evidence on historically earned risk-adjusted returns offers the investor limited ex ante 
information, i.e., whether past SRI fund performance carries over to the future. Therefore, 
besides examining cross-country variation in aggregate SRI fund performance, this study 
explores performance from the perspectives of two different types of SRI mutual fund 
investors: (i) an investor who seeks to optimize the non-financial utility from the social, 
ethical, and environmental attributes inherent in SRI by selecting funds with strong “social 
responsibility” track records, and (ii) an investor who chooses to pursue the joint goals of 
social responsibility and optimal financial return.  
To adopt the perspective of the first type of mutual fund investor, we investigate 
heterogeneity in funds’ screens and return-risk characteristics among SRI funds in a given 
country. The SRI industry offers a rich array of retail investment funds that span investors’ 
varying interests for many social and environmental issues, such as alcohol, tobacco, 
weapons and defense, and eco-efficiency. While most previous studies have implicitly 
assumed that SRI investors have homogeneous tastes for social responsibility attributes, 
we explore the extent to which an investor’s preference for a specific social screening 
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methodology or a specific set of SRI criteria affects the return and risk characteristics of 
his resulting SRI fund portfolio. We collected information on the funds’ policies 
concerning social, ethical and environmental issues in order to bundle and evaluate funds 
based on their SRI investment policy. 
To adopt the perspective of the second type of investor, we employ tests of 
persistence in (i.e., the predictability of) SRI versus conventional fund performance. 
Evidence of persistence would support the idea that information about a fund’s past 
performance can be exploited by a socially responsible investor in search of the highest ex 
ante return on his portfolio. There are reasons to suspect that SRI fund performance is 
predictable. For example, poorly performing SRI funds might not be disciplined by the 
market and continue to provide inferior returns because they are held by loyal investors 
who enjoy non-financial utility from these funds’ social resposnbility features. Consistent 
with loyalty, Bollen (2006) finds that the volatility of investor cash flows is lower in the 
case of socially responsible funds than in the case of conventional funds. In our main test, 
we examine persistence by evaluating the out-of-sample performance of a strategy that 
holds SRI funds based on their past performance. This method, which is well established in 
studies on mutual fund performance persistence, enable us to distinguish individual SRI 
funds based on their track records and to investigate whether their short-run performance 
in the past carries over to subsequent periods.  
We avoid that our results are susceptible to benchmarking errors. Since sizeable 
evidence underlines that investment performance estimates are driven by the choice of 
benchmark variables, we evaluate mutual funds relative to a broad range of benchmark 
assets identified by previous research. Our benchmark specifications include models based 
on a priori specified variables (like Carhart (1997), Fama and French (1993), and Ferson 
and Schadt (1996)) and models that contain a combination of ad hoc and statistical risk 
factors (see, e.g., Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003)).  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
socially responsible investment industry and explains the ways by which SRI funds around 
the world implement SRI. Section 3 presents theoretical discussions and develops 
hypotheses about the expected (risk-adjusted) returns of SRI mutual funds relative to those 
of conventional funds. Section 4 discusses the mutual fund and benchmark data used in 
this study. Section 5 reports empirical results. Section 6 concludes this research. 
 
 
1.2. BACKGROUND 
 
SRI Market History and Current Overview 
The origins of socially responsible investing trace back centuries, but in more recent 
decades social investment seems to have become a fact of life. For years, the financial 
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industry in the U.S. has witnessed numerous examples of institutions divesting from 
(investing in) socially controversial (responsible) investment vehicles. In the sixties and in 
subsequent decades, socially responsible investing developed progressively.4 Provoked by 
the Vietnam War, the Cold War, and by other political conflicts, pressure groups echoed 
concerns over the issue of corporate citizenship. Several American medical associations, 
universities, Catholic institutions, pension funds, and many other institutional investors 
demonstrated their discomfort with investing in stocks of companies that actively operate 
in, e.g., the tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and gambling industries. Many businesses with 
controversial regimes, such as those observed in South Africa in earlier decades, in 
Nigeria, and in China, came under strenuous attack by politically driven activists. 
Environmental disasters, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, triggered concerns for the 
economic and environmental implications of lagging corporate environmental 
management. Shareholders protested against bad environmental governance and in certain 
occasions, these pressures resulted in environmentalist being allowed to raise 
environmental awareness at a company in the role as a corporate board member (Teoh, 
Welch, and Wazzan (1999)). 
It was anticipated that the SRI industry would expand globally. Indeed, the 
number of investors applying social, moral or environmental screens on businesses in their 
investment universe has grown substantially over the last decade, despite the stock market 
decline of 2000. However, as Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) point out, most markets for 
socially responsible investments cover just a small fraction of their mainstream 
counterparts. To give some impression of the SRI markets, we present two series of 
statistics in Table 1 and in Figure 1. Table 1 separates SRI size statistics per country into 
assets under management in retail and non-retail markets. These statistics offer a snapshot 
of the status of SRI markets in mid-2003, when institutional and retail market trends were 
examined almost simultaneously by various social investment organizations around the 
world. The table clearly illustrates that the United States dominates the SRI industry in 
terms of assets under management, where now about 1 out of 9 dollars is invested in a 
socially responsible manner. According the estimates presented in Table 1, the US social 
investment industry comprises more than $2 trillion dollars, which reflects an increase of 
about 240% over the last eight years (SIF (2003)). Of this amount, more than $160 billion 
is covered by the U.S. retail market for SRI. Remarkably, the Canadian mutual fund 
market constitutes the second-largest SRI retail industry. According to estimates by 
Canada’s Social Investment Organization (2003), over $51 billion of assets are in total 
invested based on ethical principles. Of this amount, approximately $10 billion represents 
SRI retail funds.  
In Europe, the United Kingdom is by far the largest SRI market. Non-retail 
investors collectively hold more than £370 billion of assets subject to social investment 
                                                          
4 In fact, the first SRI mutual fund emerged in the United States almost a century ago.  
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criteria (Eurosif (2003)). As for the retail market, the amount of assets managed by UK 
SRI funds is estimated at £3.9 billion/$5.9 billion (Avanzi SRI Research / SIRI Group 
(2003)). Most other markets in Europe are smaller but growing steadily.  
In the eastern region, Australia covers a significant portion of socially responsible 
investments. However, all-encompassing data are lacking for this region. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that several Asian markets for socially responsible assets are rising. 
 
 
TABLE 1. Summary of SRI Size Estimates per Country (2003) 
Sources: Social Investment Forum (2003), Social Investment Organization 
(2003), Avanzi SRI Research / SIRI Group (2003, 2005), Ethical Investment 
Association (2003), UKSIF (2003),5 and Eurosif (2003). “Non-retail” is 
computed as the difference between “Total” and “Retail” statistics. All 
statistics are converted to billion U.S.$. 
 
Country Total Retail Non-Retail 
United States 2150.00 162.00 1988.00 
Canada 51.40 9.94 41.46 
UK 378.94 5.94 373.00 
The Netherlands 5.43 1.77 3.66 
Australia 15.33 1.73 13.6 
Switzerland 5.07 1.53 3.54 
Germany 1.58 1.30 0.28 
France 3.66 1.18 2.48 
Italy 4.37 0.83 3.54 
Austria 1.26 0.08 1.18 
Spain 0.14 0.05 0.09 
Belgium n/r 1.55 n/r 
Sweden  n/r 1.46 n/r 
 
 
Figure 1 provides a further look at the growth of SRI assets in Europe over time. Using 
Figure 1, we summarize European retail market trends reported periodically by 
Avanzi/SiRi Group (Avanzi (2001, 2003, 2005)). Like their mainstream counterparts, SRI 
funds underwent a strong growth until the bear market of 2000. Recently, the SRI retail 
industry has regained growth in size as a result of the recovery of international stock 
markets. Next to the U.K., several countries are becoming frontrunners in the European 
SRI industry, most notably the rapidly growing markets in France, Belgium, Sweden, and 
                                                          
5 http://www.uksif.org/Z/Z/Z/sri/data/index.shtml#inst 
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Italy. It should be noted, however, that the majority of Italian SRI vehicles comprise fixed-
income securities, whereas other markets are mostly represented by equity (Avanzi 
(2005)).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Trends in European Retail Market for SRI. 
Size of European Retail SRI Markets: 1999-2005
(Billion USD)
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SRI Criteria and Implementation Methods 
Although the abovementioned market estimates might suggest the contrary, SRI and CSR 
are ambiguous and multidimensional concepts, and thus sensitive to subjective 
interpretation. SRI funds may conceptually share a dedicated interest in social, ethical or 
environmental issues, but these funds might differ substantially in their methods to 
determine a socially responsible investment universe. For example, the first generation of 
SRI funds in the United States and in the United Kingdom predominantly employs 
“negative” (i.e., exclusionary or restricted) screens. Negative screeners seek to avoid 
investments in so-called “sin” sectors, which include businesses that yield substantial 
revenues from alcohol, tobacco, weapons and gambling. Sound intuition tells us that 
portfolios that omit these oriented sectors display a tilt towards growth stocks, which have 
been shown to possess unique risk-return features. More recent SRI mutual funds adopt 
“positive” screens. Unlike exclusionary screens, positive screeners seek to include leaders 
in corporate social responsibility in the investment opportunity set. Positive screens are 
often employed on criteria that are less suitable for restrictive or exclusionary policies. A 
special variant of positive screening is “best-in-class” analysis, which involves ranking 
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firms on ethical issues relative to industry peers. Best-in-class SRI portfolio managers 
might enjoy better industry diversification compared to other common alternatives, but 
their investment in socially controversial companies may fuel criticism that they 
insufficiently represent social awareness. In its defense, the best-in-class approach can be 
theoretically justified by the fact that a non-sector-neutral ranking approach might bias 
social investors to holding sectors that are generally more transparent on corporate social 
responsibility but not necessarily better social performers. More importantly, best-in-class 
analysis builds on the conjecture that sustainable corporate behavior of companies should 
be assessed relative to vis-à-vis industry average performance because only firms operating 
in the same industry face similar social and environmental challenges.6 This line of 
reasoning also suggests that best-in-class is very suitable for active investment managers 
who intend to use SRI as filters for a firm’s management quality and for detecting sources 
of risk and cash flow. Last but not least, the best-in-class approach more closely aligns 
with tracking-error considerations (Statman (2006)). 
Moreover, SRI fund performance may rely heavily on local factors, because SRI 
implementation has been shown to vary across continents and across countries. Market 
overviews by SIF (2003) and Eurosif (2003) indicate that SRI funds in the U.S. and the 
U.K. often exercise exclusionary screens on companies in the alcohol, tobacco, gambling 
and armaments industries combined with positive screens concerning, e.g., environmental 
performance, human rights issues and labor relations.7 Funds in continental Europe are 
increasingly showing interest in positive criteria within a best-in-class framework, but also 
use restrictive screens.8 As for specific criteria, tobacco has been a dominant criterion in 
the United States, but SRI funds in Europe and Asia have put much emphasis on 
environmental issues (SIF (2003)).  
 
 
1.3. SRI PERFORMANCE IN THEORY 
 
The influence of social, ethical and environmental screens on portfolio construction and 
performance is still the subject of debates, with the central bottleneck often being the 
tradeoff between moral and financials investment goals. Our intention is to show that there 
many theoretical views about SRI returns that reach beyond the traditional diversification 
disputes. However, although theories on the effects of social investment screens on 
investor returns are well documented, they are not well organized. To explain how SRI 
could be consequential to investors and mutual fund performance, the following sections 
                                                          
6 Apart from focusing on screens, SRI markets around the world are now also witnessing a gradual 
shift from a screening-based approach to shareholder engagement policies. 
7 Some SRI funds exclude financials because their network most likely includes controversial firms. 
8 See for example the SRI fund overview maintained by the U.S. Social Investment Forum: 
http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/sriguide/mfpc.cfm 
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present a set of hypotheses concerning the return implications of SRI policies in financial 
markets. For expositional convenience, we name them (i) the constrained diversification 
hypothesis, (ii) the value relevance hypothesis, (iii) the discriminating tastes hypothesis, 
(iv) the stock neglect hypothesis, (v) the cash flow mispricing hypothesis and (vi) the 
irrelevance hypothesis. Most of these hypotheses have their antecedents in the standard 
literatures on rational expectations and behavioral finance. 
 
SRI and Constrained Diversification 
The origins of debates on SRI trace back to mean-variance theory in the tradition of 
Markowitz (1952), according to which a rational economic agent seeks to achieve the 
highest return-risk tradeoff by means of diversification across securities, where the optimal 
allocation is a function of securities’ return dispersion, return covariation, and the 
investor’s risk appetite. Assuming a world with mean-variance investors, the oft-cited 
hypothesis against SRI performance, which we dub the constrained diversification 
hypothesis, concentrates on the restrictions that SRI screens impose on portfolio 
construction. Critics in the finance profession, such as Rudd (1981), warn that these 
restrictions induce inefficient diversification and raise the non-systematic risk of the 
investment portfolio. Not surprisingly, an empirical question central to the majority of 
research on socially responsible investing is whether the investment opportunities that one 
forgoes due to social screens significantly affect (risk-adjusted) performance. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that social investment screens applied on an unconstrained universe of 
securities leads to a decline of approximately 30% in the investment opportunity set, on 
average, although extreme filters that preclude up to 70% of the market can also be 
witnessed in practice.   
One counterargument to this constrained diversification hypothesis is the fact that 
diversification is economically valuable only to some extent. Since buying shares involves 
transactions costs, an increase in the number of stocks in a portfolio is beneficial as long as 
the marginal benefits from adding stocks (i.e. the diversification benefits) exceed the 
marginal costs (i.e. transaction costs). Statman (1987) suggested that about 30 (randomly 
selected) stocks are needed for having a well-diversified portfolio. According to updated 
estimates, however, the optimal number of stocks from a mean-variance perspective has 
increased too over 300 (see Statman (2004)). Overall, it is still an open question whether 
SRI opportunity sets are large enough to satisfy that requirement. 
Many of the theoretical objections to SRI seem to have revolved around mean-
variance efficiency, yet an overwhelming part of the money management industry is 
represented by active portfolio managers who deviate from mean-variance optimized 
investing to operationalize their security selection skills. Admittedly, SRI screens might 
preclude the selection of financially attractive stocks for purely non-financial reasons, 
thereby imposing a constraint on active money management. On the other hand, many 
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active SRI portfolio managers proclaim to act on the view that CSR criteria are important 
for obtaining a more complete view of a company’s financial risks and sources of long-
term cash flow, and that the use of these “extra-financial” criteria steers them away from 
the stock market’s future underperformers.  A sound judgment about the validity of either 
of these views requires our understanding of the implications of investors’ social concerns 
for securities’ expected (risk-adjusted) returns, which is the central theme of the next 
section. 
 
SRI, Financial Markets, and Expected Returns  
It is interesting to distinguish different schools of thought that help to relate firms’ social 
responsibility attributes to (risk-adjusted) expected returns. One school offers a somewhat 
behavioral explanation for a relation between a firm’s corporate social responsibility 
characteristics and expected return by suggesting that financial markets have 
discriminatory tastes against (in favor of) socially controversial (responsible) companies 
beyond any risk or profit motive. The idea here is that socially controversial companies are 
more cheaply priced because they are disliked by an important set of norm-constrained 
investors who drive up their expected return. The theory is “behavioral” in the sense that 
the rise in expected return is not necessarily due to greater traditional financial risks 
because investors also discount losses in non-financial utility. However, the effects can be 
rationally priced. 
Whether the effects of norms manifest in market equilibrium is not entirely clear. 
Consistent with norm-constrained investors affecting financial markets, Heinkel, Kraus 
and Zechner (2001) present a calibrated equilibrium model that allows so-called green 
investors to influence the expected return of polluting firms relative to that of non-polluters 
in the form of boycotts to polluters. In their theoretical setup, markets can drive up the cost 
of capital of firms with low environmental standards because the presence of 
environmental norms affects the risk-sharing opportunities of investors holding 
controversial stocks. The model predicts that when shares of environmentally controversial 
firms are held by a small portion of non-SRI investors, their expected returns are higher to 
compensate for investors’ limited risk-sharing potential (i.e., not being able to share risk 
with social investors). This discriminating tastes hypothesis is not confined to 
environmental issues and it can be tested for any other social criterion. Implicit in the 
hypothesis are the assumptions that the number of investors who screen stocks on social or 
environmental criteria is sufficiently large and that social investors are homogenous in the 
choice of SRI criteria. Researchers have yet to reach consensus on the validity of those 
assumptions.  (See, for instance, Malkiel and Quandt (1971), Haigh and Hazelton (2004), 
Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2006).) 
Alternatively, Hong and Kacperczyk (2006) hypothesize that such discriminatory 
tastes against socially controversial companies cause the value of socially controversial 
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stocks to be depressed below the fundamental value due to pure neglect. The taste-based 
stock neglect hypothesis they introduce in an SRI context builds on a setting inspired by 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997), in which there are (norm-constrained) investors causing the 
neglect, and natural arbitrageurs (such as hedge  funds, mutual funds, and independent 
advisors) that fail to eliminate mispricing because of a set of arbitrage risks and 
constraints. Consequently, Hong and Kacperczyk (2006) posit that “sin stocks” (of 
companies earning revenues from tobacco, alcohol and gaming) are underpriced and 
produce anomalously positive returns, controlling for traditional risk factors such as beta, 
firm size and book to market. 
Investments based on corporate social responsibility criteria need not be solely 
driven by non-financial tastes in markets. We can also define a value relevance hypothesis 
that posits that markets are rationally responsive to social responsibility because CSR 
conveys clear financial information about a firm’s risks and cash flows. In that case, 
investors carrying the official SRI label may not be the only ones responsive to certain 
social and environmental issues.  
To begin with, the old-school view embraced by SRI skeptics is that CSR is 
costly to shareholders because it requires the sacrifice of resources that could be dedicated 
to value-maximizing projects (e.g., Henderson (2002)). Barnea and Rubin (2006) go as far 
as claiming that CSR could be a source of agency costs because a firm’s insiders 
(managers, directors, and blockholders) have an incentive to promote CSR investment 
beyond financially optimal levels in order to gain reputational benefits. This interpretation 
ties CSR to corporate governance issues, like agency risks and information asymmetry. 
Alternatively, better CSR has been linked to lower litigation risks, investor trust, and other 
intangible advantages. The implication of this view is that investors have clear financial 
motivations for eschewing socially controversial companies. Recent interesting work by 
Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly (2005) suggests that investors rationally price-protect against 
litigation risks that stem from socially irresponsible activities, as measured by 
environmental violations. They found that the magnitude of share price responses to 
environmental violations fully reflects investors’ anticipation of legal sanctions, consistent 
with CSR being informationally relevant. Kahn, Lekander and Leimkuhler (1997) 
observed that many U.S. states indeed view the threat of negative long-term consequences 
of litigation as a valid financial argument for tobacco stock divestment.  
When CSR is costly to investors in the aforementioned ways, the value relevance 
hypothesis predicts that SRI portfolios earn a higher risk-adjusted return than their non-
responsible counterparts. When CSR is value relevant because controversial firms are 
subjected to greater litigation risk, SRI portfolios should earn a lower risk-adjusted return. 
A competing hypothesis, which we call the cash-flow mispricing hypothesis, is 
that the market underestimates the sources of cash flow created by strong CSR policies. 
For example, it has been suggested that investors misunderstand the long-term financial 
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benefits to CSR, possibly because financial markets and companies fixate on short-term 
performance. Several scholars posit that the majority of money managers undertake short-
term oriented investment decisions that align with their three- to five-year judgment 
periods and tracking-error restrictions (see, e.g., Rappaport (2005)).  Also related to the 
mispricing described above is the argument that many of the suggested benefits to CSR are 
either of intangible nature or the outcome of a complex set of mutually reinforcing 
mechanisms within a firm (e.g., Hillman and Keim (2001)). Complications associated with 
measuring firms’ long-term value creation potential have been articulated by a substantial 
number of researchers, such as Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001), Damodaran 
(2002), and Bassi, Harisson, Ludwig, and McMurrer (2001).  
Finally, we identify an irrelevance hypothesis for socially responsible investing 
criteria, which by definition holds when all other hypotheses are rejected. Specifically, the 
hypothesis says that the expected (risk-adjusted) returns on stocks (or stock portfolios) of 
socially responsive companies are no different from those of non-responsive firms because 
CSR and SRI criteria are irrelevant in financial markets. This is because CSR does not 
convey financially relevant information tied to traditional non-diversifiable investment 
risks, or because norm-constrained agents who shun stocks for their poor CSR attributes do 
not represent a high enough percentage of investors. 
Although each hypothesis carries implications for the expected returns of SRI and 
non-SRI mutual funds, it is difficult to reject one hypothesis in favor of another. First, the 
hypotheses as such are not perfectly mutually exclusive, and several convey similar 
predictions about expected returns. Second, because corporate social responsibility is a 
multidimensional concept that includes a broad range of specific issues, it is questionable 
whether one hypothesis holds for all individual CSR criteria. Some CSR performance 
dimensions are contentious and sensitive to subjective interpretation whereas others are 
more objectively measurable and theoretically strongly linked to financial risk. Third, any 
mispricing test that uses an estimated equilibrium model for expected returns is plagued by 
the well-known joint-hypothesis dilemma.  
Because performance evaluation models common to the literature do not 
incorporate factors associated with corporate social responsibility, socially responsible 
(non-responsible) portfolios are expected to deliver a risk-adjusted return that differs 
significantly from zero under all hypotheses other than the irrelevance hypothesis. 
Consequently, whether an observed abnormal return is attributable to an omitted (risk) 
factor in the expected return model or to mispricing is unavoidably difficult to say. 
Notwithstanding the earlier mentioned methodological difficulties, the 
performance of SRI portfolios is an empirical question because one can argue different 
ways concerning the association between corporate social responsibility and risk-adjusted 
stock returns. 
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1.4. DATA 
 
Mutual Fund Samples 
Using a unique and comprehensive database, we study the performance of SRI equity 
mutual funds vis-à-vis the performance of conventional funds in the United States, Canada, 
The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland, 
respectively. We identified socially responsible mutual funds using various SRI fund 
information services and previous literature. U.S. SRI funds were identified via the U.S. 
Social Investment Forum (SIF) and through Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993), and Statman 
(2000). Canadian SRI funds were identified using the Canadian Social Investment Forum. 
SRI funds in the U.K. were identified based on, respectively, the annual report of the 
Investment Management Association (IMA), the SRI Compass service, TrustNet, Ethical 
Investors Group, and previous empirical research (Gregory, Matatko and Luther (1997), 
Luther and Matatko (1994), and Mallin, Saadouni and Briston (1995)). We focus 
exclusively on domestic funds in these three countries because internationally oriented SRI 
funds are very scarce. In contrast, SRI funds in all other countries are mainly 
internationally oriented, and so we omitted domestic funds from samples specific to those 
countries. The funds were identified using the SRI Compass Guide, ECO-reporter, and 
Schroeder (2003), respectively. Since our focus is on funds that hold diversified equity 
portfolios, our fund samples do not include specialty funds, sector-specific funds, fixed-
income funds, balanced funds, guaranteed funds, and closed-ended funds. 
 We compare the monthly returns of SRI funds with those of a relevant sample of 
conventional funds. Domestic (international) SRI funds in a country are evaluated relative 
to all conventional funds in that country which also invest domestically (internationally). 
We do not match funds on their investment style – e.g. small cap, value, growth, or 
momentum investing – because the performance attribution models we will employ in this 
study control for the influence of style and sector tilts on fund returns. Our samples also 
include ‘dead’ funds - which have disappeared over time, e.g. due to poor performance – in 
order to manage potential survivorship bias. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) 
emphasize that the results of many performance evaluation studies are biased upwards 
because non-survivors are not present in the sample. Our sample of U.S. fund returns are 
from the CRSP U.S. Mutual Fund Database, a database that is survivor-bias free by 
construction. The returns of Canadian mutual funds are from Globefund. For all other 
countries in our study, we collected fund returns from Datastream. Since neither 
Globefund’s nor Datastream’s fund browser services keeps track of names for funds that 
have disappeared over time, our initial sample suffered from mutual fund survivorship 
bias. To tackle survivorship bias in the DataStream user interface, we manually inspected a 
listing of 20,218 dead funds (worldwide), including their Datastream identification codes, 
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which were provided by Thomson Financial.9 After excluding dead funds that are not 
relevant to this study, we recovered monthly returns of dead equity funds from the 
Datastream database. All returns are corrected for distributions and splits and are net of 
expenses. 
One contribution of this chapter is that we disaggregate composite fund return 
series into clusters based on SRI funds’ social screening policies and investment criteria. 
Our U.S. and U.K. samples are sufficiently heterogeneous to study mutual fund returns 
subject to different screening methodologies. For U.S. funds, we draw on a listing of SRI 
funds’ policies maintained by SIF. SIF’s overview allows for a characterization of a 
socially responsible fund’s position towards the following dimensions: alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, weapons and defense, animal testing, products and services, environmental 
performance, human rights issues, labor relations, employment equality, community 
investing, and proxy voting. We cross-checked the accuracy of SIF’s overview by 
manually inspecting each SRI fund’s prospectus and corrected discrepancies when 
necessary. Using SIF’s 12 social criteria, we also examine the social screening policies of 
all domestic SRI trusts in the United Kingdom. In order to describe UK fund screens in a 
manner similar to that for the U.S. sample, we hand-collected social screening information 
through, respectively, the funds’ websites, prospectuses, e-mail communication with the 
fund management companies, and SRI Compass.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the funds. Panel A reports mean 
annualized returns, annualized standard deviations of returns, annualized Sharpe ratios, 
and the number of funds that are included in the samples. In addition, we report the ZJK-
statistic proposed by Jobson and Korkie (1981) for testing the null hypothesis that SRI and 
conventional funds have identical Sharpe ratios. Several observations emerge from these 
descriptive statistics.  
First, there are no obvious consistencies in the average return differences between 
SRI funds and conventional funds across countries. SRI funds earned higher (lower) 
average returns in five (three) out of eight cases. Second, the returns of SRI funds seem 
more volatile than the returns of conventional funds. In six out of eight cases, SRI funds 
have a higher standard deviation than their conventional peers.  The higher dispersion of 
SRI fund returns might be an indication that these funds differ from their conventional 
counterparts in terms of systematic and non-systematic risk. Nevertheless, the Sharpe 
ratios indicate that some SRI funds provided a higher average return adjusted for volatility 
while others seem to have been outclassed by their conventional peers. Most reported ZJK- 
scores do not reach the conventional critical levels, suggesting that the difference in Sharpe 
ratio is marginal. 
                                                          
9 Recently, after we completed of this study, Thomson Financial improved its dead-fund interface. 
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As panel B points out, the fund samples differ in investment scope and evaluation period. 
The statistics presented thus far intend to provide a basic feeling of SRI, and we proceed 
with evaluating SRI funds more comprehensively throughout the remainder of this study, 
using performance attribution models that take into account fund market risk exposure, 
investment style tilts, and country biases.  
 
Benchmark Data 
Measuring fund returns against one or several passive benchmark asset returns has become 
the conventional performance evaluation approach in the empirical literature. Our study 
focuses on explaining SRI and conventional mutual fund performance by multiple 
benchmark returns, which are well capable of explaining the cross-sectional and time-
series variation in mutual fund returns; see, for example, Jensen (1968), Fama and French 
(1993), and Carhart (1997). 
Our primary multifactor model includes the returns on four benchmark portfolios 
to explain mutual fund performance. As in the single-index CAPM, the first variable is the 
return on a broad market portfolio over a risk-free Treasury bond rate. In line with Fama 
and French (1993), the second and third benchmark factors are two zero-investment 
portfolios: SMB is the return difference between a small cap portfolio and a large cap 
portfolio, and HML is the return difference between high a book-to-market portfolio and a 
low book-to-market portfolio. The portfolios are constructed after a two-dimensional sort 
of all stocks on, respectively, market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio. For 
further details on the construction of SMB and HML, see Fama and French (1993). 
Following Carhart (1997), we augment the three-factor model by a variable that describes 
the returns on a momentum portfolio. The returns on the momentum factor are obtained by 
ranking all stocks in the investment universe annually on their past 12-month return. The 
momentum factor (MOM) is the return difference between the portfolio of past 12-month 
winners and the portfolio of past 12-month losers.  
 Our benchmark portfolios are explicitly designed to avoid a mismatch between 
the funds’ official investment scope and the market coverage of the benchmark portfolios, 
i.e., we evaluate mutual funds with a domestic (international) investment scope relative to 
domestic (international) benchmark models. For evaluating U.S. funds, the three factor-
mimicking portfolio returns developed by Fama and French (1993) are available from the 
Kenneth French Data Library.10 The U.S. momentum factor we use is from Mark Carhart 
(1997).11 For non-U.S. funds, we composed benchmark portfolios using an international 
stock database provided by Style Research. Style Research builds benchmark portfolios 
based on all stocks in the Worldscope universe.12 The Worldscope database is 
                                                          
10 See Ken French’s website: mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
11 We thank Mark Carhart for kindly providing the momentum factor returns. 
12 Http://www.styleresearch.co.uk 
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comprehensive, covering 98% of total market capitalization, and allows for developing 
benchmark portfolios with sizeable market coverage. We constructed factor-sorted 
benchmark portfolios based on the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
methodologies by ranking all stocks in the Worldscope universe on the abovementioned 
fundamental characteristics (size, book-to-market and past annual return) and on 
geographical scope.13 
 As a robustness check, we estimate two additional multifactor models. One 
specification is a conditional model, similar to Ferson and Schadt (1996), that allows for 
time variation in mutual fund performance and in factor sensitivities due to changes in 
fundamental economic variables. The lagged economic instruments we use as conditioning 
instruments are the (a) dividend yield of a representative market index, (b) the 12-month 
inflation rate, (c) and the term spread measured by a long government bond yield in excess 
of a Treasury bill rate. The last multifactor model we employ contains country factors 
orthogonal to variables in the four-factor model. The country factors are obtained from 
principal components analysis (PCA) applied on the returns of MSCI country indexes, 
which are available from Datastream. 
 
 
1.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Aggregate SRI Fund Performance around the World 
We use an array of multifactor models to assess SRI and conventional mutual fund 
performance in response to mounting evidence that these models are most efficient in 
explaining equity returns.14 Multifactor models can be characterized by the following 
equation: 
 
it
J
j
jtijiftit FRR εβα ++=− ∑
=1
                         (1) 
where Rit is the return on mutual fund i in month t, Rft denotes the one-month T-Bill rate, 
Fjt is the (excess) return on determinant j at t, and J denotes the number of determinants. If 
                                                          
13 Our approach differs only in one respect. After composing 6 value-weighted portfolios of stocks 
ranked on size and book-to-market, we use the 20th percentile of market capitalization as the 
discriminating factor between ‘small’ caps and ‘large’ caps. Fama and French (1993) use the median 
market value. Consistent with Fama and French (1993), the book-to-market breakpoints that we use 
to identify ‘value’, ‘neutral’ and ‘growth’ stocks are the 30th and 70th percentiles. The sorting 
procedure is performed independently for all countries or regions.  We rebalance all portfolios 
annually at the end of June, ignoring transaction costs. 
14 Fama and French (1993, 1998), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and others provide evidence 
suggesting that passive investment styles produce alphas that differ significantly from zero in the 
single-index framework. 
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the factors F are solely excess returns on passive investments, the βij’s can be thought of as 
the weights assigned to a set of passive portfolios that most closely explain the time-
variation in the fund’s return. Generally, Jensen’s alpha can be interpreted as the 
contribution of active money management to investment return. However, since our 
research involves a comparison between SRI mutual funds and conventional funds, the 
interpretation of Jensen’s alpha can be different. While conventional fund alpha measures 
the incremental value of active management after subtraction of expenses and after 
correction for factor-sensitivities, the SRI mutual fund alpha also captures the influence of 
social screens on average portfolio return. Thus, by comparing alphas we formally test a 
joint hypothesis that the average abnormal return on conventional funds resulting from 
active management and expenses is equal to the abnormal returns of SRI funds resulting 
from active portfolio management, expenses, and from social screens. If we assume that 
fund expenses associated with SRI funds are no different from those of their conventional 
peers then our empirical tests more explicitly measure the return consequences of SRI 
screens (in the form of the earlier mentioned diversification effects and/or selection 
effects). This assumption is sensible, as suggested by SIF (2003). 
We consider various multifactor models. Our main multi-index model 
incorporates the widely known factor-mimicking returns put forward by Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997). This four-factor specification is equivalent to the single-index 
CAPM model augmented by three passive zero-investment portfolios.15 The second 
variable in the model, SMB, is calculated as the return difference between a small cap and 
a large cap portfolio. The third variable in the model, HML, is computed as the return 
differential between a value stock portfolio with a book-to-market ratio and a “growth” 
portfolio with a low book-to-market ratio. The fourth passive zero-investment strategy, 
MOM, buys a portfolio consisting of prior 12-month “winner” stocks and sells short prior 
12-month “losers”. Empirical evidence points out that expanding the single-factor 
framework by these three variables is particularly important when performance assessment 
involves SRI mutual funds; see for example Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005), who suggest 
that SRI funds are tilted towards stocks with high market-to-book ratios. 
The resulting model is written as follows: 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + β0i(Rmt – Rft) + β1i SMBt + β2i HMLt + β3i MOMt + εit               (2) 
 
where Rit is monthly return on fund portfolio i in month t in excess of the risk-free rate 
proxy (Rft), and where the four common factor-mimicking returns are designed to match 
the geographical investment scope of the funds that generate Rit. 
                                                          
15 Although there is an ongoing discussion about whether these additional factors proxy for risk, we 
have no opinion in this debate but merely use the factor mimicking portfolio returns as control 
variables in the fund performance evaluation methodology. 
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As a robustness check, we estimate several alternative specifications, starting with 
the widely documented CAPM. Even though empirical evidence points out that the CAPM 
framework is unable to explain a recent chain of security return regularities, the single-
index model has strong theoretical roots.16   
Our second alternative model incorporates eight-factors. Although the four-factor 
model has been popularized in recent empirical finance literature, the international version 
of the model is not suitable to account for risks and returns associated with strong country 
tilts in internationally-oriented mutual funds. For this reason, the eight-factor specification 
includes statistical factors designed to mitigate this problem. The underlying rationale is 
that passive country indexes can display abnormal performance in the absence of a robust 
performance evaluation model, but that the unexplained returns are accounted for by just a 
few common factors. To identify the country indexes, we use a principal components 
analysis (PCA) similar to Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003). We derive a multifactor 
model that explains country return variation that is left unexplained by the four-factor 
model by collecting a large set of MSCI country-based equity indexes and running 
individual regressions of the country index returns on the four factor-mimicking returns. 
We extracted factors from unexplained series, defined as the residuals plus the intercept 
from each regression, by means of a principal components analysis of the covariance 
matrix based on uncentered variables.17 From the PCA, the first four computed scores were 
added to the four-factor model.18 The resultant eight-factor model was used to estimate 
fund alphas.19 
The last alternative model we explore is the conditional multifactor model that 
allows for time-varying factor sensitivities in response to (macro)economic development. 
In line with Ferson and Schadt (1996), we condition a fund’s factor loadings on a set of 
economic instruments. However, whereas Ferson and Schadt (1996) introduced a model of 
the form 
 
Rit – Rft = αi  + βi0(Rmt – Rft) + B’i Yt-1(Rmt – Rft)  + εit,               (3) 
 
where Yt-1 is a vector of fundamental economic variables, we extend their approach in 
order to arrive at a four-factor model with four factor loadings that vary over time in 
response to variation in economic variables. The vector of economic variables we use is 
                                                          
16 See Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). 
17 Examples of non-SRI studies that derive statistical factors from residuals are Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (1999), Jones and Shanken (2004) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002). 
18 There are no strict rules of thumb for choosing the number of components. We used two common 
approaches: an eigenvalue scree plot suggested by Catell (1966), and an inspection of total variance 
explained by the four components. 
19 We also developed models with global industry variables instead of the country variables. 
However, inclusion of the industry factors, which were derived from a PCA on global industry 
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based on the funds’ geographic scope and includes the (a) dividend yield of a relevant 
market index, (b) the 12-month percentage change in the consumer price index observed 
monthly in a rolling window, and (c) the term spread as measured by the yield difference 
between a long-term government bond and a short rate.  
Table 3 presents the results of estimating the four-factor models using, 
respectively, excess SRI fund returns and excess conventional fund returns as the 
dependent variable. In addition, we formally compare SRI mutual funds with their 
respective conventional counterparts using the returns on a “difference” portfolio as the 
dependent variable, which are obtained by subtracting conventional fund returns from the 
returns of SRI funds. Generally the loadings on the broad market portfolio, SMB, HML 
and MOM point out that mutual funds not only have significant aggregate market 
sensitivity but also experience significant style tilts. For example, SRI and conventional 
mutual funds in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France and Germany tend to have positive and 
significant loadings on SMB, suggesting that these funds are exposed to small caps. 
Loadings on HML (i.e. the value-versus-growth factor) and those on MOM (the 
momentum factor) are less pronounced, as we observe significant coefficients on these 
regressors occasionally. As for the alpha estimates, the regression results largely tell a 
consistent story. Neither SRI mutual funds nor conventional funds outperform the set of 
passive indexes: the average abnormal returns mostly do not differ significantly from zero. 
Finding no anomalously positive mutual fund returns at the aggregate level is consistent 
with a large literature on mutual funds; see, for example, Jensen (1969) and Elton, Gruber, 
Das and Hlavka (1992), and Carhart (1997).  
Central to our study are statistical tests involving the “difference portfolios”, 
which explicitly highlight how well SRI funds fare against their conventional peers and 
how they differ in risk. Table 3 presents two important observations. First, contrary to 
previous studies, we do not find uniform evidence that SRI funds and conventional funds 
are differentially sensitive to the risk and style factors at the aggregate level. While Bauer, 
Koedijk and Otten (2005) observed that SRI funds tend to be less market sensitive, our 
global results contradict their findings. In five countries, the difference in market exposure 
between SRI and conventional funds is not significant at the usual cut-off levels. In the 
U.S., the Netherlands, and Switzerland, our “difference” portfolios show a significantly 
positive loading on the broad market portfolio, thus pointing out that SRI funds in these 
markets are more market-sensitive than their conventional peers. Similarly, HML 
exposures portfolios with respect to the “difference” portfolios do not support the 
conjecture made by previous work of a relative bias toward growth-stocks. In the Canadian 
and French retail markets, we observe that SRI funds have been more (less) exposed to
                                                                                                                                                  
indexes based on FTSE industry classification, yielded similar results. 
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value (growth) stocks compared to conventional funds. In all other countries, however, 
differential loadings on HML are not statistically significant. The fact that our more 
globally oriented research does not fully align with previous work hints that prior evidence 
is country-specific.  
Second, the reported differences in alpha strongly suggest that the risk-adjusted 
return delivered by SRI funds matches the return of conventional funds. We find that 
German SRI mutual funds have underperformed their conventional peers significantly, by 
approximately 4.7 percent per annum. In all other cases, the performance difference 
between SRI funds and conventional funds is not significant at the usual cut-off levels. 
In Table 4, we report results for the alternative multifactor model specifications.20 
Since most alternative regressions produce loadings which are more difficult to interpret 
than those from unconditional four-factor regressions, we focus only on their alphas. We 
imported the four-factor alpha estimates from the previous table and additionally report 
alphas and differential alphas estimated for the single-factor CAPM, eight-factor model 
and the conditional four-factor model, respectively. Differences between the four-factor 
alphas and CAPM alphas are marginal. Compared to the four-factor models, the eight-
factor models (8F) more frequently point to significantly negative fund alphas for 
international funds. In contrast, the conditional four-factor model (C4F) delivers mutual 
fund alpha estimates which exceed the alphas obtained from the unconditional regressions 
(4F). This observation is consistent with past research on conditional mutual fund 
performance, e.g., Ferson and Schadt (1996). The differential alphas, however, are robust 
to the choice of performance attribution model and confirm our previous conjecture that 
SRI funds and conventional funds earn comparable risk-adjusted returns. Thus, also after 
controlling for country risk, and time variation in funds’ risk factor loadings, the results 
suggest that the aggregate performance of SRI funds is robust across countries. 
In one of the most critical articles ever written on the topic of socially responsible 
investing, Entine (2003) suggests that current views on SRI performance are exaggerated 
because most empirical evidence comes from the long bull-market state of the nineties. 
Entine (2003) argues that SRI funds are more likely to outperform unscreened portfolios in 
certain market states because screened funds typically hold “growth” stocks. Although the 
four factors in the Carhart model should be able to control for such style tilts in fund 
holdings, one may still be interested in risk- and style-adjusted performance over different 
markets conditions. We can slightly modify the conditional performance evaluation 
framework to allow SRI and conventional fund alphas and betas to vary across discrete 
“bull” and “bear” regimes, using the following model:21 
                                                          
20 Statistical model selection criteria (the adjusted R2, the Log likelihood, the Akaike information 
criterion, and the Schwarz criterion) suggest that models with four country factors perform better 
than does the four-factor model. The criteria regarding the conditional models suggest these models 
only occasionally have more explanatory power compared to the four-factor model.  
21 Theoretically, the view that SRI mutual fund performance varies across stock market regimes can 
be justified by the stylized fact that stock returns exhibit different correlations during “down” 
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Rit – Rft = αi + A’ Zt-1 + βi0(Rmt – Rft) + B’i Zt-1(Rmt – Rft)  + εit,               (4) 
 
This model is similar to the conditional model of Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman 
(1998) with the exception that we use one dummy as instrumental variable. Zt-1 is a 
variable indicating bear market states. Estimating (4) is equivalent to estimating a model 
with time-varying betas and two dummies – one indicating bear markets and one denoting 
bull markets - and without a regular constant. We define a bull (bear) market phase as the 
period in which the 6-month moving average return on the value-weighted market 
portfolio is higher than (less than) zero percent. We generalize model (4) to a multivariate 
framework, allowing loadings on Carhart’s (1997) fund alpha and factors loadings to vary 
over time. 
In Table 5, we present differential alphas between socially responsible and 
conventional mutual funds. Interestingly, SRI funds in North-America and the United 
Kingdom outperformed their conventional peers more strongly in bear markets than in bull 
markets. In contrast, the performance difference between SRI funds and conventional 
funds in continental Europe is mostly positive during bull markets and negative during 
bear markets. While there is an economically large variation in differential alpha across the 
different regimes, these differences are mostly not statistically significant. In most cases, a 
simple Wald test shows that the hypothesis that bear-market alpha equals bull-market 
alpha cannot be rejected at the standard significance levels. In only two cases, the results 
are significant.  Canadian socially responsible funds underperformed conventional funds 
significantly in bull markets, by 2.40 percent annually, but outperformed their 
conventional peers significantly in bear markets, by 2.58 percent. In Belgium, SRI funds 
outperformed conventional funds by an amazing 5.4 percent during bull markets but 
underperformed their conventional counterparts by an equally large percentage during bear 
markets. Given the lack of statistically significant excess returns across different states, we 
conclude that the returns of socially responsible funds relative to conventional mutual are 
reasonably robust to changes in stock market conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                  
markets, as evidenced by Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1994) and Campbell, Koedijk and Kofman 
(2002). Given that security return covariation appears to be stronger during bear markets, we could 
argue the impact of SRI screens on the management of (idiosyncratic) risk via diversification or 
selectivity skills depends on the state of the market. 
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TABLE 4. Robustness Tests: Alpha under Alternative Models 
Reported are alphas obtained under the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (4F), 1-factor 
CAPM, (1F),  the 4-factor model with four extra country factors derived from PCA (8F), 
and the conditional four-factor model (C4F). Alphas are annualized. T-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
 
   4F 1F 8F C4F 
United States      
SRI Funds    -0.24%   0.37%   0.01%   0.11% 
  (-0.23) (0.30) (0.01) (0.11) 
Conventional Funds    -1.31%   -0.82%   -1.33%   -0.33% 
  (-1.17) (-0.75) (-1.21) (-0.53) 
Difference  1.24%  1.16% 1.49%   0.44% 
  (0.79) (0.81) (0.95) (0.44) 
Canada      
SRI Funds       -3.80%**   -1.92%       -4.72%***   -1.77% 
  (-2.27) (-0.90) (-2.68) (-0.91) 
Conventional Funds      -2.50%*   -1.15%      -2.91%**   -1.15% 
  (-1.92) (-0.53) (-2.18) (-1.00) 
Difference  -1.30%   -0.77%   -1.81%   -0.62% 
  (-1.12) (-0.63) (-1.51) (-0.49) 
United Kingdom      
SRI Funds    -0.97%   -1.45%   -1.10%   -0.11% 
  (-0.75) (-0.94) (-0.87) (-0.10) 
Conventional funds    -1.18%   -1.37%   -1.05%   0.25% 
  (-1.29) (-1.20) (-1.25) (0.31) 
Difference    0.21%   -0.08%   -0.06%   -0.36% 
  (0.22) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.42) 
* Significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. 
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TABLE 4 Continued. Robustness Tests: Alpha under Alternative Models 
 
   4F 1F 8F C4F 
France      
SRI Funds   -2.39%    -2.76%     -3.27%**  -0.79% 
  (-1.34) (-1.51) (-1.99) (-0.38) 
Conventional funds   -2.56%      -3.64%**     -3.49%**  -0.63% 
  (-1.49) (-2.20) (-2.52) (-0.39) 
Difference   0.17% 0.88 0.22%  -0.16% 
  (0.14) (0.71) (0.19) (-0.11) 
Germany      
SRI Funds       -6.41%**       -7.09%**     -6.46%**  -3.69% 
  (-2.21) (-2.43) (-2.42) (-1.37) 
Conventional funds   -1.68%    -2.44 %   -1.89%  0.79% 
  (-0.81) (-1.15) (-1.40) (0.46) 
Difference       -4.78%**    -4.68%*    -4.59%*    -4.62%** 
  (-2.00) (-1.75) (-1.94) (-2.01) 
Netherlands      
SRI Funds    1.94%  1.92%   1.34% 5.23% 
  (0.64) (0.64) (0.56) (1.66) 
Conventional funds    0.28%  0.29%   -0.19% 1.90% 
  (0.11) (0.12) (-0.14) (0.83) 
Difference    1.66%  1.63%    1.53% 3.33 % 
  (0.82) (0.81) (0.76) (1.44) 
Belgium      
SRI Funds    -1.19%   -1.44%   -1.61%  -1.06% 
  (-0.43) (-0.56) (-0.87) (-0.46) 
Conventional funds    -2.37%   -2.39%     -2.54%**  -1.60% 
  (-1.37) (-1.33) (-2.42) (-1.22) 
Difference    1.18%   0.93%   0.94%  0.54% 
  (0.59) (0.49) (0.54) (0.28) 
Switzerland      
SRI Funds   -0.80%  -0.43% -1.09% 1.36% 
  (-0.33) (-0.18) (-0.61) (0.54) 
Conventional funds   -1.10%  -0.96% -1.42% -1.05% 
  (-0.48) (-0.43) (-1.38) (-0.49) 
Difference    0.45%  0.53% 0.33% 2.41% 
    (0.20) (0.27) (0.17) (1.07) 
* Significant at 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level. 
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TABLE 5. Differential Alphas under Bull and Bear Markets 
Performance evaluation results are based on equation (4). The conditioning variable is a 
bear-market identifier, which is equal to unity if the 6-month moving average return on the 
market portfolio (Rm) is below zero percent. The differential alphas are annualized. Each 
F-statistic (and respective p-value) tests the whether the differential risk-adjusted return 
between SRI and conventional funds is equal across bull and bear market states.  
              
  Differential Fund Alpha:  Wald Test: 
  SRI-Conventional Funds  Bull Alpha = Bear Alpha 
    Bull Market Bear Market  F Probability 
United States   1.10%      5.55%**  1.07 0.3 
  (0.88) (2.08)    
       
Canada     -2.40%*    2.58%*    5.45** 0.02 
  (-1.72) (1.67)    
       
United Kingdom   0.01% 0.50%  0.03 0.87 
  (0.01) (0.86)    
       
France    1.17%  -1.22%  1.07 0.3 
  (0.55) (-1.23)    
       
Germany    -3.97%      -6.50%**  0.29 0.59 
  (-1.10) (-2.09)    
       
Netherlands  2.16% 0.34%  0.19 0.66 
  (0.64) (0.13)    
       
Belgium       5.36%**       -5.36%**       10.07*** 0.00 
  (1.99) (-2.44)    
       
Switzerland 1.14% -0.08  0.15 0.70 
    (0.40) (-0.03)       
* Significant at 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1 % level.
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Sorts on Social Screening Policy 
The foregoing sections studied SRI mutual fund performance at the aggregate level. 
However, aggregation may introduce a loss of information on the effects of social screens 
on investment performance if SRI funds differ in social screening methodology. Research 
up to this point has paid little attention to how a fund’s SRI screening methodology can be 
consequential to SRI fund investors. Here, we focus on SRI fund performance from the 
perspective of an investor who prefers funds that return a certain level of non-financial 
performance from the social, ethical, and environmental attributes inherent in these 
investment vehicles. Therefore, we explore whether an investor’s choice for funds with a 
specific social screening methodology or a certain level of screening intensity will affect 
the risk-adjusted return of the resulting SRI fund portfolio. 
To our knowledge, only one earlier study relates to ours. Using panel data, 
Barnett and Salomon (2002) investigated the sensitivity of fund returns to the adoption of 
specific social investment criteria. They observe a curvilinear relationship between the 
performance of a SRI fund and the number of social criteria the fund adopts. As the 
number of screens adopted by an SRI fund increases, risk-adjusted returns decline at first, 
but rebound as the number of screens reaches a maximum. Their results suggest that the 
constrained diversification and mispricing hypotheses coexist: those funds that adopt an 
average number of SRI screens materially suffer from constraints on the investable 
universe whereas those with a large number of SRI filters enjoy better stock picking.  
Barnett and Salomon use panel data regressions of SRI fund returns on dummy 
variables indicating a fund’ s specific social investment criteria (as reported by the U.S. 
social investment forum for each fund), but we adopt a clustering approach.22 Our method 
differs from that of Barnett and Salomon (2002) because we adopt the perspective of an 
investor forming a portfolio of SRI funds given his taste for a certain level of social 
responsibility.  Another motivation for doing so is the fact that neither the stringency of 
social screens nor the screening methodology can be determined with absolute certainty 
based on publicly available information. The interpretation of what is a negative screen or 
a positive screen varies across mutual funds management companies. For example, 
although many fund prospectuses proclaim to pursue exclusionary screens on certain 
ethical criteria, these funds sometimes weigh a firm’s negative attributes against its 
positive features. Consequently, if a firm has sufficiently positive attributes, some SRI 
mutual funds may acquire shares in that company notwithstanding the presence of negative 
attributes. Our intention is to look more broadly at differences between funds rather than 
exploring fund return sensitivities to specific criteria that are not well-defined. 
Since only the U.S. and U.K. samples are sufficiently heterogeneous, our 
comparison of socially responsible funds that differ in social screening methodology is 
                                                          
22 In addition, Barnett and Salomon (2002) largely include fund specific characteristics as controls 
but do not adjust fund returns for risk and style exposures by means of multi-index returns. 
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limited to these two markets. The U.S. social investment forum (SIF 2003) provides an 
outline of screening criteria that are used for every SRI fund in the United States and 
demonstrates that SRI funds display variation in their choice of screens.  
The criteria we use for clustering were originally identified by SIF for the U.S. 
market and portray a fund’s position towards several broad categories: 23  
 
• Alcohol: this criterion typically involves screening out companies with significant 
revenues from the sales of alcoholic beverages. 
• Tobacco: this criterion involves not investing in companies that report significant 
revenues from the sales of tobacco and tobacco-related products. 
• Gambling: this criterion excludes companies that have a significant association 
with gambling. 
• Weapons and defense: this screen excludes companies operating in the weapons 
and defense industry. 
• Animal testing: this criterion screens whether firms engage in the abuse of 
animals for testing their products. 
• Products and services: this criterion encourages investment in companies 
developing products and services that are of high quality, safe, and contribute to a 
sustainable development. 
• Environmental performance: with this screen funds typically seek to invest in 
companies that have strong environmental policies. 
• Human rights issues: this screen involves investment in companies that support 
human rights, pay fair wages, and implement a code of conduct. 
• Labor relations: investment in companies that have strong employee relations, fair 
benefits, and safe working conditions. 
• Employment equality/diversity: when applying this criterion, funds include (or 
exclude) companies based on equality and diversity issues, for example, women 
and minority contracting, or specific gay/lesbian employment policies. 
• Community impact and involvement: SRI funds may decide to base stock 
inclusion on a company’s involvement on the community, for example, charitable 
giving, volunteer programmers, support for education, and involvement in non-
U.S. communities.  
 
                                                          
23 Our approach implicitly assumes a time invariant screening policy. Since we could not obtain 
screening policies over time for all the funds in our study, this assumption is necessary. Geczy, 
Stambaugh and Levin (2003), report that the vast majority of U.S. SRI funds in their sample did not 
change their SRI criteria over time.  
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For more detailed information on the areas covered by each social investment criterion, we 
refer to SIF (2003, pp. 42). For each SRI fund in our U.S. and U.K. samples, we manually 
collected the fund’s stance towards the abovementioned criteria.  
Table 6 presents an overview of the screens employed by the funds in the sample. 
Reported is the frequency by which the funds in these two retail markets adopt each 
criterion via either a negative/restricted screening approach or a positive approach. A brief 
inspection of the table indicates that all U.S. funds in the sample factor the criteria 
“tobacco”, “gambling” and “weapons/defense” into their investment policies, primarily as 
a negative screen.  The criterion “animal testing” is clearly underrepresented. U.K. funds 
seem to put most emphasis on “tobacco”, “weapons/defense” and on environmental issues. 
Least reported by U.K. funds are the criteria “labor relations”, “employment equality”, and 
“community involvement”. 
We first use the U.S. and U.K. samples to investigate the performance of SRI 
funds clustered by social stringency, which we define as the number of SRI criteria a fund 
employs to establish a socially responsible investment opportunity set. The procedure we 
adopt to disaggregate our samples into mutually exclusive subsets is somewhat sample-
dependent. Specifically, we label U.S. SRI funds as having either “high stringency” 
(employing more than 8 criteria) or “medium stringency” (applying 5 to 8 criteria) or “low 
stringency” (applying 4 criteria or less). For U.K. funds, however, we are restricted in 
allowing for such discrepancies because a limited number of funds employ few criteria. 
We allocate UK funds to either a group with high stringency (applying more than 6 
criteria) or a group with low stringency (using a maximum of 6 criteria). Alternative 
breakpoints are not feasible. 
Secondly, we study SRI fund samples broken up into subsets based on screening 
methodology. One sample subset includes funds that limit their social investment policies 
solely to restrictive or negative screens.  A second sample, which can only be identified in 
the U.S. case, includes funds that merely employ positive criteria. A third sample 
comprises funds that adopt a combination of negative (or restrictive) and positive criteria. 
Table 7 gives the results of estimating the four-factor model for funds sorted on 
screening stringency. Several interesting observations emerge. Looking at the U.S. SRI 
funds, we observe that highly stringent social screeners have underperformed their least 
stringent counterparts by approximately 5 percent annually. This performance gap is 
significant at the 1% cut-off level. At first glance, this result seems to support the 
conjecture that stringent social screens lead to portfolios with risk-adjusted returns below 
the returns of conventional funds. However, the observed differential is mostly attributable 
to the counterintuitively large and significant positive abnormal return on SRI funds with 
low stringency. Because least restrictive screeners are less likely to differ much from 
conventional funds in terms of security holdings, we would a priori expect that the returns 
of the least stringent SRI funds most closely match those of conventional funds. 
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The results in Table 7 indicate the contrary, showing that highly stringent SRI funds 
weakly outperformed their conventional peers, by 1.02 percent.  
The results for the U.K. retail market reinforce the hypothesis that SRI funds earn 
risk-adjusted returns similar to those earned by their conventional peers. We find that 
highly stringent SRI funds in the United Kingdom perform neither better nor worse 
relative to least stringent social screeners, and relative to conventional funds. For example, 
the performance difference between SRI funds with high stringency and those with low 
stringency is small (-0.27 percent per annum) and statistically insignificant.  
  Table 8 reports the outcomes of estimating four-factor specifications for SRI 
funds after sorts on screening methodology. Empirical results for the U.S. and U.K. 
samples suggest that neither negative/restricted screeners, nor positive screeners, nor funds 
that employ both negative and positive criteria produce abnormal returns. In all cases, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero alpha.  
Even though neither most restrictive nor least restrictive SRI funds underperform 
conventional funds, Tables 7 and 8 do highlight differences in investment risk and style 
across the sub-aggregate fund groups we investigate.  According to Table 7, exposure to 
SMB tends to increase as the number social investment criteria adopted by a fund 
decreases. Furthermore, sensitivities to HML indicate that U.S. social funds which adopt 
few criteria are more tilted to low book-to-market stocks than their most restrictive 
counterparts. Similarly, several fund categories load differently on the momentum factor. 
The patterns with respect to HML are consistent with a widely held view about first-
generation SRI funds, i.e., that these funds screen out high book-to-market sectors. This 
interpretation of the results, however, suggests that screening stringency interacts with the 
decision to pursue either negative or positive screens. Table 8 partially supports that idea, 
showing that negative screeners in the U.S. load negatively on the HML factor. U.K. SRI 
funds, however, are generally growth-stock oriented, independent of the screening policy. 
An interesting message emerges from the results of this section. Our evidence 
suggests that an association between the returns of SRI mutual funds, on risk- and style-
corrected basis, and the choice of social screening policy is not very evident. It seems that, 
provided style tilts are managed carefully, investors can allocate their money to almost any 
set of SRI funds that meet their social, moral and environmental preferences without being 
subjected to a significant financial sacrifice. 
 
 
Sorts on Past Performance 
We now explore the potential return earned by a socially responsible investor who chooses 
to pursue the joint goals of social responsibility and optimal financial return. This investor 
accepts a minimum level of social responsibility by only choosing funds that carry the SRI 
label, but wishes to ex ante maximize the performance of his fund portfolio. Prior sections 
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evaluated fund performance ex post, but did not tell whether the alpha estimates convey ex 
ante information about performance, which is what matters to this type of investor. 
In essence, the approach central to this section of the study involves tests for 
persistence in the performance of SRI funds relative to that of conventional funds. Even 
though the vast majority of mainstream mutual fund studies documents that most active 
managers are not able to produce anomalously positive returns over the long term, recent 
work provides strong evidence that mutual fund managers have “hot hands”.  Hendricks, 
Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Bollen and Busse (2005) and 
others document persistence in the performance of actively managed funds over various 
short-term investment horizons. The rationale of studies on short-term performance 
persistence is that, provided managerial skill truly exists, the superior investment 
performance of a skilled manager realized over a certain period should also manifest itself 
in at least one subsequent period. Further, poorly performing funds might continue to earn 
lagging returns when the market does not discipline these funds. Evidence on cash flows 
into SRI funds by Bollen (2006) hints that SRI clientele are less likely to discipline their 
fund for poor returns because they invest in part to obtain non-financial utility from the 
SRI attribute. Alternatively, the investment return implications of social screening might 
be short-lived because of a learning phase that young SRI fund undergo before optimally 
incorporating SRI screens. Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005), for instance, suggest that SRI 
funds initially witness a period of underperformance before delivering returns that match 
those of conventional funds. 
To maintain the perspective of a fund investor, our main test deals with a fund 
selection strategy in the spirit of Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993). Our strategy 
involves out-of-sample evaluation of SRI funds ranked on their historical financial track 
record. In case of persistence, funds that did well in the past continue to do so. At the start 
of every calendar year, we sort all SRI funds on their past four-factor alpha relative to the 
average conventional fund alpha. We allocate all SRI funds that outperformed their 
conventional peers to a “winner” portfolio and those which underperformed to a ”loser“ 
fund portfolio, and collect the portfolios’ monthly returns over the subsequent 12-month 
period. After having repeated this procedure up to the end of the evaluation period, we 
evaluate the post-rank returns of the portfolios using the four-factor model. Obviously, a 
rank portfolio strategy requires a minimum number of funds to be present in the sample 
every calendar year in order to obtain reasonably diversified portfolios. For this reason, we 
can only report performance evaluation results involving equally weighted portfolios of 
SRI funds in the U.S., U.K., and French market. We note that the appendix to this chapter 
reports on alternative performance persistence tests that do not require portfolio 
construction. 
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The post-rank alphas in Table 9 suggest that past performance can be used to discriminate 
between repeat winner and loser SRI funds. Whatever the sample, the return difference 
between the winner portfolio and the loser portfolio is economically large and statistically 
significant. The winner SRI portfolio in the U.S. outperforms the loser portfolio by almost 
3 percent per year after risk- and style adjustment. In the U.K. and France, the out-of-
sample performance difference amounts to more than 5 percent. However, consistent with 
most non-SRI studies in this area, Table 9 also shows that persistence largely traces to 
repeat loser funds, which tend to undergo consistent underperformance vis-à-vis the 
benchmark model. The winner portfolios outperform the both the benchmark model and 
the average conventional fund, but not significantly so.  
The rank portfolio results support the idea that a strategy of avoiding past losers 
optimizes the performance of an SRI fund portfolio.24 We note that the appendix to this 
chapter offers alternative persistence tests, which confirm persistence in relative 
underperformance. There are several possible causes of performance persistence. A large 
body of evidence attributes persistence to improper risk-adjustment of returns, and 
persistent differences in funds’ expense ratios, fund characteristics, and managerial skill. In 
the context of SRI funds, the influence of social screens might additionally factor into 
persistence patterns. This study has mitigated (if not eliminated) risk- and style bias using 
the four-factor benchmark model, leaving several sources a candidate explanation for the 
strong differential returns.  
The causes of persistence as well as the question whether investors in SRI funds 
can benefit from fund return predictability after sales loads are interesting topics for further 
research, which should be addressed in greater length as soon as the SRI fund universe 
expands substantially. 
 
 
1.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has offered new evidence on the performance of socially responsible mutual 
funds by studying the robustness of SRI fund performance in several ways. First, this study 
compiled a global sample, covering fund markets from eight developed countries, to 
determine whether the return and risk characteristics of SRI funds relative to conventional 
                                                          
24 While we focus on optimization within a SRI universe, the optimization impact of SRI can be 
evaluated accross SRI and non-SRI universes. Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) investigate the 
SRI constraint to an investor who develops a fund portfolio with the maximum ex ante Sharpe ratio 
given a prespecified fund universe, and given his prior beliefs about mutual fund management skill 
and asset pricing models. Their Bayesian setup suggests that the difference between the certainty-
equivalent returns of a portfolio optimized based on a SRI-constrained fund universe and those of an 
optimized portfolio derived from the unconstrained universe can be significant to an investor who 
refutes skill but believes in multifactor asset pricing models. Also, diversification restrictions 
imposed by SRI do not seem as costly as the limits to selection of skilled fund managers.  
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funds differ across countries. Our evidence strongly suggests that the average SRI fund has 
earned returns similar to those of mainstream mutual funds in many countries around the 
world. Using a battery of multifactor performance evaluation models and SRI samples 
from eight retail equity markets, we found that the risk-adjusted returns of aggregated SRI 
fund samples are not statistically different from those of their conventional peers.  
We also explored performance from the perspectives of two different types of SRI 
mutual fund investors. First, we examined the influence of screening methodology on SRI 
fund performance. This exploration is relevant from the perspective of an investor who 
wishes to achieve a certain level of non-financial utility by investing in a set of funds that 
deliver a desired level of “social responsibility”. We did so by sorting funds based on 
screening intensity, and we largely observed that neither stringent social screeners nor their 
least stringent counterparts underperform conventional funds. Equivalently, we found no 
strong evidence that a fund’s decision to adopt either an exclusionary or a positive 
approach to socially responsible investing has significant financial consequences. 
Although these results lend support to the belief that investors are free to choose a fund 
that offers the social return they expect without a binding impact on risk-adjusted return, 
the screening categories display distinctive style (risk) sensitivities that should be taken 
into account.  
Second, we investigated persistence in the performance of SRI funds, which is 
relevant to an investor in pursuit of the joint objectives of social responsibility and optimal 
financial return. Analysis of rank portfolio returns suggests that SRI funds classified as 
prior-year losers delivered a large negative risk-adjusted return out-of-sample when 
compared to winners. This observation could imply that a strategy of avoiding SRI funds 
with poor past returns enhances the risk-return profile of a fund portfolio. Given that most 
of the persistence is due to SRI funds that continue to lag their benchmarks, it seems that 
the market does not discipline SRI funds that repeatedly underperform. This observation 
could be in line with the idea that investors in socially responsible mutual funds are willing 
to forgo investment return as long as they enjoy sufficient non-financial utility from 
socially screened portfolios, but this theory must await further empirical research.  
Most of the evidence in this study, by reporting no significant differential 
performance between SRI and conventional funds, supports only one of the wide range of 
hypotheses discussed in this chapter. The irrelevance hypothesis, which says that corporate 
social performance is not priced, would be supported by finding no SRI portfolio returns 
beyond those predicted by appropriate benchmark models. However, although the 
evidence in this paper is comprehensive, we hasten to argue that our findings on mutual 
funds should be interpreted with the appropriate perspective. It is not clear whether 
evidence on the performance of SRI mutual funds has a more general applicability, since 
fund data are insufficiently informative to reveal all merits and weaknesses associated with 
social investment policies. Although SRI funds have the advantage of representing real 
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tradeable portfolios, we posit that a better understanding of the valuation of corporate 
social responsibility as such requires that we expand the scope beyond mutual funds. For 
example, because funds adopt a mixture of different SRI criteria, we cannot adequately 
examine whether stock-return information is conveyed by specific constituents of the 
broad corporate social responsibility concept. This task is carried out in Chapters 3-6. 
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APPENDIX: Alternative Tests for Performance Persistence  
 
 
This section summarizes the results of two alternative tests commonly applied in 
persistence research which we employ within the context of SRI fund performance.  
We develop contingency tables to investigate persistence in the performance of 
socially responsible funds. The persistence test concentrates on the annual performance of 
SRI funds. We first estimate the annual four-factor alpha of each SRI fund at 12-month 
non-overlapping intervals. Based on the risk-adjusted performance of each SRI fund 
(relative to the median performance) in two consecutive calendar years, we then allocate 
each SRI fund into one of four cells in a 2-by-2 contingency table, where each cell in the 
matrix represents a unique combination of performance in year t and year t+1.  For 
example, the upper left cell contains the number of SRI funds that earned a risk-adjusted 
return that exceeds the median abnormal return in two consecutive periods, whereas the 
bottom right cell denotes consistent relative underperformance. Subsequently, we test for 
persistence by formally comparing the actual frequencies by which funds ended up in the 
cells with the respective expected frequency. Malkiel (1995) suggests that persistence is 
proven when the probability that a fund with better returns in the past repeats superior 
performance subsequently is significantly greater than fifty percent. Under his null 
hypothesis of no persistence, a “winner” (“loser”) in the past is equally likely to end up a 
“winner” or a “loser” in the successive year. Hence, given a certain performance in the 
past, a fund can end up in either of two cells with an expected probability of 0.5. For each 
cell, Malkiel (1995) computes a simple Z-score: 
  
)1(/)( pnpnpWWZ −−= ,                (5) 
 
In our tests, WW represents the number of times a socially responsible fund persistently 
delivers a relatively higher four-factor alpha (“Winner”/“Winner”), and p denotes the 
probability that an SRI fund that displays relative outperformance in a given year t 
continues to do so in the successive year t+1, and n indicates the number of SRI funds with 
a superior year-t performance. Note that in a manner analogous to the aforementioned 
approach, we can test for persistence in SRI underperformance. 
 An alternative and more general persistence measure involves a Chi-square test 
(CHI), which focuses on all four quadrants simultaneously and which tests the null 
hypothesis that all cells have an equal probability. 
 
 CHI = ((WW – N/4) 2 + (WL – N/4) 2 + (LW – N/4) 2 + (LL – N/4)2) / N,         (6) 
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where N is the total number of observations in either the winner or the loser segment. See 
Carpenter and Lynch (1999) for a discussion of contingency table test statistics.  
The contingency table results are presented in Table 10. Reported are the 
allocations to each cell in year t and the number of cases better or worse performance 
occurs in the following year. In addition, we indicate, respectively, the frequency by which 
winner (loser) SRI funds continue to outperform be winner (loser) in the subsequent year 
and the corresponding Z-score. The last column in Table 10 reports the Chi-square 
statistic. Of the Z-scores reported in Table 10, several reach values that correspond with 
strong significance. All significant Z-scores, namely those observed for the U.S., 
Germany, The Netherlands, and Switzerland, point to a significant persistence in SRI 
underperformance. The results thus suggest that persistence is found because SRI funds 
which underperformed their conventional counterparts in the previous year continue to do 
so in the year thereafter. This finding is reinforced by a Z-test on a sample that 
accumulates all country observations in order to increase statistical power (reported in the 
last row). The Chi-square statistics suggest that persistence in the performance difference 
between SRI funds and conventional funds is not apparent in most countries we 
investigate. However, when we accumulate all country-specific observations, we reject the 
null of no persistence.  
Although the contingency table has the advantage of being quite robust to outliers 
because it focuses on the sign of excess fund performance instead of the magnitude, it only 
tests for persistence in the performance of SRI funds relative to other funds. In order to 
give an impression about whether performance persistence is caused by some funds 
consistently outperforming or underperforming passive benchmarks indexes, a simple SRI 
fund selection strategy inspired by Hendriks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) was carried out 
earlier in this chapter. Overall, those results align with the results reported here in that they 
point to persistence in (relative) underperformance of SRI funds. 
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Chapter 2 
Socially Responsible Fixed-Income Funds 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Socially responsible investing (SRI) is gaining momentum. The largest institutional 
investors around the world are demonstrating their interest in investing based on SRI 
principles. Nevertheless, SRI has not yet been embraced by the mainstream investment 
community, in part because there exists uncertainty as to whether adding an ethical 
dimension to the stock selection process adds or hurts value to investors. Conflicting 
theories about SRI performance have fuelled empirical research in the area of socially 
responsible mutual fund performance. As we have learned from Chapter 1 and prior 
studies, there now is global evidence that strongly suggests that the risk-adjusted 
performance difference between SRI equity mutual funds and their conventional peers is 
not statistically significant.  
Remarkably, almost all empirical research in this field has involved SRI common 
stock mutual funds and little is known about the performance of retail products that invest 
in socially responsible fixed-income securities.25 Our objective is to fill that gap. In this 
chapter, we evaluate the performance of socially responsible fixed-income (henceforth SRI 
fixed-income) mutual funds in the United States relative to the returns of their mainstream 
counterparts. Because time-series information on the social responsibility features of 
(corporate) bonds is underdeveloped, SRI fixed-income mutual funds provide the best 
laboratory for testing the financial impact of social screens on fixed-income portfolio 
returns. We focus on two sets of samples: SRI funds which fully invest in bonds (SRI bond 
funds), and balanced funds which hold both socially responsible debt and equity (SRI 
balanced funds). 
Our study is important for several reasons. First, now that SRI has attracted the 
attention of the world’s largest investors, it is important to understand whether SRI can be 
aligned with mainstream asset allocation problems. More specifically, although 
institutional investors are increasingly viewing SRI as a viable approach to meeting not 
only their financial objectives but also their social duties, they need a better understanding 
of SRI for different asset classes in order to make optimal strategic and tactical asset 
allocation decisions. Focusing solely on SRI equity return has only limited value to 
strategic asset managers who seek to optimize their asset mix. Yet, there is barely any 
information on the track record of SRI in the fixed-income area. By concentrating on SRI 
                                                          
25 D’antionio, L. Johnsen and Hutton (1997) raised the possibility that the concept of socially 
responsible investing is applicable to bonds, but these authors did not study SRI fixed-income fund 
performance. 
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fixed-income portfolio performance, we thus add new insights that are relevant for making 
such allocation decisions. Second, studying socially responsible bond funds is relevant 
because these vehicles allow investors to purchase a stake in companies that are not 
publicly traded on financial markets (i.e. owned through private equity). Through fixed-
income funds, investors are thus indirectly able to participate in socially responsible 
companies they cannot access directly. Finally, the massive size of the market for 
corporate and government debt illustrates there is enormous potential for SRI in fixed-
income markets. Moreover, recent estimates by the Investment Company Institute (2004) 
emphasize the overwhelming demand for bond mutual funds. Of the $7.4 trillion invested 
in all mutual funds at the end of 2003, more than $1.2 trillion were invested in bond funds 
and $2.1 trillion were invested in money-market funds. Assessments of SRI fixed-income 
fund performance relative to conventional funds can add new and significant insights 
concerning the prospects of SRI within this tremendous industry.  
Prior to the empirical section, we discuss theory on the performance of socially 
responsible investments in fixed-income markets. Subsequently, we discuss the data and 
explain the importance of multi-index models for evaluating fixed-income mutual fund 
performance. Using these models, we demonstrate that socially responsible fixed-income 
funds have performed no worse, if not better, than their conventional peers. 
 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The previous chapter outlined a number of alternative theories about whether incorporating 
ethics into investment decisions affects performance. An oft-cited claim is that socially 
responsible investors face a financial penalty for imposing ethical constraints on the 
investment universe: by avoiding assets for ethical reasons, socially responsible investors 
constrain portfolio risk-return optimization. Chapter 1 showed that the adoption of social 
screens does not have material consequences for the risk-adjusted returns of SRI mutual 
funds in the equity domain, when compared to returns of conventional funds. 
How important is the problem of inefficient diversification and how well do 
conventional theories about SRI fare in the fixed-income area? Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that approximately 30% of all companies are screened out by SRI bond funds on 
social, moral or environmental grounds.26 Do these screens influence fixed-income 
portfolio optimization? A prevalent belief among scholars is that bonds constitute a 
homogenous asset class, that is, their returns are largely a function of variation in a few 
systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable) risk factors. For investors in government bonds and most 
high-quality corporate bonds, timing the market by changing the duration structure of a 
portfolio to exploit future changes in market-wide interest rates is considered more 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Stephen Taub (2004), ‘Socially Responsible Bonds’, BondsOnline Advisor. 
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important in enhancing portfolio return than managing idiosyncratic risk through selection 
or diversification. If idiosyncratic factors have little impact on bond returns, then the 
benefits of (and limits to) bond risk diversification are fairly scant.  
However, several studies support the belief that a sizable portion of the risk of 
non-government bonds is firm-specific and can either be exploited by active management 
or be eliminated by means of diversification, which also suggests that social investment 
constraints might have a non-trivial impact on investment performance. Indeed, active 
managers perform credit analysis with the objective to identify non-government bonds that 
are likely to witness a change in credit quality in the future and to invest in those securities 
that yield a larger premium than is suggested by their risk or credit rating.27 Hottinga, van 
Leeuwen and Ijserloo (2001), suggest that corporate bond selection strategies based on 
security-specific and firm-specific attributes yield superior information ratios.28 
Particularly high-yield corporate bonds might constitute a credit-risk sensitive investment 
vehicle, displaying heterogeneity (Barnhill, Joutz and Maxwell (1991)) and unique risk-
return characteristics (Blume and Keim (1987), Cornell and Green (1991)).  
Empirical evidence on actively managed bond funds suggests that not only 
investment constraints but also expenses can be central to discussions about SRI bond fund 
performance. A number of studies on bond fund performance evaluation support the view 
that the average bond fund underperforms its benchmark portfolio by the expenses it 
charges (e.g., Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995), and Huij 
and Derwall (2006)). One could expect that ethical screens come at a cost, because SRI 
asset management companies purchase corporate social performance data from rating 
vendors and spend time on translating the data into investment decisions. These costs raise 
the question as to whether SRI fixed-income funds have higher expense ratios compared to 
their conventional peers (and whether differences in expense ratio fully account for a 
difference in performance). Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) suggest that SRI equity funds 
have higher expense ratios than the equity retail market as a whole. 
 Since several theoretical perspectives seem to plague SRI in fixed-income 
investment context, how could SRI investors reap the benefits from social screening? One 
theory that we already articulated in Chapter 1 says that SRI investors enjoy an 
information advantage, because the economic benefits (liabilities) corporations reap 
(avoid) by adopting strong CSR policies tend to materialize slowly, which may be 
overlooked by an investment community that is obsessed with short-term judgment periods 
(e.g. Kurtz (1997), Moskowitz (1972)). Graham, Maher and Northcut (2000) indeed find 
evidence to confirm the value-relevance on environmental information for assessing firms’ 
                                                          
27 Another element of selectivity is exploiting differences in liquidity across bonds. Furthermore, 
bond managers may adopt a sector-rotation approach. 
28 There are more examples of studies that find management of non-systematic factors to be an 
important source of improving return-to-risk ratios; see, for example, Dynkin et al. (1999) and 
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creditworthiness. Their empirical evidence suggest that firms’ environmental liabilities, as 
measured by either monetary or non-monetary indicators based on public data from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are negatively associated with their credit rating. 
Their study suggests that the inclusion of environmental information in rating models 
results in increased rating classification accuracy. Hence, a small body of evidence lends 
support to the view that social criteria carry value-relevant information beyond that 
conveyed by mainstream fundamental indicators.  
 Moreover, SRI has attracted the attention of investors in sovereign bond markets. 
Sovereign states represent an overwhelming portion of debt issuers, perhaps because the 
case for SRI in this segment is most straightforward (see, for instance, EPN (2004)). Bond 
rating agencies seem to agree that sovereign credit risk is driven by quantifiable and non-
quantifiable instruments related to social, political and economic factors (Cantor and 
Packer (1996)). Here, socially responsible investors make a case for integrating 
environmental and social factors into international investment decisions, because these 
factors influence countries’ long-term economic development and political stability. The 
case of Argentina, for example, makes it clear that social inequality can hinder long-term 
economic growth with potentially severe consequences for default rates. However, beyond 
such anecdotal examples, empirical evidence on whether social investment criteria 
systematically enhance fixed-income portfolio management is scarce.  
 
 
2.3. DATA 
 
Mutual Fund Samples 
Our data set contains bond and balanced mutual funds that are labeled by the US Social 
Investment Forum29 as socially responsible in investing, and matched samples consisting 
of conventional fixed-income funds. We manually inspected fund prospectuses and 
websites to verify the presence of a social investment policy. All bond mutual funds in our 
sample are U.S.-oriented and primarily invest in intermediate- and long-term fixed-income 
securities. All balanced funds hold a mixture of domestic bonds and domestic equity. We 
evaluate SRI fund performance relative to matched samples of conventional fixed-income 
funds. Each socially responsible mutual fund is matched against an equally weighted 
portfolio of five conventional funds using fund age, end-of-period fund size, and 
investment objective as matching criteria. In using these criteria, we control for the 
potentially interfering influence of, respectively, fund age, fund size, and investment scope 
on fixed-income fund returns. For example, Philpot, Hearth, Rimbey, and Schulman 
(1998) document a positive relationship between bond fund performance and total fund 
                                                                                                                                                  
Dynkin, Hyman and Konstantinovsky (2002). 
29 See SIF (2003) 
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assets, suggesting that bond mutual funds are able to enjoy economies of scale. We select 
five funds to compose a matched sample, instead of one fund, in order to mitigate the 
problem that mutual funds are not entirely equal in terms of the size criterion. This 
discrepancy averages out. The fund data are primarily from the CRSP U.S. Mutual Fund 
database and cover the period 1987:09-2003:03. Supplementary data were obtained from 
Datastream and Morningstar.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the bond mutual funds (Panel A) and on the 
balanced funds (Panel B). Panel A shows that the majority of pure bond funds in the 
sample invest in high-quality bonds (ICDI classification “BQ”, as reported by CRSP). 
Approximately one-eighth of all funds invest in high-yield debt instruments (“BY”). Panel 
B shows that the number of SRI balanced funds in our sample is smaller than the number 
of pure SRI bond funds. However, both retail markets can be traced back several decades. 
While some SRI bond funds and SRI balanced funds have existed for almost twenty years, 
most socially responsible funds commenced operations in the nineties.  
Table 1 also reports the statistics of the funds as a group. Group statistics on the 
bond fund samples indicate that the average SRI bond fund has a lower expense ratio 
compared to its conventional counterpart. SRI balanced funds, on average, have a higher 
expense ratio. (The calculation of the average expenses ratio does not include the New 
Covenant Balanced Fund, because this is a fund of funds with a very low expense ratio). 
Taken as a whole, the difference in expense ratio between socially responsible fixed-
income funds and conventional funds is trivial. This observation adds new insights on the 
costs of social screening, because evidence on equity funds suggests that socially 
responsible investments are associated with relatively higher expense ratios (see Bauer, 
Koedijk and Otten (2005)). Apparently, the costs associated with screening fixed-income 
securities do not necessarily translate into higher expense ratios.  
A glance at some simple return statistics in Table 1 suggests that SRI bond funds 
provided a higher average return and a higher Sharpe ratio compared to conventional 
funds. The socially responsible balanced fund group has a higher return, a lower standard 
deviation, and a higher Sharpe ratio compared to its conventional peer.  Note, however, 
that these statistics are merely descriptive of nature. Throughout this chapter, we shed 
more light on these performance differentials using rigorous performance attribution 
approaches and formal tests for significance of the results.  
 
Benchmark Data 
We evaluate SRI and conventional fixed-income fund performance using benchmark 
models that include US bond and equity indexes as performance attribution variables. 
Several studies on bond funds suggest that a few indexes jointly explain most of the
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variation in bond portfolio returns. See, for example, Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993), 
Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995), and Detzler (1999). We employ different sets of indexes 
to capture the entire spectrum of investment exposures a fund might have. These indexes 
possess several unique risk and return characteristics to account for the fact that fixed-
income funds can differ in scope and “style”. 
Our primary set of benchmark indexes is maintained by Citigroup. We utilize 
total returns on their CGBI US Broad Investment-Grade Bond Index (USBIG) as well as 
the returns on some of its subsets. The indexes are aimed at providing stable and easily 
replicable benchmarks by including all investment opportunities that are available to 
market participants under regular conditions. USBIG is a value-weighted index that 
includes fixed-rate Treasury, government-sponsored, mortgage, asset-backed, and 
investment-grade issues that have a remaining maturity of at least one year. The issues are 
eligible for inclusion when they pass a size criterion that is designed to ensure the bonds 
are reasonably available. Further details on the Citigroup Bond Index construction 
methodology can be found in Citigroup (2003). Because the CGBI High-Yield index does 
not span the entire sample period, we use the Merrill Lynch High Yield Index to account 
for a fund’s exposure to high yield instruments. 
Our study also allows for the possibility that fixed-income fund performance can 
be explained partially by equity return variation. Although bond indexes are the primary 
instruments for evaluating pure bond funds, adding an equity index to bond performance 
models is important for evaluating the returns of balanced funds and bond funds that hold 
convertible debt. The stock market variable we employ is defined as the value-weighted 
return on all stocks in the NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq universe over the risk-free rate proxy 
from Ibbotson Associates, and is from Fama and French (1993).  
Apart from including benchmark asset returns, we also consider models that 
include variables related to the macroeconomy. Previous research has suggested that risk 
premiums associated with fundamental economic variables are potentially relevant in 
explaining bond mutual fund returns (e.g, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995)). For this 
purpose, we collected data on the U.S. inflation rate and on economic development (more 
information is detailed in Appendix I). 
 
 
2.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Performance Evaluation of Fund Portfolios 
In this section, we compare portfolios of SRI fixed-income funds with their conventional 
peers using multifactor benchmark models. Our decision to adopt multi-index models 
follows from evidence that single-index specifications cannot explain the returns of all 
bond classes. Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993) illustrate that the returns of high-yield bond 
funds are poorly captured by a broad market index. (Equivalently, the returns of bond 
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funds with broad market exposure are poorly explained by a high-yield index.) Hence, 
under single-index benchmark specifications, even passive bond investment strategies can 
easily deliver significant abnormal return estimates if there is a mismatch between the 
funds manager’s strategy and the benchmark used for evaluation of the fund. Consider, for 
example, a mutual fund that mainly invests in investment-grade bonds and does so in a 
socially responsible manner. If the manager of this fund chooses to be tilted slightly 
towards high-yield debt, provided this is allowed within some prespecified range, then a 
single-index regression of the fund’s return on a broad investment-grade bond index will 
deliver an inaccurate estimate of mutual fund performance. Performance evaluation models 
that suffer from this form of misspecification bias can severely hamper a sound judgment 
on the effects of SRI screens on fund performance. 
If we have a set of investment indexes in vector F and economic variables in G, 
the multifactor models we employ can be written as: 
 
it
K
k
ktik
J
j
jtijiftit GFRR εββα +++=− ∑∑
== 11
             (1) 
      
where Rit is the return on bond mutual fund i in month t, Rft denotes the one-month T-Bill 
rate, Fjt is the excess return on determinant j at t, and J denotes the number of determinants 
(passive indexes) F used in the model. Equivalently, Gkt is the value for fundamental 
economic variable k at t and k indicates the number of fundamental variables. The 
coefficients in this model can be interpreted along various lines, depending on the nature 
of the determinants. Generally, the coefficients reflect sensitivities to the regressors of an 
APT model which builds on Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). However, if the factors are solely 
excess returns on passive investments, the βij’s can also be thought of as the weights 
assigned to a set of passive portfolios that most closely explain the time-variation in the 
fund’s return.  
Analogous to the intercept term in equity fund performance models, α  (i.e., 
Jensen’s (1968) alpha) is usually viewed as the contribution of active money management 
to fixed-income portfolio return. As we also explained in Chapter 1, our interpretation of 
Jensen’s alpha is different because this research involves a comparison between SRI 
mutual funds and conventional funds. While conventional fund alpha measures the added 
value of active management net of expenses and after correction for factor-sensitivities, the 
alpha for SRI mutual funds additionally reflects the potential influence of social screens on 
average portfolio return. By comparing the alphas we thus formally test a joint hypothesis 
that the average abnormal return of SRI funds resulting from active portfolio management, 
expenses, and social screens is equal to the abnormal returns on conventional funds 
resulting from active management and expenses. If we assume that management timing 
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skills and expenses are similar for both mutual fund categories, then our tests point more 
explicitly to the influence of SRI screens. The previous section showed that the assumption 
concerning expenses is acceptable. There is also no reason to expect that the market timing 
skill of the average SRI fixed-income portfolio manager differs from the skills of 
conventional managers. 
Since there is no consensus on the optimal set of bond indexes is most suitable for 
explaining the returns on bond funds, we consider several models. The principal model we 
use is a four-factor model developed by Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995). The model’s first 
variable, which captures broad market sensitivity, is computed as the return on the USBIG 
Index in excess of a risk-free rate proxy. The second variable, DEFAULT, is defined as the 
return spread between the High Yield Index and the USBIG Treasury Index and is 
intended to capture default risk compensation in fixed-income portfolio returns. The third 
variable, OPTION, is computed as the difference in return between the USBIG GNMA 
Mortgage Index and the USBIG Treasury Index. Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993) 
introduced the mortgage index to capture option features in specific bonds. Finally, we 
include an EQUITY variable, which is defined as the value-weighted return on a portfolio 
of all stocks listed on the NYSE-AMEX-Nasdaq markets in excess of the risk-free rate. 
Including an equity variable is relevant because balanced funds have a significant exposure 
to the stock market and because bond funds may hold convertible debt. Thus, the main 
model is written as: 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + β0i(USBIGmt – Rft) + β1iDefault + β2iOptiont + β3i Equityt + εit,    (2) 
 
where USBIGmt – Rft represents the return on the broad investment grade bond index above 
the Ibbotson risk-free rate, DEFAULTt is the return spread between the Merrill Lynch 
High Yield Index and the USBIG Treasury index, OPTIONt denotes the return difference 
between the USBIG GNMA index and the Treasury Index, and EMKTt is the excess return 
on the CRSP value-weighted U.S. stock portfolio. 
The alternative multifactor specifications we construct in robustness tests are as 
follows. We develop a five-factor model that additionally includes a term structure 
variable, which is defined as the return difference between the CGBI 20-year+ Treasury 
Index and the 1-3-year Treasury Index. Second, we consider a model that additionally 
includes two variables that reflect market prices of risk stemming from innovations in 
fundamental economic variables. Following Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995), we use a 
joint-estimation approach to estimate the risk premiums on innovations in inflation and in 
economic development; see Appendix I for more details on the methodology employed for 
estimating the unobservable risk premiums. The inflation variable is computed as the 
monthly change in the 12-month expected inflation rate. Variation in economic 
development is measured by changes in 12-month industrial production growth. The last 
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specification we employ offers a slight methodological innovation. This model improves 
upon the seven-factor model by removing pricing errors that are neither attributable to the 
contribution of active money management nor to the influence of a social investment 
policy. The model is designed such that it accounts for errors in explaining the returns of 
alternative passive indexes by means of statistically derived factors. For a whole host of 
alternative passive indexes, we run individual regression of passive index returns on the 
seven-factor model. The unexplained returns (i.e. the model’s intercept and the residual 
series) are decomposed by means of a principal components analysis on the covariance 
matrix of non-centered variables. The redidual returns on passive bond indexes were 
obtained from several investment-grade corporate bond indexes (with different maturities), 
government bond indexes (with different maturities), and the high-yield market index. The 
first two principal components, which capture 85 percent of the residuals, are added to the 
seven-factor model. The resulting model is a nine-factor model. Note that studies that only 
use principal components to describe bond returns typically extract three factors, which are 
known as level, steepness, and curvature (e.g., Litterman and Scheinkman (1991)). A 
portfolio’s loading on the first component describes bond duration, which is equivalent to 
the coefficient on the bond market index in our models. Thus, we only use two principal 
components. 
In Table 2, we report the results of regressing excess mutual fund returns on the 
sets of indexes. Panel A reports performance evaluation results for pure bond funds, while 
panel B displays results for balanced funds. In panel A, we also report separate results for 
high-yield bond funds because low-grade bond returns are relatively less market interest-
rate sensitive and more dependent on selectivity skill and risk diversification. High-yield 
fixed-income fund returns may therefore display a higher than average sensitivity to the 
diversification constraints inherent in social screens. All SRI bond funds are grouped into 
an equal-weighted SRI bond fund portfolio prior to the estimation of the models. The same 
method is applied to the conventional fund samples. This section, thus, concentrates on 
evaluating SRI fund group performance relative to that of conventional funds. We 
formally compare the SRI fund portfolios with their respective matched samples using the 
returns on a “difference” portfolio, which are obtained by subtracting conventional fund 
returns from the returns of SRI funds. Differences in risk-adjusted performance, as 
indicated by the difference in alpha, are implicitly attributed to differences in social 
responsibility between the matched samples. 
Regression R2s indicate that the four-index model does a good job in explaining 
the returns of fixed-income mutual funds. From the broad market index sensitivities, it can 
be observed that market risk estimates for the aggregated fund groups are large and 
comparable to equity market betas that tend to vary around unity. Corresponding t-
statistics point out that the coefficients on the broad market factor are highly significant at 
the standard cut-off levels. Moreover, the results point to the relevance of the DEFAULT,
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OPTION, and EQUITY variables. Not only are the coefficients on these regressors mostly 
significant from a statistical perspective, they also have economically plausible signs. For 
example, the group of high-yield funds loads heavily on the default variable, which 
confirms their exposure to default risk associated with investing in low-grade bonds. 
Balanced funds load less USBIG and more on EQUITY, compared to pure bond funds, 
resulting from significant investment in both bonds and stocks. 
After controlling for benchmark sensitivities, we make two important 
observations. First, full-sample results show that both SRI bond funds and conventional 
bond funds, as a whole, underperformed the set of benchmark indexes by more than 1 
percent per annum. The t-statistics corresponding to the intercepts indicate that the 
underperformance is significant below the 1% cut-off level. For high-yield funds, the 
average underperformance is in the order of 2 percent, but is not significant. Although 
these percentages might seem large at first glance, the negative excess returns we observe 
are consistent with the results of previous research on mainstream bond mutual funds. 
More importantly, the difference portfolio results suggest that difference in average risk-
adjusted return between the SRI bond fund portfolio and conventional fund portfolio is 
0.20 percent per annum when all funds are included in the evaluation and -0.13 percent 
when the analysis is restricted to high-yield funds. These performance differentials may be 
economically important, but statistical tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a zero 
return difference at the standard significance levels.  Second, the results for balanced funds 
are more optimistic about SRI fund performance. While SRI balanced fund returns do not 
exceed significantly the returns predicted by the performance evaluation model, 
conventional funds underperformed the set of benchmark indexes significantly, by 1.25 
percent. Consequently, the differential return between SRI balanced funds and their 
conventional peers is economically large (1.36 percent) and statistically significant. Thus, 
SRI balanced funds have been able to produce highly competitive risk-adjusted returns. 
Table 3 reports alpha estimates under alternative specifications. In the first 
column of results, we report single-index alphas because single-factor measures are widely 
monitored in practice and have strong theoretical roots. The indexes used in this model are 
tailored to the scope of the funds: USBIG is used to measure pure bond fund alphas, the 
high-yield index is employed for evaluating high-yield bond funds, and an equally 
weighted portfolio of USBIG and EQUITY is used to estimate balanced fund alphas. The 
other columns report the results of estimating, respectively, the five-factor model that 
augments the four-factor model by the term spread, the seven-factor model that 
additionally includes two fundamental economic variables, and the nine-factor model that 
further includes statistical factors.  
All scenarios corroborate the evidence from our initial four-factor model. On 
average, SRI bond funds and conventional bond funds earned similar benchmark-adjusted 
returns whereas SRI balanced funds outperformed their conventional peers. 
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Residual Risk and Risk-Adjusted Return 
Rudd (1981) criticizes SRI by stressing that socially motivated investment screens 
inherently induce higher risk. He argues that SRI portfolios underperform the “normal” 
portfolio, i.e., a portfolio that is most efficient in maximizing the risk-return tradeoff by 
means of diversification, because SRI portfolios do not offer extra return to compensate for 
the additional residual risk. Residual risk can be separated into two components. The first 
component is extra-market covariance, which arises when portfolio managers deviate from 
the normal portfolio by investing in highly correlated stocks with fundamental 
commonalities (or “style” investing); the second component is firm-specific risk which is 
due to firm-specific tilts in the portfolio. One could expect most of the extra-market 
covariance to be accounted for by our multifactor models. However, since fund alphas 
assume zero idiosyncratic risk, additional performance measures are necessary to test 
Rudd’s predictions. 
 Several measures of performance that correct for idiosyncratic risk have been 
proposed in the literature. The most widely known measure is the Sharpe ratio, which 
corrects portfolios’ excess return for total risk. A statistical test for comparing Sharpe 
ratios of funds was originally developed by Jobson and Korkie (1981).  Let the Sharpe 
ratio be the ratio of portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate to the standard deviation 
of excess return. If SRIµ  and cµ are, respectively, the mean SRI fund portfolio return and 
the mean return of the respective conventional fund, and if SRIσ , cσ  and cSRI ,σ  are the 
standard deviations and covariance of the excess returns of the two fund portfolios, then 
Jobson and Korkie’s ZJK score becomes: 
 
 
Θ
−−−= )()( fSRIcfcSRIJK
RR
Z
µσµσ
            (3a) 
 
where  
 
( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−++−=Θ 222 ,2222,22 22121221 cSRIcSRIcSRI cSRISRIccSRIcSRIcSRIcSRIT σσσσσ µµσµσµσσσσσ          (3b) 
 
and T is the number of monthly return observations, and where Rf is a risk-free rate proxy. 
When T is sufficiently large, ZJK has a standard normal distribution with a zero mean and 
unit standard deviation.  
The Sharpe ratio, although capable of risk-adjusting to some extent, has 
limitations similar to the single-index performance evaluation model in that it does not 
facilitate a comparison between portfolios while controlling for differences in the 
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TABLE 3. Alternative Specifications for Robustness Tests 
The single-factor model includes the excess return on a broad market index (i.e. USBIG 
for bond funds in the full sample, the high-yield index for high-yield funds, and an equal-
weighted portfolio of USBIG and the EQUITY factor portfolio for balanced funds). The 
five-factor model augments the four-factor model by the term spread variable. The seven-
factor model additionally includes monthly spreads associated with changes in the annual 
inflation rate and in industrial production. The nine-factor model further contains two 
statistical factors derived from PCA. Alphas are annualized, and t-statistics appear in 
parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Pure Bond Funds           
  
Single-factor 
CAPM α  
Five-factor 
model α 
Seven-factor 
model α  
Nine-factor 
model α 
Using All Funds in Sample (1987:01 – 2003:03)    
SRI Bond Funds         -0.85% **    -1.06% ***     -1.05% ***     -1.07% *** 
  (-2.55)    (-3.62)     (-3.65)    (-4.08) 
Matched Sample        -0.87% **    -1.15% ***     -1.15% ***     -1.13% *** 
  (-2.25)    (-5.43)     (-5.41)     (-5.56) 
Difference     0.01%      0.09%      0.10 %      0.06% 
  (0.06)     (0.45)     (0.49)     (0.31) 
       
Using High Yield Funds (1997:01 – 2003:03) 
SRI Bond Funds     -2.41% -1.87% -1.75%  -2.22% 
  (-1.43) (-1.23) (-1.16)  (-1.53) 
Matched Sample     -2.75% -1.66% -1.32%  -1.32% 
  (-1.54) (-1.17) (-1.03)  (-1.03) 
Difference     0.34% -0.21% -0.44%  -0.43% 
    (0.38) (-0.24) (-0.48)  (-0.48) 
** Significant at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
 
 
 
portfolios’ investment style. A more convenient measure that overcomes this caveat is one 
that estimates the residual risk-adjusted return on funds subsequent to a systematic risk-and 
style-adjustment. A multifactor variant of the “appraisal ratio” of Treynor and Black 
(1973) or the “information ratio” described in Goodwin (1998) satisfies this requirement. 
We slightly modify the Jobson and Korkie (1981) statistic to make equation (3a) suitable 
for comparing appraisal ratios obtained from (multi)index models. See Appendix II for 
more details. 
Table 4 reports F-statistics for differences in residual risk, measured by residual
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TABLE 3 continued. Alternative Specifications for Robustness Tests 
The single-factor model includes the excess return on a broad market index (i.e. USBIG 
for bond funds in the full sample, the high-yield index for high-yield funds, and an equal-
weighted portfolio of USBIG and the EQUITY factor portfolio for balanced funds). The 
five-factor model augments the four-factor model by the term spread variable. The seven-
factor model additionally includes monthly spreads associated with changes in the annual 
inflation rate and in industrial production. The nine-factor model further contains two 
statistical factors derived from PCA. Alphas are annualized, and t-statistics appear in 
parentheses.  
  
Panel B: Balanced Funds (1987:01 – 2003:03)  
  
Single-factor 
CAPM α 
Five-factor 
model α 
Seven-factor 
model α  
Nine-factor 
model α 
       
SRI Balanced Funds       -0.77%      0.28%      0.28%       0.23% 
      (-0.93)     (0.38)     (0.38)      (0.32) 
       
Matched Sample       -2.06% ***      -1.08% **    -1.08% **       -0.90% * 
      (-4.06)     (-2.31)     (-2.33)      (-1.92) 
       
Difference  1.29% *      1.36% *      1.36%*       1.13% * 
        (1.95)     (1.89)     (1.89)      (-1.79) 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
 
 
 
variance, for the fund portfolios described earlier. According to the majority of 
performance evaluation models in Panel A, SRI bond funds have a relatively higher 
residual risk. A simple F-test for equal variances rejects the null hypothesis that the 
difference in residual variance between SRI funds and conventional funds is zero in almost 
all cases. Interestingly, the residual variance of high-yield SRI funds is not significantly 
different from that of the matched sample, which is somewhat surprising because basic 
intuition tells us that deviations from a normal portfolio are most likely to influence the 
residual risk of portfolios that invest in heterogeneous segments of the fixed-income 
market. It should be noted, however, that the high-yield fund return regressions are prone 
to small sample issues. Panel B shows that SRI balanced funds have a higher residual risk 
than their conventional counterparts, rejecting the null hypothesis of equal residual 
variances strongly. Thus, notwithstanding the results for high-yield SRI funds, the 
observed residual risk differences are consistent with the idea that SRI portfolios deviate 
from conventional benchmark assets in terms of securities held. 
 To verify whether these residual risk differences are materially large enough to 
affect our view on SRI funds’ risk-adjusted performance, Table 5 presents Z-scores for the 
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Sharpe ratios and for the appraisal ratios obtained from our set of multi-index models. The 
Z-scores should be handled with caution under particular circumstances, since the Sharpe 
ratio is often interpreted differently when the excess return of a portfolio is positive 
compared to when the excess return is negative. This caveat complicates a comparison of 
the Sharpe and appraisal ratios delivered by balanced fund in our sample. With this 
difficulty in mind, we report Z-scores for all our fund samples but refrain from an 
economic interpretation of the results. The Z-scores do not alter the evidence from 
previous sections dramatically. The Sharpe and appraisal ratios of SRI bond funds and 
high-yield SRI funds are somewhat higher than those of conventional funds but not 
significantly so. The results for balanced funds are unsurprisingly stronger, since SRI 
funds earned positive multifactor alphas while conventional funds underperformed the 
benchmark model. ZAR scores suggest a statistically significant difference in appraisal ratio.  
Taken as a whole, the results of this section suggests that the higher-residual risk 
associated with SRI fixed-income funds has a negligible impact on the risk-adjusted 
returns of SRI funds relative to those of their mainstream counterparts.  
 
Fama-MacBeth Setup 
An attractive feature of grouping funds into portfolios is that long-run mutual fund 
performance can be assessed at the aggregate level without requiring all funds in the data 
to have a long-term history. The aggregation process inherent in the portfolio evaluation 
approach may sacrifice some information for simplicity. This section presents a final 
robustness check by relating fund alphas to fund-specific attributes in a cross-sectional 
analysis. 
Inspired by Fama and MacBeth (1973), our approach involves a two-step 
regression methodology. As a starting point, we use the four-factor model described earlier 
to estimate 12-month non-overlapping alphas for each fund in our sample. Subsequently, 
for each calendar year, we use fund-specific attributes to explain the cross-section of fund 
alphas. To evaluate SRI fixed-income fund performance, our model includes well-
documented fund characteristics augmented by a variable that identifies a socially 
responsible fund. If SRI screens influence benchmark-adjusted fund returns, then the SRI 
fund identifier should explain the cross-sectional variation in fund alphas. Our set of fund-
specific attributes contains the following variables: fund size (Log TNA) as measured by 
the natural log of total net assets, a fund’s expense ratio (EXPENSES), a fund’s turnover 
rate over year t (TURNOVER), and a dummy variable for SRI funds. The resulting 
specification can be thought of as a model that estimates the average benchmark-adjusted 
return of fixed-income funds after controlling for fund size, expenses, turnover, and the 
presence of SRI screens. The model can be described as follows: 
 
ititititititititotit SRITURNOVEREXPENSESLogTNAa εγγγγα +++++= 4321 ,             (4) 
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Since the cross-section of funds in our sample is too small in early years in order to 
produce informative regression results, the analysis is restricted to the period 1994-2002. 
The parameters in model (4) are estimated over each calendar year. Subsequently, we 
compute time-series averages of the cross-sectional coefficient estimates. We then 
compute corresponding t-statistics by using standard errors from the time-series 
parameters.  
Table 6 reports Fama-Macbeth regression results for bond funds and balanced 
funds, respectively. Both the intercept term and the coefficients on the SRI dummy 
variables are annualized and expressed as percentages. The reported sensitivities with 
respect to the control variables are supported by existing literature (e.g., Blake, Elton and 
Gruber (1993), Carhart (1997)), but not all coefficients are statistically significant. 
Consistent with a large body of fund performance studies, the expense ratio is significantly 
and negatively related to excess fixed-income fund returns. The other controls have 
coefficients that are consistent in terms of sign but not highly significant. Central to this 
section are the SRI fund identifiers. Notwithstanding the fact that previous sections 
enjoyed a larger sample window, the loadings on the SRI dummy variables in this cross-
sectional framework support our portfolio evaluation results. The coefficient on the SRI 
bond fund dummy variable is virtually zero. The coefficient on the SRI balanced fund 
dummy is in magnitude similar to the differential alphas reported in the previous section 
(1.3 percent) but not statistically significant. Thus, the cross-sectional regressions suggest 
that the excess returns of SRI bond funds and SRI balanced funds match those of their 
conventional peers.  
 
 
2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Sizeable academic interest has been shown in the performance of socially responsible 
equity mutual funds. To the best of our knowledge, no evidence exists in the investment 
literature regarding the performance of SRI funds that focus on fixed-income securities. 
Using several performance attribution techniques, we showed that socially responsible 
fixed-income funds have been steady performers over the period 1987-2003. 
We found that a portfolio of SRI bond funds earned a benchmark-adjusted return 
similar to that of its conventional counterpart. A portfolio of SRI balanced funds 
outperformed conventional balanced funds by 1.3 percent per year. Although SRI funds 
generally seem to have a higher residual risk, which is consistent with them being different 
from normal portfolios, controlling for residual risk does not materially affect our 
conclusions. Finally, cross-sectional models that include fund size, expenses, turnover, and 
an SRI dummy as determinants of fund alpha offer supportive evidence. Coefficients on 
the SRI dummies indicate that socially responsible fixed-income funds have performed no 
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TABLE 6. Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
This table reports the results of annual regressions of  a fund’s 12-month four-
factor alpha on a constant, the log of total net assets (Log TNA), the fund’s 
expense ratio, (Expenses), the turnover rate (Turnover), and a dummy indicating 
that a fund is a socially responsible fixed-income fund. In the tradition of Fama 
and MacBeth (1973), we calculate time-series average of the cross-sectional 
coefficient estimates. We then compute corresponding t-statistics by using 
standard errors from the time-series parameters. Sample period: 1994-2002. The 
intercept terms and the coefficients on the SRI fund dummy variables are 
presented as an annual percentage. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
   
Fama-MacBeth  
Time-Series Average Coefficients 
      Pure Bond Funds  Balanced Funds 
     
Intercept      0.25%    0.80% 
   (1.32) (0.39) 
     
Log TNA   -1.07E-03 2.60E-04 
   (-1.74) (0.13) 
     
Expenses       -0.98 ***      -1.57 *** 
   (-4.23) (-4.40) 
     
Turnover   -0.02  -1.05 * 
   (-0.26) (-2.22) 
     
SRI Fund Dummy     0.02%    1.34% 
      (0.14)  (0.89) 
* Significant at 10% level, *** at 10% level 
 
 
 
worse than their conventional peers. Note that the returns investigated in this study are 
post-expense fund returns. The expenses charged by SRI funds, on average, match those 
charged by our matched sample of conventional funds, and evidently do not cause SRI 
funds to underperform. At the very least, our evidence shows that SRI funds face no 
financial penalty and supports the idea that SRI in the fixed-income industry is a 
financially viable investment approach. 
 
 
  76 
 
 
APPENDIX I: Construction of Models with Risk Premiums for Expected Inflation 
and Economic Innovation 
 
Consider a model for the return generating process, consistent with an APT framework 
(see Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995)), that incorporates both 
returns on benchmark portfolios and fundamental economic variables: 
 
( )∑ ∑
= =
++−+=
J
j
K
k
itktijjjtijiit gRERREr
1 1
][][ εδβ                    (5) 
 
where itr  denotes the period-t return on asset i, jtR is the return on (benchmark) portfolio j, 
ktg indicates the unexpected change in fundamental variable k, ijβ  and ijδ  represent 
(risk) factor sensitivities for asset i, and itε  is the return on asset i independent of 
sensitivities with respect to benchmark portfolios and innovation in fundamental variables. 
This model says that the return on an asset is a combination of the expected return and 
unexpected returns due to unexpected variation in tradeable portfolio returns and 
unexpected changes in fundamental variables. E[gk] = E[εi] = 0 because the expected 
values of unexpected changes are zero. Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995) use APT reasoning 
to specify the expected return of an asset: 
 
∑ ∑
= =
++=
J
j
K
k
kijjijiRE
1 1
*
0][ τδτβτ                             (6) 
 
where 0τ  indicates the risk-free rate of return, and *jτ  and kτ  indicate the market prices  
associated with sensitivity to portfolio j and fundamental factor k. It is relatively easy to 
understand market prices of risk when determining variables are investable portfolios, 
which then become the returns of those portfolios above the risk-free rate: *jτ = E[Rj] - 0τ . 
This relationship, when we use Rf as substitute for 0τ , can be used to modify (6) into:  
 
( )∑ ∑
= =
+−+=
J
j
K
k
kijfjijfi RRERRE
1 1
][][ τδβ                            (7) 
 
Equations (6) and (7) can be combined to arrive at: 
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( ) ( )∑ ∑
= =
+++−=−
J
j
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1 1
ετδβ              (8) 
 
(with Rf = Rft ).  
 
When APT holds (assuming that the model is correctly specified), the following model 
applies: 
 
( ) ( )∑ ∑
= =
+++−+=−
J
j
K
k
itktkijfjtijifit gRRRr
1 1
ετδβα    (9a) 
 
with the restriction 
 
∑
=
=
K
k
kiji
1
τδα               (9b) 
 
Following Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995), we use this condition to derive proxies for the 
unobservable “true” risk premiums associated with two fundamental variables: inflation 
and economic development. Like Elton, Gruber and Blake (1995) we define unexpected 
changes as changes in expected values of the variables and use survey data to determine 
expectations. The expected U.S. inflation rate is based on the U.S. consumer opinion 
survey, which is maintained by the University of Michigan. The economic development 
variable is computed as the change in industrial production index from The Federal 
Reserve Bank. We jointly estimate the APT-based model subject to aforementioned 
restriction with multiple passive benchmark asset returns as the dependent variables. The 
passive bond portfolios employed are the CGBI USBIG short-term Treasury Index (which 
includes 1-3 year maturity vehicles), the intermediate Treasury Indexes (3-7 years and 7-10 
years), long-term Treasury Indexes (10+ and 20+ years), CGBI USBIG Corporate Bond 
Indexes (1-3, 7-10 and 10+ years), the GNMA Index, and the Merrill Lynch High-Yield 
Index.  Our fitting approach implicitly assumes time invariant risk premiums ( kτ ).  
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APPENDIX II: Statistical Test for Comparing Appraisal and Information Ratios 
 
To test for the difference in appraisal ratio between SRI funds and conventional funds, we 
build on the test statistic developed by Jobson and Korkie (1981), which focused on 
differences between Sharpe ratios and between Treynor ratios. For example, let the Sharpe 
ratio be the ratio of portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate to the standard deviation 
of excess return. If SRIµ  and cµ are, respectively, the mean SRI fund portfolio return and 
the mean return of the respective conventional fund, and if SRIσ , cσ  and cSRI ,σ  are the 
standard deviations and covariance of the excess returns of the two fund portfolios, then 
Jobson and Korkie’s ZJK score becomes: 
 
 
Θ
−−−= )()( RfSRIcRfcSRIZJK µσµσ             (3a) 
 
where  
 
( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−++−=Θ 222 ,2222,22 22121221 cSRIcSRIcSRI cSRISRIccSRIcSRIcSRIcSRIT σσσσσ µµσµσµσσσσσ          (3b) 
 
 
Let the excess returns denoted as SRIλ  and cλ  be, respectively, 1bSRI µµ −  and 
2bc µµ − , where 1bµ and 2bµ are the average benchmark returns (i.e., returns predicted by 
an estimated single- or multi-index model) corresponding to SRI and conventional funds, 
and let SRIλσ , cλσ , and cSRI ,λσ be the respective standard deviations and covariance of the 
portfolios’ excess returns. Then, we compare the funds’ appraisal ratios by means of the 
following ZAR score:  
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The benchmark returns can be obtained via an index or by estimating the returns according 
to an estimated expected return model. We choose the latter and compare the returns on 
bond funds with those on a benchmark portfolio of similar risk using the four-index model 
outlined earlier, where the benchmark returns are defined as the funds’ estimated four-
factor loadings multiplied by the returns of the four indexes. 
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Chapter 3 
The Eco-Efficiency Premium Puzzle30 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many businesspeople believe that companies cannot use their financial resources to 
improve environmental performance without decreasing shareholder value. A common line 
of reasoning is that a company’s costs of adhering to environmental standards will 
translate into higher product prices, a competitive disadvantage, and lower profitability 
(Walley and Whitehead (1994)). Others believe that improved environmental performance 
can enhance a company’s input–output efficiency or generate new market opportunities. 
Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argued that active policies to improve environmental 
performance can create a competitive advantage because of the more cost-efficient use of 
resources. If this argument is true and the benefits of social or environmental initiatives 
outweigh their costs, then businesses that embrace the concept of corporate environmental 
responsibility should be able to report higher corporate earnings than less responsible 
companies. 
 The extent to which environmental screening policies contribute to investment 
returns, however, depends on the financial markets’ ability to factor the financial 
consequences of corporate social responsibility into share prices. The belief is still 
widespread that at the investment level, incorporating environmental criteria into 
investment decisions comes at the cost of portfolio performance. Asset-pricing theory that 
relies on the efficient market hypothesis posits that (i) investment portfolios deliver returns 
proportional to associated risk and that (ii) the optimal investment portfolio is a well-
diversified one. Therefore, any empirical evidence of anomalous risk-adjusted investment 
performance on the part of stocks grouped by company-specific characteristics—such as 
size, book-to-market ratio (BV/MV), or corporate social responsibility—are attributable to 
deficiencies in the performance evaluation models that attempt to explain them. After the 
methodological shortcomings are corrected, no abnormal returns should exist. This 
reasoning suggests that socially responsible investors, who would be inherently suffering 
from imposed limits to diversification, should report suboptimal returns when the 
appropriate performance attribution framework is used. Proponents of SRI, however, 
typically argue that corporate social responsibility reflects the company managers’ views 
on how the company will perform in the long term. These views may be mispriced because 
                                                          
30 As published in the Financial Analysts Journal (See Derwall, J., N. Guenster, R. Bauer and K. 
Koedijk (2005), “The Eco-Efficiency Premium Puzzle”, Financial Analysts Journal, vol 61.(2), pp. 
51-63.) I thank the French Social Investment Forum for awarding this article the 2005 Finance and 
Sustainability Research Award and associated financial support.  
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of short-term thinking within the financial community. This school of thought suggests 
that SRI can be incrementally profitable over long-run horizons. 
The central empirical question arising from this debate is whether corporate 
environmental responsibility is associated with financial performance. A large body of 
research has investigated the social/environmental–financial performance link empirically 
by comparing the historical returns of socially responsible mutual funds with those of 
conventional funds or market indexes. Although this research approach provides useful 
evidence on the financial consequences of SRI in a practical context, the method has some 
limitations. Results from mutual fund studies may be biased because of nonquantifiable 
aspects, such as management skill, unknown portfolio holdings, and screening methods. 
Furthermore, mutual fund studies cannot adequately establish whether a social or 
environmental responsibility premium exists because holdings of social funds and 
conventional funds are not mutually exclusive.  
In this study, we avoid these difficulties by using the Innovest Strategic Value 
Advisors rating database to evaluate self-composed equity portfolios. Despite being well 
established in the investment community, these ratings are rarely used in empirical 
research. The Innovest scores build on the concept of “eco-efficiency,” which can be 
interpreted as the economic value a company adds (e.g., by producing products and 
delivering services) relative to the waste it generates when creating that value. Focusing 
exclusively on the environmental element of social responsibility, our study investigates 
whether a long-run premium or penalty exists for holding environmentally responsible 
companies. We construct two mutually exclusive portfolios with distinctive eco-efficiency 
scores. We then apply performance attribution models to test whether any performance 
differential between the portfolios is significant and attributable to the environmental 
component. This method allows us to examine the long-term benefits of including 
environmental criteria in the investment process. 
We explicitly attempt to overcome the performance attribution problems outlined 
earlier by using several sophisticated performance evaluation methods. Following Carhart 
(1997), we evaluate the portfolios while controlling for multiple non-environmental factors 
known to determine stock performance. This process is a methodological improvement on 
most related (non-mutual fund) studies on SRI, which typically account only for volatility 
or market risk. The major benefit of the approach we use, as empirically confirmed by 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart, is that we also control for the presence of style tilts 
(based on, for example, size, value versus growth, or momentum effects) in stock 
portfolios. This approach is particularly important because of the mounting evidence that 
environmentally and socially screened portfolios in the United States tend to be biased 
toward large-capitalization growth stocks (see, for example, Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten 
(2005)). Following Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2003), our study applies a four-factor 
model augmented by factors that capture industry effects in socially responsible equity 
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portfolios. Last, we check the performance of best-in-class and worst-in-class portfolios 
that are industry neutral by construction. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
review prior studies on the relation between environmental responsibility and stock market 
performance. Subsequently, we explain the data we use to measure firms’ environmental 
performance and we outline in detail how we use them to construct SRI portfolios. We 
then evaluate our portfolios in several asset pricing frameworks. We end our analyses by 
testing best-in-class and worst-in-class portfolios, including long-short positions, under 
several transaction costs scenarios. Last, we summarize the results and conclude Chapter 3. 
 
 
3.2. ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND STOCK RETURNS 
 
A large body of literature has investigated the relationship between environmental and 
financial performance. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence to date is inconsistent. As 
pointed out by Ullman (1985) and by Griffin and Mahon (1997), the conflicting results in 
prior research are mainly attributable to differences in methodology and in the choice of 
financial and environmental performance indicators. For the studies that used stock returns 
as the financial performance measure, Wagner (2001) identified three categories: portfolio 
studies, event studies, and (multivariate) regression studies. 
Portfolio studies typically compose mutually exclusive portfolios based on 
various corporate social performance indicators and investigate the portfolios’ return 
differences over some investment horizon. For instance, Diltz (1995) studied daily returns 
for a variety of portfolios constructed on the basis of several ethical performance 
indicators. Diltz found that, although many screens did not improve portfolio performance 
significantly, environmental screens enhanced stock performance significantly during the 
1989–91 period. Cohen, Fenn, and Konar (1997) constructed industry-balanced portfolios 
with different environmental responsibility characteristics to investigate the financial 
performance difference between low-polluter and high-polluter companies in the United 
States. Contrary to the Diltz study, their findings suggest that there is neither a premium 
nor a penalty for investing in companies that are leaders in nonpollution issues. A 
comparison by Yamashita, Sen, and Roberts (1999) of 10-year risk-adjusted returns 
showed, however, that their environmentally highest-ranked stocks performed significantly 
better than the lowest-ranked stocks. White (1996), furthermore, examined the 
performance of “green,” “oatmeal,” and “brown” equity portfolios and demonstrated that 
the green portfolio provided a significantly positive Jensen’s alpha while the other two 
alternatives failed to outperform the market. In addition to these studies, some studies have 
compared self-composed socially screened portfolios with a regular investment portfolio. 
One of Innovest’s online research publications (Blank and Daniel (2002)) discussed the 
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potential usefulness of eco-efficiency scores in making investment decisions. Blank and 
Daniel reported that an equal-weighted eco-efficiency portfolio delivered somewhat higher 
Sharpe ratios than the S&P 500 Index during the 1997–2001 period. Finally, Guerard 
(1997) used the social performance database of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Company 
and concluded that portfolios derived from a socially screened investment universe did not 
perform differently from those obtained from an unscreened set during the 1987–96 
period. 
The most pronounced evidence of a link between environmental and stock market 
performance is found in event studies. Shane and Spicer (1983) documented that 
companies experienced abnormal declines in stock prices two days prior to their pollution 
figures being reported by the Council on Economic Priorities in the United States. 
Moreover, on the day of publication, negative returns were significantly larger for 
companies with relatively poor records of pollution control than for companies with better 
rankings. Hamilton (1995) reported a significantly negative abnormal return for publicly 
traded companies following the first release of their TRI (toxics release inventory) 
pollution figures. Consistent with previous results, Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) found 
evidence that positive corporate events, measured by environmental awards given to 
companies by third parties, are associated with positive subsequent abnormal returns. 
Significantly negative returns tend to follow environmental crises. Similarly, Rao (1996) 
reported that the performances of companies following pollution reports by the Wall Street 
Journal between 1989 and 1993 were significantly below the companies’ expected market-
adjusted returns. Only Yamashita, Sen and Roberts (1999), studying scores of 
environmental conscientiousness published in July 1993’s Fortune magazine, did not find 
significant stock market responses to the scores. 
A third category of literature has used primarily regression or correlation analysis 
to examine whether a long-term relationship exists between corporate environmental 
responsibility and stock performance. Taken as a whole, these studies provide only limited 
support for such a relationship. Spicer (1978) documented that companies in the U.S. pulp 
and paper industry with the better pollution control records have higher profitability and 
lower stock betas. Chen and Metcalf (1980), however, in replicating Spicer’s study but 
controlling for the impact of company size on environmental performance, cast doubt on 
his findings. Using a similar method, Mahapatra (1984) also found no evidence that 
pollution control initiatives are rewarded with improved stock performance. 
Most prior research, implicitly resting on Sharpe’s (1964) CAPM (capital asset 
pricing model) framework, controlled portfolio performance or observed relationships for 
only a single risk factor. Evidence presented by Fama and French and by Carhart indicates, 
however, that a single factor cannot explain the cross-sectional variation in equity returns. 
Therefore, the relationship between environmental and financial performance observed in 
studies to date may have been driven by latent factors that were not used as control 
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variables in the research. Surprisingly, the empirical literature addressing some of such 
unobserved influences is limited to non-U.S. studies. They include Thomas (2001), who 
added environmental policy dummies to a two-factor model that controlled for size effects 
in addition to market sensitivity in the U.K. market, and Ziegler, Rennings, and Schröder 
(2002), who controlled for market risk, company size, and the BV/MV effect in the 
European market. Both studies found some evidence of a positive association between 
environmental responsibility and stock performance.  
We extend prior portfolio research, particularly Blank and Daniel (2002), by 
considering advanced performance attribution frameworks and a larger sample. 
   
 
3.3. MEASURING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Whereas most proxies for environmental performance represent absolute pollution levels, 
the concept of eco-efficiency is frequently used to measure the environmental performance 
of a company in a relative sense. Eco-efficiency can be thought of as the ratio of the value 
a company adds (e.g., by producing products) to the waste the company generates by 
creating that value (see, for instance, Schaltegger, Burritt, and Petersen 2003). To 
understand the difference between absolute and relative environmental performance, 
consider, for example, companies that operate in such environmentally sensitive industries 
as mining, energy, or chemicals. In absolute terms, these companies are typically labeled 
poor environmental performers. On the eco-efficiency performance measure, however, 
these companies can still do well relative to their competitors facing the same 
environmental challenges. 
To proxy for corporate eco-efficiency, we obtained rating data from Innovest. The 
main benefits of these scores are their comprehensiveness. Using more than 20 information 
sources, both quantitative and qualitative in nature, Innovest’s analysts evaluate a company 
relative to its industry peers via an analytical matrix. Companies are evaluated along 
approximately 60 dimensions, which jointly constitute the final rating. For each of these 
factors, each company receives a score between 1 and 10. Because these variables are not 
considered equally important in the overall assessment of ecoefficiency, each factor is 
weighted differently. For example, a company’s environmental product development is 
usually considered more important than, for instance, outside certification by any non-
governmental organization. The final numerical rating assigned to a company is converted 
into a relative score based on the total spread of scores in the sector to which the company 
belongs. 
To summarize, the criteria can be grouped into five broad categories, which 
address five fundamental types of environmental factors (Innovest 2003): 
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• historical liabilities—risk resulting from previous actions; 
• operating risk—risk exposure from recent events; 
• sustainability and eco-efficiency risk—future risks initiated by the weakening of 
the company’s material sources of long-term profitability and competitiveness; 
• managerial risk efficiency—ability to handle environmental risk successfully;  
• environmentally related strategic profit opportunities—business opportunities 
available to the company relative to industry peers. 
 
Although the Innovest database contains scores on more than 1,200 companies globally, 
we consider only U.S. companies. The number of companies was about 180 at the end of 
May 1997 and increased steadily to approximately 450 at the end of May 2003. All ratings 
are dated for the month in which they were made available. 
 
 
3.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Portfolio Construction 
We construct two mutually exclusive stock portfolios with distinctive eco-efficiency 
characteristics.31 After matching all companies in the Innovest universe with the CRSP 
stock database, we rank the companies annually on their most recent eco-efficiency 
ratings. The high-ranked (low-ranked) portfolio consists of companies making up the 30 
percent of total capitalization rated highest (lowest) by Innovest. The annual re-ranking 
and portfolio rebalancing occurs at the end of June. When constructing the portfolios, we 
take into account a one-month lag for the ranking data to avoid look-ahead bias. 
Companies for which no rankings were available at the rebalancing date are excluded 
automatically for the subsequent 12-month period. 
The Innovest database contains scores only for the 1997–2003 period, but asset-
pricing tests require many data points. Therefore, we confronted a small-sample problem. 
To obtain meaningful results, we extend the July 1997 ratings backward through July 
1995. Because eco-efficiency ratings tend to have low variability, we believe that 
extending the data backward for two years is acceptable. As a result, we observe end-of-
month portfolio return data for the period July 1995 through December 2003. We are 
aware that this procedure potentially introduces look-ahead bias. However, the ratings’ 
variability is extremely low, and the results of using the ‘real-time’ period 1997-2003 are 
similar to those reported in the paper. These results are available upon request. 
                                                          
42 It should be noted that the sorting approach proposed in this study does not allow for an explicit 
judgment on the direction of causality between environmental and financial variables. We are merely 
concerned with the long-term benefits of incorporating environmental criteria into the investment 
process. 
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Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the two portfolios and for a value-weighted 
portfolio consisting of all stocks in the CRSP database, which is a proxy for the market (as 
in Fama and French (1993)). These basic statistics suggest that the portfolio consisting of 
highly eco-efficient companies performed better than the eco-inefficient portfolio, even 
after adjusting for volatility. The low-ranked portfolio also has a substantially lower 
Sharpe ratio than the market proxy. The last columns of Table 1 report some additional 
time-series properties. Ljung-Box Q-statistics and corresponding p-values in parentheses 
serve as tests for autocorrelation (AC) and heteroskedasticity (HC). These test statistics 
suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and no 
heteroscedasticity up to one lag.32  Hence, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are not a 
concern throughout the remainder of our research. The skewness and kurtosis estimates 
indicate only weak deviation from a normal distribution.33  
 
Portfolio Performance in a CAPM-Framework 
To account for differentials in the portfolios’ market risk, we first measure portfolio 
performance via the well-established CAPM-framework. Specifically, for all portfolios we 
employ a (OLS) regression to estimate the model of the form: 
 ( ) itftmtiftit RRRR εβα +−+=−                                 (1) 
 
where, itR is the return on portfolio i in month t, ftR  indicates the one-month T-Bill rate at 
t, mtR  represents the return on a value-weighted market proxy in month t, and ε is an error 
term. The value-weighted market proxy and the risk-free rate were provided by the 
Kenneth French Data Library. The model-β (‘beta’) is interpreted as measuring a 
portfolio’s market risk exposure and α (Jensen’s ‘alpha’) represents the average abnormal 
return in excess of the return on the market proxy. Hence, in this scenario it is implicitly 
assumed that the difference between the return on a portfolio and the return on the single-
factor benchmark according to an estimated CAPM provides an accurate estimate of risk-
adjusted performance.  
                                                          
32 When multiple lags were considered, we also did not detect AC and HC at other lags. 
33 In most cases, a Jarque–Bera nonparametric test of normality did not reject the null hypothesis of a 
normally distributed series. 
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Table 2 reports performance evaluation results obtained from the CAPM framework. 
Because the primary focus of the research is the performance differential between the high-
ranked portfolio and the low-ranked portfolio, we provide the returns on a “Difference” 
portfolio, which is constructed by subtracting the low-ranked portfolio returns from the 
returns on the high-ranked stock portfolio. The influence of environmental screening on 
investment performance is the difference between the alpha on the high-ranked portfolio 
and the alpha on the low-ranked portfolio. 
 
 
TABLE 2.  Empirical Results 1-Factor Regressions 
This table reports the results of estimating CAPM-based regression models; see 
equation (1). The difference portfolio is constructed by subtracting low-ranked 
portfolio returns from the returns on the high-ranked stock portfolio. The final 
row displays the results of estimating the difference in industry-adjusted return 
using three additional regressors obtained via a principal components analysis; 
see equation (2). Coefficients on the principal component scores IP1-3t are not 
reported. T-statistics (in parentheses) are derived from Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors. Sample period: 1995:07 – 2003:12. Alphas are annualized 
percentages. 
 
Equity Portfolio  α (Rm – Rft) adj. Rsq.   
High-Ranked Companies  1.29    0.94*** 0.82  
  (0.51) (22.62)   
Low-Ranked Companies  -1.76    0.91*** 0.83  
  (-0.86) (15.87)   
Difference  3.05  0.04 0.00  
  (1.09) (0.66)   
Industry-Adjusted Difference   3.82 0.03 0.00  
   (1.42) (0.39)     
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
According to the reported alpha estimates and corresponding t-statistics, neither portfolio’s 
performance is significantly different from that of the market proxy. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the betas reveals that the portfolios do not differ significantly in exposure to 
the market factor. The most important observation is that the alpha of the Difference 
portfolio is positive (i.e., 3.05 percent annually), which suggests that the high-ranked 
portfolio provides a higher market risk–adjusted return than its low-ranked counterpart. 
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Although economically large, the performance difference in this framework is not 
statistically significant.  
DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999) provided evidence that sector exposures drive 
SRI portfolio returns to a great extent; therefore, we also investigate whether our results 
tend to be industry sensitive. In testing for industry sensitivity, we use an approach similar 
to that of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and Jones and Shanken (2004). This approach, 
previously applied on socially responsible mutual fund returns by Geczy, Stambaugh and 
Levin (2003), involves the construction of a factor model composed of the excess market 
return and three industry factors mechanically extracted from returns orthogonal to the 
primary factor. To derive these regressors, one performs a principal-components analysis 
on the portion of Fama and French’s 30 excess industry-sorted portfolio returns that cannot 
be explained by the single-factor model (i.e., the model’s intercept and the residual series). 
Subsequently, the first three components, by capturing most remaining industry return 
variation, are taken to complement the single-factor model. The resultant model is of the 
form: 
 
( ) it
k
ktkiftmtiftit IPRRRR εββα ++−+=− ∑
=
3
1
0                              (2) 
 
where IP1-3t  represents three factors (principal components) capturing industry effects. 
After performing this regression, we obtain industry bias–free alpha estimates. 
The results are reported in the bottom row of Table 2. Note that Table 2 does not report 
loadings on the industry adjustment variables because these coefficients are difficult to 
interpret. The return on the Difference portfolio after industry adjustment increases to 3.82 
percent a year, indicating that the performance estimates reported previously were 
adversely affected by industry exposures. The model intercept, nonetheless, remains 
insignificant. 
 
Performance in a Multifactor Framework 
After empirically establishing the inefficiency of the single-factor CAPM framework, 
Fama and French (1993) introduced a three-factor model that adds to excess market return 
a capitalization-based factor (small-cap stock returns minus large-cap stock returns, SMB) 
and a BV/MV factor (stock returns for companies with high BV/MV minus stock returns 
for companies with low BV/MV, HML). Although the benefits of the three-factor model 
are acknowledged, the model has been subject to further improvement. For example, 
examining persistence in U.S. mutual fund performance, Carhart demonstrated that the 
three-factor model fails to explain the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum strategy 
and proposed the addition of a momentum factor (MOM) to existing performance models. 
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In this section, we report our analysis of the historical monthly return distribution 
of the two portfolios by means of the multifactor performance model used by Carhart 
(1997). In using three additional control variables, we mitigate potentially severe biases 
that could result from style tilts in stock portfolios (size, value versus growth, or 
momentum effects).34 This control is particularly important in light of mounting evidence 
that the returns on style investment strategies account for a considerable portion of SRI 
portfolio performance (see, for example, Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005), Gregory, 
Matatko, and Luther (1997)). As a further adjustment of average returns for industry 
effects, we extend the industry-adjustment process to the multivariate setting by analyzing 
the residuals derived from a regression of Fama and French’s industry-sorted portfolio 
returns on the four factors.  
Formally, the approach to performance assessment entails estimation of the 
following equations: 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + β0i(Rmt – Rft) + β1i SMBt + β2i HMLt + β3i MOMt + εit,                  (3) 
 
Where SMBt represents the return difference between a small cap portfolio and a large cap 
portfolio in month t, HMLt is defined as the return difference between a value (high B/M) 
portfolio and a growth (low B/M) portfolio in month t, MOMt  is the return difference 
between a portfolio of past 12-month winners and a portfolio of past 12-month losers in 
month t, and 
 
Rit – Rft = αi + β0i(Rmt – Rft) + β1i SMBt + β2i HMLt + β3i MOMt + β4-6i IP1-3t  + εit             (4) 
 
SMB and HML were obtained from the Kenneth French Data Library. The momentum 
factor (MOM) came from Mark Carhart.  
Table 3 reports performance estimates resulting from estimation of the four-factor 
model (Equation 3). Table 3 has several prominent differences with Table 2. First, the 
adjusted R2s from the models have increased. This observation confirms the incremental 
explanatory power of a multivariate framework. Second, the high-ranked portfolio is 
reported to have earned a significant average factor-adjusted return of 3.98 percent a year, 
whereas the low-ranked portfolio performed poorly. Third, factor loadings on the 
additional determinants, SMB, HML, and MOM, are generally significant. For both the 
high-ranked portfolio and the low-ranked portfolio, the coefficient on SMB is significantly 
negative, which implies a bias toward large-cap stocks in the Innovest database. The factor 
loadings on HML suggest that the high-ranked portfolio was somewhat growth-stock 
                                                          
34 Although there is an ongoing discussion about whether these additional factors proxy for risk, we 
bypass that subject and merely use the factor-mimicking portfolio returns as control variables in 
performance estimation. 
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oriented during the period examined whereas the low-ranked portfolio was significantly 
tilted toward value stocks. 
Note also the significantly negative coefficients on the momentum factor. They 
suggest that both stocks with relatively bad past-year performance and those with good 
past-year performance tend to have relatively poor eco-efficiency rankings, which seems 
counterintuitive. Because prior related studies revealed evidence of a positive relationship 
between financial performance and subsequent social performance (e.g., Chung, Eneroth, 
and Schneeweis (2003)), we expected the high-ranked portfolio to be positively related to 
the momentum factor.  
 Results with regard to the Difference portfolio show that the performance 
differential between the two portfolios, 5.06 percent a year for the full period after 
adjusting for multiple factor loadings, is also significant at the 10% level (and almost 
significant at the 5% level).  
Table 3 also reports some subsample analyses on the Difference portfolio to allow 
for the possibility that the stock market crash of March 2000 introduced a structural break 
in the data. Subsample results for this portfolio suggest that the influence of the crash was 
negligible. The subsample alphas remain economically large—more than 6 percent a year. 
And, in spite of the small samples, the alphas remain statistically significant, at the 10% 
level. 
As for the factor loadings, the results confirm that there are significant differences 
in styles or risk sensitivities between the two extreme portfolios. In line with the outcomes 
within the CAPM framework, the two portfolios do not significantly differ in exposure to 
market risk. Only with respect to HML does the Difference portfolio exhibit a significant 
factor exposure. 
The bottom row in Table 3 reports coefficients estimated by Equation 4—that is, 
the seven-factor model that additionally controls for industry tilts. These results show that 
after industry effects are taken into account, the difference in performance between the 
high-ranked portfolio and the low-ranked portfolio increases slightly (to 6.04 percent a 
year) and becomes statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Note, however, that the interpretation of performance results can be overly driven 
by various parameters in the measurement process that have been specified exogenously. 
Therefore, continuing with the analysis of industry-adjusted returns, we “endogenize” 
some of these parameters by considering alternative portfolio construction methodologies 
and return calculations. The empirical results of these robustness checks are reported in 
Table 4.  In the first row of Table 4, we report the outcome of estimating the seven-factor 
model but using equal-weighted (instead of value-weighted) industry-adjusted portfolio 
returns. The performance gap between the high-ranked portfolio and its low-ranked 
counterpart, as represented by the Difference portfolio, narrows to 2.17 percent from the 
6.04 percent of Table 3, indicating that alpha depends more on large-cap stocks than on 
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smallcap stocks. Portfolio construction based on equal weighting is uncommon, however, 
in practice. 
 
 
TABLE 3.  Multifactor Regression Results 
This table reports empirical results corresponding to the multifactor regressions described 
by equation (3). Rmt – Rft represents the returns on the market proxy in excess of the risk-
free rate, SMB denotes the difference in return between a small cap portfolio and a large 
cap portfolio, HML denotes the return spread between a value portfolio and a growth 
portfolio and MOM is the return difference between a prior 12-month winner portfolio and 
a prior 12-month loser portfolio. SMB and HML are discussed in Fama and French (1993) 
and MOM is from Carhart (1997). The final row displays the results of comparing 
portfolio returns after adding 3 industry-adjustment factors to the four-factor model. 
Coefficients on principal component scores are not reported.  T-statistics (in parentheses) 
are derived from Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Sample period: 1995:07 – 2003:12. 
Alphas are annualized percentages. 
 
Equity Portfolio  α (Rm – Rft) SMB HML MOM adj. R2 
        
High-Ranked Companies  3.98*    0.90***    -0.22*** -0.08    -0.10*** 0.87 
  (1.93) (25.02) (-4.30) (-1.16) (-5.99)  
        
Low-Ranked Companies  -1.08    0.95***    -0.15*** 0.11**    -0.08*** 0.88 
  (-0.55) (19.09) (-3.70) (2.29) (-2.62)  
        
Difference  5.06* -0.05 -0.07  -0.19** -0.02 0.01 
  (1.86) (-0.80) (-0.95) (-2.20) (-0.43)  
       
Difference 6.21* 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.03 
(1995:07-2000:02) (1.71) (0.04) (0.08) (0.95) (1.16)   
        
Difference 6.71* -0.06 -0.11    -0.32*** -0.01 0.13 
(2000:03-2003:12) (1.84) (-0.62) (-0.97) (-2.96) (-0.29)  
         
Industry-Adjusted 
Difference    6.04** -0.20*   -0.14* -0.30** -0.01 0.01 
  (2.38) (-1.79) (-1.87) (-2.18) (-0.18)  
                
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 4.  Robustness Analysis: Results under Alternative Methodologies 
The table reports the results of performing regression (4) after applying some changes to 
various parameters in the methodology. The first row presents the difference in alpha 
estimates between the high-ranked portfolio and the low-ranked portfolio derived from 
industry-adjusted equal-weighted portfolio returns. The second and third row reports the 
results of changing the size of the upper (lower) deciles of the portfolios to 20% and 40% 
of total capitalization, respectively. Finally, the last row reports the industry-adjusted 
performance difference when only companies belonging to environmentally sensitive 
industries are considered. T-statistics (in brackets) are derived from Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors. Sample period: 1995:07 – 2003:12. Alphas are annualized percentages. 
 
    α (Rm – Rft) SMB HML MOM R2 adj. 
Equal – Weighting 
Industry-adjusted 
 Difference portfolio 2.17    -0.10     -0.15***     -0.12* -0.01 0.18 
  (1.11) (-1.08) (-3.33) (-1.75) (-0.41)  
20% portfolios       
Industry-adjusted  
Difference portfolio    8.60***   -0.21    -0.09 -0.23   0.01 -0.04 
  (2.83) (-1.40) (-1.21) (-1.36) (0.28)  
40% portfolios       
Industry-adjusted 
 Difference portfolio   4.69** -0.31**    -0.22***  -0.28** 0.01 0.06 
  (2.40) (-2.62) (-3.41) (-1.98) (0.51)  
Sensitive sectors only       
Industry-adjusted 
 Difference portfolio 4.47** -0.17**    -0.14*** -0.24**    0.09*** 0.15 
  (2.07) (-2.25) (-2.72) (-2.60) (3.77)  
                
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
 
 
 
In the analysis of value-weighted industry-adjusted returns, we also find that the results are 
somewhat sensitive to changes in portfolio formation. The second and third rows in Table 
4, which report the results of using size deciles of, respectively, 20 percent and 40 percent 
of total capitalization, reveal different outcomes from the results of the initial scenario (30 
percent breakpoints). When 20 percent quintiles are used, thereby increasing the 
distinction in environmental performance between the highest and lowest ranked 
portfolios, we find that the performance gap widened from the 6.04 percent of Table 3 to 
8.60 percent. When portfolios covering 40 percent of total market value are used, the 
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performance of the Difference portfolio falls to 4.69 percent. In both cases, however, the 
excess return remained significant from both an economic and a statistical perspective.  
Finally, we compute alphas for portfolios comprising only stocks from 
environmentally sensitive industries (electric utilities, chemistry, metal and mining, paper 
and forest products, aerospace and defense, and petroleum). The last row in Table 4 shows 
that the industry-adjusted performance differential falls to 4.47 percent, but it remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level. A relatively lower alpha for SRI strategies 
pertaining only to environmentally sensitive industries is remarkable because 
environmental performance expenditures in these industries are usually substantial. 
Overall, we find that companies that perform relatively well along environmental 
dimensions collectively provide superior returns. The average return on the Difference 
portfolio is economically large and statistically significant on a risk-, style-, and industry-
neutral basis. In terms of statistical significance, the premium estimate is reasonably robust 
to variations in methodology. Therefore, the results as a whole corroborate the notion that 
environmentally responsible investing provides benefits. 
Our findings also, however, call for an important discussion of the eco-efficiency 
premium. Given that efforts to correct for investment style and industry bias fail to explain 
the observed performance differential, what is the nature of the eco-efficiency premium? Is 
the observed performance gap attributable to latent risk factors or to mispricing? 
Many so-called anomalies, such as the size effect (Banz (1981)), the value 
premium (Fama and French (1993)), and the momentum anomaly (Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993)) have become the subject of considerable debate. A large number of scholars 
suggest most return anomalies can be interpreted as proxies for various forms of risk – see 
for example (Fama and French (1993), Vassalou and Xing (2004), and Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003)) – while others attribute the observed effects to market inefficiencies 
(e.g. Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1994), or Haugen and Baker (1996)). Contrary to 
these well-documented return premia, however, the eco-efficiency premium is difficult to 
explain within the well-known risk-return paradigm.  We also find it difficult to attribute 
the results to deficiencies in the performance attribution analysis, because our results are 
robust to, if not strengthened by, the inclusion of factors that control for investment risk, 
investment style and industry effects.  
The alternative explanation — in the tradition of Lakonishok, Schleifer and 
Vishny (1994) and Haugen and Baker (1996) —is that our findings are the result of the 
market’s inability to price eco-efficiency in an efficient manner. This interpretation could 
also explain the smaller magnitude of the eco-efficiency premium observed within 
environmentally sensitive industries. In environmentally sensitive sectors, where eco-
efficiency is arguably a significant driver of future corporate performance, investors are 
more likely to factor environment-related information into investment decisions. In sectors 
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where the benefits of eco-efficiency are less obvious, corporate eco-efficiency information 
may be priced inappropriately by financial markets.  
 
 
3.5. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: A BEST-IN-CLASS STRATEGY 
 
We have shown that a portfolio comprising stocks of companies ranked high as to eco-
efficiency outperforms its low-ranked counterpart after adjusting returns for market risk, 
investment style, and industry effects. Obtaining evidence by adjusting returns after the 
fact may not be very useful, however, from an investor’s perspective. Therefore, in this 
section, we outline the economic implications of our findings by demonstrating how one 
can construct an environmentally responsible investment portfolio under practical 
conditions. To take into account our evidence that industry tilts greatly influence portfolio 
performance, we construct an SRI portfolio based on “best-in-class” analysis, an approach 
that is commonly applied in the SRI industry.  
We first use Fama and French’s industry classification scheme to identify 12 
industries.35 In each group, we first rank all the companies in our dataset by their eco-
efficiency scores. Within each industry, we then construct a value-weighted portfolio of 
high-ranked stocks and a portfolio of low-ranked stocks. As a general rule, the two 
portfolios are equal in size—namely, 30 percent of total capitalization—and mutually 
exclusive. In the rare case of a too small number of companies within an industry, we 
assign companies to both the high-ranked group and the low-ranked alternative to maintain 
a balance in the portfolios’ asset sizes. Based on the ratio of total industry capitalization to 
total market value of all companies in the NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ universe, we compute 
12 industry weights. Finally, we assign these weights to our subportfolios to obtain a best-
in-class portfolio and a worst-in-class portfolio. 
 Summary statistics on the portfolios are reported in Table 5. The best-in-class 
portfolio (before transaction costs) outperformed the worst-in-class portfolio by about 3 
percentage points. The portfolio Sharpe ratios indicate that the performance difference 
persisted after adjusting for volatility. Notice also that the worst-in-class portfolio 
comprised more companies and exhibited a higher turnover than the best-in-class portfolio. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative absolute return over time for the two portfolios. 
The cumulative performance difference between the high-ranked portfolio and the low-
ranked portfolio was substantial at the end of the observation period (i.e., approximately 66 
pps), but the return gap widened predominantly during the second half of the observation 
window. 
                                                          
35 Companies were assigned to one of the following industries: Consumer Durables, Consumer Non-
Durables, Manufacturing, Energy, Chemical, Business Equipment, Telephone and Television, 
Utilities, Shops, Health, Money/Finance, and all remaining. 
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TABLE 5.  Descriptive Statistics: Best-in-Class vs. Worst-in-Class Portfolio 
The table reports summary statistics on the two extreme portfolios. The best-in-class 
(worst-in-class) portfolio comprises firms having the highest (lowest) eco-efficiency score 
in each industry group. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the mean excess return to the 
standard deviation of return.The mean return, the standard deviation and the Sharpe ratio 
are annualized.  Sample period: 1995:07 – 2003:12 
 
  Mean StDev Sharpe Avg. 
Turnover 
Avg # 
firms 
       
Best-in-Class Portfolio  13.07 17.23 0.53 19.67% 88 
       
Worst-in-Class Portfolio  9.88 18.04 0.33 28.65% 163 
       
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Cumulative Returns of Two Portfolios, July 1995–December 2003 
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Table 6 reports performance results in the CAPM framework (Equation 1) for the two 
portfolios under several transaction-cost scenarios. Because best-in-class and worst-in-
class strategies are industry neutral in nature, we do not consider the model given by 
Equation 2. As in previous cases, we report alphas and factor loadings for the long position 
on the best-in-class portfolio, the long position on the worst-in-class portfolio, and the 
Difference portfolio (the worst-in-class portfolio returns subtracted from the best-in-class 
returns). Additionally, we evaluate a zero-investment strategy that goes long on the high-
ranked portfolio and short on the low-ranked portfolio. The long–short portfolio return is 
computed as the return on the Difference portfolio with zero transaction costs minus the 
sum of transaction costs associated with each of the two positions. 
On a market risk–adjusted basis, the alpha computed for the Difference portfolio 
(3.55 percent) is significant at the 10% level. Notice that this performance difference 
resembles the one reported previously in Table 2. Furthermore, the difference in 
performance between the two portfolios is also robust to the introduction of transaction 
costs. In fact, an increase in transaction costs leads to a widening of the return gap because 
the worst-in-class portfolio suffered from a higher turnover rate than the best-in-class 
portfolio. For example, in the 200 bp cost scenario, the return on the Difference portfolio is 
3.83 percent on a market risk–adjusted basis. 
Performance evaluation results for the long–short strategy underline the 
difficulties of long–short investing in the presence of transaction costs. As the level of 
transaction costs gradually increases from 0 to 200 bps, the long–short investment strategy 
experiences a decrease in risk-adjusted return. The statistical significance of alpha also 
falls. Although remaining economically large in all transaction costs scenarios, Jensen’s 
alpha is slightly affected in terms of statistical significance. The t-statistic corresponding to 
alpha under transaction costs of 50 basis points is 1.65 and the p-value is 0.101. 
Table 7 reports the outcomes of using Equation 3 for multivariate performance 
attribution analysis. As expected, the results are generally more pronounced after 
controlling for style bias. In the absence of transaction costs, the best-in-class portfolio 
outperformed the worst-in-class portfolio with an alpha for the Difference portfolio of 
almost 6 percent that is significant at the 5% level. Again, note that this performance 
estimate is similar to the one reported in Table 3.  
In the presence of transaction costs, the excess return on the best-in-class portfolio 
remains statistically significant. For instance, even in the scenario of 200 bp transaction 
costs, we find that the annualized alpha of the best-in-class portfolio is still large (3.43 
percent) and statistically significant at the 10% level. Unsurprisingly, the factor-adjusted 
return on the Difference portfolio is statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
transaction-cost scenarios. Table 7 also reports that the performance of the long–short 
portfolio is much better when we control not only for market risk but also for style tilts. All 
four-factor alphas are significant at standard levels regardless of the assumed level of
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transaction costs. 
In brief, our results suggest that various practical ways to exploit the eco-
efficiency premium are available. Which investment approach would be best is, however, 
difficult to say. Generally, the liquidity of the stocks, trading costs, the presence of short-
sales constraints, an investor’s attitude toward short selling, and the investor’s style 
preference play important roles in determining the optimal strategy. Liquidity seems a 
minor issue in the context of the SRI strategies in our study because the eco-efficient 
companies are the larger companies in the U.S. investment universe. As for trading costs, 
although we have examined them in general, a practitioner would be wise to carry out a 
more detailed analysis of potential trading costs of specific stocks before making 
investment decisions. Keim and Madhavan (1997), for example, documented variations in 
trading costs among institutions, investment styles, and markets. Short-selling constraints 
may limit investors’ abilities to exploit the eco-efficiency premium by using long–short 
positions, but the results provided here suggest that long positions in a simple best-in-class 
strategy are also capable of producing significant alpha under practical circumstances. 
Finally, given the importance of size and style factors in explaining the SRI portfolio 
returns, implementing SRI not only on an industry-balanced basis but also on a style-
neutral basis could be incrementally valuable. 
 
 
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
While conventional investment theory predicts that investors should be cautious about 
adopting SRI, we present evidence that a stock portfolio consisting of companies labeled 
‘most eco-efficient’ sizably outperformed its ‘less eco-efficient’ counterpart over the 
period 1995-2003. Using several enhanced performance attribution models to overcome 
methodological concerns, we show that the observed performance difference cannot be 
explained by differences in market sensitivity, investment style, or industry bias. Even in 
the presence of transaction costs, a simple best-in-class stock selection strategy historically 
earned a higher market risk-adjusted and style-adjusted return of 6% compared to a worst-
in-class portfolio. Overall, our findings suggest that the benefits of considering 
environmental criteria in the investment process can be substantial.  
Our results are puzzling in the sense that it is difficult to reconcile the observed 
performance differential with conventional asset pricing theory, and particularly the well-
established return-risk paradigm. The fact that common risk factors fail to account fully for 
the observed results raises the possibility of a mispricing story. However, testing a 
mispricing hypothesis is beyond the scope of this chapter. For now, we leave our findings 
open to interpretation and encourage future research to concentrate on longer time-series 
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data and to present complementary evidence from different countries. In Chapter 4, we 
provide further evidence on the sources of the observed abnormal return patterns. 
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Chapter 4 
The Economic Value of Corporate Eco-Efficiency36 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate environmental performance is considered an important component of the CSR 
construct, and its potential usefulness as a forward-looking measure of firm financial 
performance has gained acceptance, both in the literature and in practice. Although the 
assessment of the CSR-financial performance relationship relies heavily on qualitative data 
and subjective interpretation, the financial impact of environmental governance is easier to 
assess a priori, particularly now that the law punishes negative environmental performance 
with concrete financial penalties more than ever before. For example, 15 years after the 
widely reported Exxon Valdez oil spill drama in Alaska, a federal judge recently imposed 
punitive damages of more than $4 billion on the Exxon Mobil Corporation. 
However, several scholars have stressed that the financial information content of 
environmental performance is not evident by itself. Among others, Hart and Ahuja (1996), 
King and Lenox (2002), and Russo and Fouts (1997) emphasize that companies can 
display environmental awareness through “end-of-pipe” pollution control, where 
companies clean up emissions subsequent to the production process, but that proactive 
pollution prevention techniques embedded in the firm’s production processes are more 
likely to increase operating efficiency and profitability.  
Building on these assertions, we continue to focus on the concept of corporate 
eco-efficiency, a concept that reflects the environmental governance of the firm beyond 
that which is indicated by elementary environmental compliance and pollution control 
policies. Broadly, we can define eco-efficiency as creating more value with fewer 
environmental resources resulting in less environmental impact (for example, less pollution 
or natural resource exhaustion).   
Using a comprehensive database of firm-level eco-efficiency scores produced by 
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, we examine the relationship between corporate eco-
efficiency and financial performance over the period 1997 to 2004. The eco-efficiency data 
we use are made available on a monthly basis, allowing us to exploit statistical power. 
While the eco-efficiency scores we study are based on multidimensional research and are 
                                                          
36 This chapter extends the paper entitled “The Economic Value of Corporate Eco-Efficiency”. (See 
Guenster, N., J. Derwall, R. Bauer and K. Koedijk (2005), “The Economic Value of Corporate Eco-
Efficiency”, Paper Presented at the 2005 Meeting of The Academy of Management, Honolulu.) I 
thank the U.S. Social Investment Forum and the Haas School of Business for awarding the paper the 
2005 Moskowitz Prize and for financial support. 
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now monitored by some of the world’s largest institutional investors, the data have not yet 
received much attention in the empirical literature.  
By means of an accounting-based and a market-based measure, we capture 
different ways in which eco-efficiency influences financial performance. We use return on 
assets (ROA) which represents operating performance and profitability, and Tobin’s q (Q), 
which proxies for a company’s valuation. Q and ROA have several aspects in common but 
also differ in some important respects. ROA is based on firms’ contemporaneous income, 
whereas Tobin’s q is a forward-looking measure that reflects the intangible value investors 
assign to a company. Since eco-efficiency is associated with both, tangible and intangible 
benefits, discrepancies might occur between its relation to ROA and Q.  
The intangible nature of the benefits of eco-efficiency makes the task of valuing 
environmental governance complicated. Our recent study offers evidence that eco-
efficiency is value-relevant but is incorporated slowly into a company’s stock price. In 
Chapter 3, we composed two equity portfolios of stocks sorted on the eco-efficiency scores 
and assess their performance using elaborate performance attribution models. The results 
suggest that companies labeled the most eco-efficient significantly outperformed their least 
eco-efficient counterparts by approximately 6 percent per annum over the period 1995-
2003 after controlling for differences in risk, investment style and sector exposure. This 
evidence seems to contradict the widely held view that assets are priced efficiently. The 
abnormal returns could be explained by a period of adjustment, where stocks of eco-
efficient companies are initially undervalued and undergo a positive price correction 
subsequently. Accordingly, the upward trend in firm valuation generates anomalously high 
returns.  
The results reported in Chapter 3 have interesting research implications, 
suggesting that the relation between environmental governance and firm valuation should 
be studied in a multi-period cross-sectional framework. If stock prices did not accurately 
incorporate environmental information then studies on the market valuation of corporate 
environmental management that implicitly assume market efficiency may have been time-
specific and difficult to generalize. To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate 
whether the market’s valuation of environmental performance has strengthened over time 
by using a unique longitudinal sample of corporate eco-efficiency scores. We adopt a 
research design that allows for an exploration into both static and dynamic empirical 
relationships. 
Moreover, we study errors in the expectations of financial analysts to offer an 
explanation for both the abnormal return on stocks of environmental leaders reported in an 
earlier study and the prediction of a time-varying relation between eco-efficiency and firm 
value. We argue that the idea of a causal relation between firms’ eco-efficiency and stock 
performance is reinforced if we can link errors in analysts’ earnings forecast to firms’ 
environmental performance. Consistent with this intuition, we document a positive 
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association between analysts’ earnings forecast errors and firms’ eco-efficiency ranking. 
We find that analysts’ surprises about future earnings are more positive (or less negative) 
for our set of most eco-efficient firms, controlling for other factors correlated with earnings 
surprises. In doing so, we lend support to the conclusion that the positive abnormal returns 
associated with environmental leaders are realized because investors are positively 
surprised by the reported earnings of eco-efficient companies. 
Chapter 4 is organized as follows. First, in the next section, we give an overview 
of prior related research, taking into consideration the financial variables of interest to this 
research. This section also notes several limitations encountered in the literature and 
highlights the contribution of this study. Second, we outline several theoretical lines of 
reasoning pertaining to the link between corporate social (environmental) performance and 
financial performance. Third, we describe in more detail the database on corporate eco-
efficiency. Finally, we discuss the empirical analysis and the results of our study. 
 
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Researchers have long sought empirical evidence on the environmental-financial 
performance link. However, studies on CSR are well documented, but not well structured. 
Griffin and Mahon (1997) and Ullman (1985), among others, discuss this literature and 
point out that methodological inconsistencies across studies make most evidence 
incomparable and inconclusive. In this section, we review prior research while keeping in 
mind the financial performance variables central to this study: stock returns, firm value 
measured by Tobin’s q, and return on assets. 
 
Prior Evidence 
The empirical literature relating the environmental component of CSR to stock 
performance separates into three subsets: event studies that explore the immediate effects 
of social or environmental performance proxies on short-term stock price variability; cross-
sectional regression analyses that attempt to establish a longer-term relationship between 
CSR and stock returns; and portfolio studies that investigate the benefits of embedding 
CSR into investment decisions. 
 To date, event studies provide the best evidence of a link between environmental 
and stock market performance. This body of research, which includes studies by Hamilton 
(1995), Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), and Shane and Spicer (1983) suggests that 
although environmental pollution figures generally tend to have an influence on stock 
market performance, there is also an asymmetrical stock return sensitivity to environmental 
news. For example, Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) find evidence suggesting that a stock 
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price increase following positive environmental information about the firm is less strong 
than a price decline in response to negative news. 
  A second group of studies uses regression or correlation analysis to explore long-
term relationships between corporate environmental responsibility and stock returns. These 
studies provide mixed support for the notion of a relationship between environmental 
performance and shareholder value. Spicer (1978) reports that those companies in the U.S. 
pulp and paper industry that have better pollution control records have higher profitability 
figures and lower stock betas, but both Chen and Metcalf (1980) and Mahapatra (1984) fail 
to confirm the idea that pollution control initiatives are rewarded with improved stock 
performance. More consistent evidence pertains to markets outside the United States, for 
which Thomas (2001; U.K.) and Ziegler, Rennings and Schroeder (2002; Europe) 
document moderate evidence of a positive relationship between environmental 
performance and stock returns.  
Portfolio research involves a comparison of average risk-adjusted returns between 
two or more mutually exclusive portfolios. These portfolios are constructed using a 
company characteristic as a discriminating factor. Portfolios are usually evaluated by using 
a performance attribution model that controls for common intervening factors known to 
influence portfolio performance. Despite the popularity of this approach in the mainstream 
asset pricing literature (e.g., Fama and French, 1993), remarkably little research has 
applied environmental firm characteristics as a discerning variable. Among the few 
exceptions, research by Cohen, Fenn and Konar (1997) suggests that there is neither a 
premium nor a penalty for investing in environmental leader companies. On the other hand, 
White (1996) finds that his “green” portfolio provides a significantly positive market-risk 
adjusted return, while “brown” and “oatmeal” portfolios do not. Recent research in 
Derwall et al. (2005)/Chapter 3, which uses comprehensive performance evaluation 
techniques, suggests that eco-efficient companies jointly provide anomalously positive 
equity returns relative to their less-eco efficient peers over the period 1995-2003. 
 A relatively recent strand of research addresses the evidence on potential links 
between environmental performance and firm value. Generally, the evidence is uniform 
and points to a positive and significant relationship between environmental management 
policies and Tobin’s q. Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) separate multinational firms in 
their U.S. sample into three groups: firms that default internationally to (less stringent) 
local environmental standards; companies that apply U.S. environmental standards on an 
international scale; and firms that adopt more stringent standards than those required by 
U.S. law. Their results suggest that firms that adopt higher, more stringent environmental 
criteria have a higher firm valuation than those that use less stringent ones.  
 These findings are consistent with Konar and Cohen (2001), who suggest that 
firms that are disposing of relatively smaller amounts of toxic chemicals, and those that are 
confronted with fewer or no environmental lawsuits, tend to have a higher Q. King and 
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Lenox (2002) further expand previous research by disentangling the emissions of a large 
number of U.S. firms into sub-aggregates. The important conclusion from their work is that 
waste prevention and future firm value are positively associated, but that pollution 
reduction efforts by other means, such as “end-of-pipe” pollution treatment, do not affect 
Tobin’s q.  
 Another massive body of research relies on operating performance measures, 
predominantly using accounting data.  Not surprisingly, the results from this research are 
somewhat dependent on the choice of operating performance measure. A few empirical 
studies are of particular concern to our work. Considerable interest has been shown in the 
company’s return on assets as a dependent variable, primarily because ROA is one of the 
broadest measures of firm operating performance. For example, Freedman and Jaggi 
(1988) investigate the relation between environmental pollution disclosure and several 
accounting-based performance indicators but find little evidence to support the conjecture 
that there is a clear-cut and significant association. However, McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis (1988) show that, contrary to alternative measures in their study, ROA does 
correlate with their corporate social performance index. Russo and Fouts (1997) 
complement previous work, suggesting that environmental performance is positively 
connected with ROA but also that this association is more pronounced for high-growth 
industries. Hart and Ahuja (1996) and Waddock and Graves (1997) also report that several 
financial measures, including ROA, relate significantly to environmental performance 
indicators, but express some doubts regarding the direction of causality. In a more recent 
study, King and Lennox (2002) suggest that pollution prevention, but not pollution 
treatment, causes higher return on assets.37 
 
Contribution to Existing Literature 
While the research up to this point seems overwhelming at first glance, a substantial part of 
the evidence should be interpreted with caution. Our goal in this paper is to overcome 
several methodological limitations that are often encountered in the empirical literature. 
Broadly, our enhancements pertain to the following areas.  
 First, we address the problem of choosing an appropriate proxy for environmental 
performance. Corporate social (environmental) responsibility is a broad construct that can 
only be assessed with multidimensional indicators. As also suggested by Waddock and 
Graves (1997), the majority of related literature relies on measures that either lack 
sufficient depth and detail or, alternatively, are too noisy to be fully capable of measuring 
corporate social or environmental performance. In addition, as underscored by Konar and 
                                                          
37 Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003) do not follow the empirical methods of these studies but apply 
a meta-analytical approach on 52 prior studies that relate various CSR proxies to financial 
performance measures. Their findings suggest that better social responsibility and, to a lesser extent, 
better environmental responsibility most likely pay off in the form of better accounting performance. 
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Cohen (2001), most previous research analyzes data that only point towards historical 
performance. In contrast, our study builds on the concept of eco-efficiency, which is a 
more strictly defined construct and can be quantified by using Innovest’s eco-efficiency 
rating methodology. As we explain, the rating is not only intended to reflect historical 
environmental performance, but also to identify future environmental risks and 
opportunities. 
 Our second contribution concerns the choice and interpretation of financial 
performance criteria. We first use accounting-based and a market-based measures to assess 
the different pathways leading environmental management to financial performance. Using 
return on assets, we capture the association between environmental and operating 
performance. Via Tobin’s q (Q), we capture the value investors assign to environmental 
policies. 
 Moreover, we then extend earlier studies that implicitly infer a static relation 
between environmental management and performance based on market value measures. 
While Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000), King and Lennox (2002), and Konar and Cohen 
(2001) suggest that environmental governance is positively related to market value 
measures of performance, recent evidence casts doubt on whether environmental 
information is valued accurately. Chapter 3 of this dissertation points to an anomalously 
positive stock return differential between environmental leaders and laggards, suggesting 
that environmental information is incorporated slowly into stock prices. Those results 
motivate us to analyze whether the relation between environmental performance and 
Tobin’s q has strengthened over time. The environmental database we study is unique in 
that it covers monthly environmental performance ratings for more than eight years. Thus, 
it is an excellent means for testing time-varying relationships. Using a variant of the two-
step modeling approach introduced by Fama and MacBeth (1973), we are able to exploit 
the richness of information contained by both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of 
the data.  
 Finally, unlike other studies, this study aims to investigate the association between 
environmental performance and errors in investors’ expectations. If there is indeed a causal 
relation between environmental performance and stock return, consistent with the 
mispricing hypothesis to be discussed hereafter, we could expect that investors are 
systematically surprised by the differential operating income between eco-efficient firms 
and least eco-efficient firms. According to this interpretation, stocks of eco-efficient 
companies earn their larger return following the realization of positive surprises. We 
develop a proxy for investor surprises using errors in analysts’ earnings-per-share 
forecasts.  
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4.3. THEORETICAL DEBATES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
For several decades, the academic community has postulated models and hypotheses that 
relate corporate social and environmental responsibility to financial performance, mostly 
with the intention to provide a framework that aligns CSR with shareholder value creation. 
Despite the growing academic attention for the CSR-financial performance relationship, 
management scientists and financial economists have developed their ideas in this area 
almost autonomously. Corporate management theories up to this point discuss many 
benefits to CSR, but leave unexplained questions that are critically relevant to shareholders 
of socially and environmentally responsible companies. Modern investment theories fill 
that gap. In this section, we introduce and test hypotheses that combine management and 
financial theories. Both theories are critical for understanding how firms’ environmental 
management relates to financial performance. 
 
Management Theories 
The CSR-financial performance relationship is the source of considerable debate. Theories 
in the management literature are far from uniform and, as pointed out by Griffin and 
Mahon (1997), more than 25 years of empirical research has been unable to overcome 
long-lasting theoretical divides. 
The roots of the debates go back decades. During the 1960s, the concepts of 
corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investing were gaining momentum. 
However, opponents of CSR quite forcefully questioned the validity of CSR in the context 
of what they believed is the purpose of the firm: maximizing shareholder wealth. In 
general, opponents of the concept of CSR raise two critical points: 
 
• CSR is far from well defined. A view shared by many skeptics, including 
Friedman (1962), is that managers are unable to determine what the social 
responsibility of their company is. Many managers believe that the only 
responsibility of the firm is to engage in profitable activities. Shareholders 
themselves are capable of deciding whether their stock income sufficiently 
represents social awareness.  
 
• CSR is expensive and decreases shareholder value. At least partially because of 
the problem of determining the social responsibility of businesses, a common 
criticism of CSR cites the financial dangers of adopting corporate social 
responsibility principles. Several critics stress that CSR initiatives inherently 
demand significant portions of a company’s financial resources, but the potential 
financial benefits of such initiatives are mostly in the distant future, if these 
benefits are evident at all (e.g., Henderson (2002), Walley and Whitehead (1994)). 
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Briefly, the main concern expressed by CSR skeptics is that the costs associated with 
corporate social performance improvements are likely to outweigh the financial benefits, 
which makes CSR inconsistent with the principles of shareholder wealth maximization. 
In contrast, a sizable number of CSR proponents have put forward a long list of the 
advantages to corporate social responsibility. Their reasoning is that organizations can 
generate significant goodwill and new market opportunities by displaying social and 
environmental awareness (e.g., Fombrun, Gardberg and Barnett (2000), Hart and Ahuja 
(1996), Porter and Van der Linde (1995) Russo and Fouts (1997)). However, there is a 
growing belief that the economic benefits depend on the nature of environmental 
performance. More and more often, researchers argue that the advantages resulting from 
social and environmental compliance with regulatory requirements are not a primary 
source of competitive advantage. For example, the mere fact of environmental compliance 
hardly allows a company to distinguish itself from its competitors, because most intra-
industry peers are affected by compliance in a similar way. As pointed out by Dowell, Hart 
and Yeung (2000), Hart and Ahuja (1996), and Russo and Fouts (1997), real benefits to 
organizations are likely to come from more rigorous (i.e., proactive) forms of 
environmental performance that require both changes in production and manufacturing 
processes and a forward-looking management style. Hillman and Keim (2001) add that 
CSR initiatives can pay off, as long as these efforts are in the interest of the company’s 
primary stakeholders.  
Conditional on these lines of reasoning, specific arguments in favor of CSR 
include: 
 
• CSR is associated with reputational benefits. Several scholars suggest that 
adopting corporate social responsibility policies may lead to improvements in the 
firm’s image (e.g., Davis, 1973). Because the firm’s social performance record 
can proxy for labor conditions, socially responsible companies gain a competitive 
advantage by improving their ability to attract high-quality employees. Empirical 
evidence by Turban and Greening (1996) strongly supports this line of reasoning. 
Apart from human-resource benefits, other researchers, for instance, 
Vandermerwe and Oliff (1990), and Russo and Fouts (1997), mention the 
possibility that reputational advantages result in sales benefits, because customers 
may be sensitive to social issues. Similarly, reputational increases may affect 
relationships with potential suppliers and lenders. 
 
• CSR can also serve as a proxy for management skills. Alexander and Buchholz 
(1978) and Bowman and Haire (1975) suggest that corporate social and 
environmental performance reflects management quality. A structural and 
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dedicated CSR policy might inherently require commitment to CSR among and 
between all levels of the firm as well as a forward-thinking, long-term-oriented 
management (Shrivastava (1995)).  
 
• CSR may also reflect (technological) innovativeness. For example, Porter and van 
der Linde (1995) argue that poor environmental performance is a sign of the 
firm’s operational inefficiency, which ultimately leads to competitive 
disadvantages. In addition, the resource-based view towards environmental 
governance, as outlined by Russo and Fouts (1997), says that a proactive 
environmental policy within the firm ultimately requires a structural change in 
production and service delivery processes. This redesign involves the 
development, acquisition, and implementation of new technologies and may lead 
to economic advantages vis-à-vis competitors.  
 
In fact, the resource-based view suggests that only pro-active environmental governance is 
a source of financial benefits, which will be unique to the firm and difficult to obtain by 
competitors. Since eco-efficiency closely coincides with the resource-based view in that it 
represents pro-active environmental management, we arrive at the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Eco-efficiency relates positively to operating performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Financial Theories 
Now, more than ever before, financial-market participants have been paying attention to 
CSR. Institutional investors are demonstrating their interest in the concepts CSR and 
socially responsible investing (SRI) as a means of fulfilling their social and financial 
obligations. Recent estimates by the Social Investment Forum (2003) suggest that the 
market for socially responsible investments currently covers approximately 12 percent of 
the market as a whole.  
Analogous to these developments, researchers, starting with Moskowitz (1972), 
have put forward theoretical frameworks that either support or reject the validity of CSR 
from an investor perspective. These frameworks rely on established asset pricing theories 
which center on the risk-return paradigm.  
The risk-return paradigm is important because it highlights that managerial 
perspectives towards CSR are only one part of the story. Although there is a tendency 
among management scholars to believe that firms are doing well by engaging in activities 
that increase their (intangible) value, financial theories add important insights on benefits 
from such activities in terms of risk-adjusted returns to stockholders. Whether investors 
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benefit from holding stocks of socially responsible companies depends on how investors 
perceive CSR.  
Recall Hamilton, Jo, and, Statman (1993), who note that financial markets may 
respond to corporate social responsibility information in three different ways: 
 
• In scenario one, the market does not value corporate social responsibility. 
Investors do not tie better social or environmental performance to lower risk. 
Consequently, the expected stock returns of CSR leaders are no different from 
those of laggards, all else equal, and firm value is independent of environmental 
governance. This scenario would be supported empirically by evidence that a 
relation between CSR and market-based measures of firm value is not statistically 
significant. This scenario can apply to CSR as well as any of its subsets. When 
focused on the concept of eco-efficiency, the hypothesis that follows from this 
scenario can be stated as: 
 
H2a: Eco-efficiency is not associated with firm value, ceteris paribus.  
 
• Contrary to scenario one, the second scenario predicts that investors do value 
CSR. As suggested by Narver (1971), Shane and Spicer (1983) and Spicer (1978), 
firms with a strong social or environmental performance record might be regarded 
as less risky investments compared to poor environmental performers. In the risk-
return framework, the notion that social and environmental leaders are less risky 
investments than laggards implies that investors demand a lower return on these 
firms’ stocks. Because investors assign a lower discount rate to expected future 
cash flows of socially responsive companies, these firms have a higher value. We 
note that if capital markets incorporate information related to CSR efficiently, we 
can assume that expected returns on stocks compensate investors fairly for the 
associated risk, and that risk-adjusted stock returns are consistent with an 
equilibrium setting. When the focus is on the economic significance of corporate 
eco-efficiency, the hypothesis consistent with the second scenario is stated as: 
 
H2b: Eco-efficiency is positively associated with firm value, ceteris paribus. 
 
• Scenario three describes disequilibrium. This scenario raises the possibility that 
the paradigm is violated in practice and suggests that the market does not price 
CSR efficiently. Investors may find it complicated to value the benefits or costs 
associated with environmental governance, particularly intangible ones. Whether 
environmental information is slowly impounded into stock prices has important 
implications for both firm value and stock returns. Under the previous scenario, 
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the expected returns on environmental leaders firms, all else equal, should be 
lower than those of environmental laggards. In the third case, however, stocks of 
socially responsible companies can be initially undervalued (overvalued) relative 
to those of less socially responsible companies and ultimately produce higher 
(lower) risk-adjusted returns. Our recent evidence from Chapter 3 indicates that 
eco-efficient stock portfolios outperformed their least eco-efficient counterparts 
by more than is suggested by investment risk, supporting an undervaluation 
hypothesis. The study in Chapter 3 motivates the following hypothesis: 
 
H2c: The valuation differential between the most eco-efficient firms and the least 
eco-efficient firms increases over time, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
Collecting evidence in support of this hypothesis requires that we analyze the market’s 
valuation of firms’ CSR characteristics over time. The unique longitudinal dimension of 
the environmental data in this study satisfies that condition. 
 Up to this point, empirical evidence in favor of or against the mispricing 
hypothesis mainly stems from studies that evaluate the risk-adjusted stock returns of firms 
that embrace CSR versus those of firms that do not. A more direct test in support of a 
mispricing story, one that is also consistent with a causal relation between environmental 
performance and future stock returns, focuses on whether investors fully anticipate the 
earnings performance differentials of firm that differ in environmental performance. Our 
final hypothesis is based on the idea that if investors indeed do not understand the 
implications of environmental management for future operating cash flows, they will be 
surprised when the realized earnings of environmental leaders (laggards) firms are high 
(low) relative to their earnings forecast. To establish that (operating) cash flow differences 
caused by environmental management trigger, in turn, future stock return differences, we 
must test the hypothesis that the differential operating performance between eco-efficient 
and least-eco efficient companies was unexpected by investors. When we take into account 
prior evidence of positive abnormal returns for eco-efficient firms and when we use 
analysts’ earnings forecast as a proxy for investors’ expectations, we derive the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: Analysts’ earnings forecast errors are more positive (less negative) for eco-
efficient firms than for less eco-efficient firms, ceteris paribus. 
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4.5. DATA 
 
Eco-Efficiency Data 
Among both managers and scholars, there is no consensus as to precisely what constitutes 
the social or environmental responsibility of the firm. Traditional proxies for 
environmental performance, such as environmental reports by third-party organizations, 
typically rely on news concerning absolute pollution levels. However, these indicators of 
environmental responsibility address merely a single dimension of a company’s 
environmental performance and usually reflect historical environmental events.  
We focus on eco-efficiency. As noted earlier, we define a firm’s eco-efficiency as 
the ability to create more value while using fewer environmental resources, such as water, 
air, oil, coal and other limited natural endowments. Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) 
interpret eco-efficiency as the ability of companies to minimize pollution by improving the 
production and manufacturing process. This form of environmental responsibility 
represents proactive environmental management, one which concentrates on good 
environmental performance from changes in operational efficiency, rather than by adopting 
standards for pollution control at the “end of the pipe”.  
Eco-efficiency usually measures the environmental performance of a firm in a 
relative sense. To understand the difference between absolute and relative environmental 
performance, consider, for example, firms that operate in environmentally sensitive 
industries such as mining, energy, or chemicals. In absolute terms, these firms are usually 
regarded as poor environmental performers. However, at the intra-industry level, firms 
facing the same environmental challenges can still do well relative to competitors, and can 
benefit from this financially. 
We explore empirical relationships between eco-efficiency and several 
dimensions of corporate financial performance. To do so, we use eco-efficiency scores 
developed by Innovest Strategic Value Advisors. Since the Innovest data have received 
little attention in previous research, by using Innovest’s data we can provide new evidence.  
One of the main strengths of this database is its comprehensiveness. Using over 20 
information sources, both quantitative and qualitative in nature, Innovest’s analysts 
evaluate a company relative to its industry peers via an analytical matrix. Companies are 
evaluated by more than 60 criteria, which jointly constitute the final rating. For each of 
these factors, all companies receive a (sub)score. As these variables are not considered 
equally important in the overall assessment of eco-efficiency, each factor is weighted 
differently. For example, Innovest analysts consider a firm’s environmental product 
development as more important than certification by a third party that is devoted to 
promoting environmental awareness. The final numerical rating analysts assign to a 
company is converted into a relative score based on the total spread of scores in the sector 
to which the firm belongs.  
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 The eco-efficiency score reflects environmental performance in five fundamental 
areas. The first broad area covers historical liabilities, which concern the risks (and 
opportunities) a firm faces in consequence of past environmental behavior. Among other 
things, this category covers superfund liabilities, state and hazardous waste sites, and toxic 
torts. A second component represents contemporaneous operating risk, addressing risk 
exposures from events that are more recent. This category includes, for example, toxic 
emissions, product risk liabilities, waste discharges, and supply-chain management risk. 
The third area, which can be labeled “sustainability and eco-efficiency risk,” pertains to the 
weakening of a firm’s material sources of long-term profitability and competitiveness, and 
the potential future risks initiated by this development. This area spans energy intensity, 
energy efficiency, the durability and recyclability of the product life cycle, but also the 
extent to which companies are exposed to changes in consumer values. The fourth area 
covered by the score concerns managerial risk efficiency. This category represents the 
ability of the company to manage environmental risks successfully, as can be witnessed 
from, e.g., the quality of supply chain management, environmental audit/accounting 
capacity, the strength of environmental management systems, training capacity. The last 
dimension involves business prospects resulting from eco-efficiency, such as the degree to 
which businesses can reap future competitive advantages from environmentally driven 
market trends and profit opportunities provided that the company’s management has well-
developed eco-efficiency policies. 
From this brief overview, it becomes apparent that Innovest’s eco-efficiency 
measure is intended to embody both ex post (i.e., historical and current) and ex ante (i.e., 
forward-looking) dimensions of corporate eco-efficiency.  
In this paper, we consider firms listed on the U.S. stock markets. As we also use various 
financial data, we match the Innovest database to the CRSP U.S. stock database and to the 
Compustat U.S. Research database. We match by ticker, company name, and CUSIP 
number. The resulting data set is survivor-bias-free in the sense that it includes not only 
firms that were covered by Innovest recently, but also those which disappeared over time, 
for instance, due to merger or bankruptcy. Further details on the financial data will be 
given in the appropriate sections. 
We convert Innovest’s seven non-numerical ratings into numerical eco-efficiency 
scores, where the highest-ranked firms receive a rating equal to six and lowest-ranked 
firms receive a rating of zero.  
Table 1 shows some statistics on the eco-efficiency scores over time. These 
statistics are merely descriptive and serve as some background for the analyses that follow.  
The table shows results for five particular dates. We note that the last date covered 
by Table 1 is September 2004, because the financial data are reported on a quarterly basis 
(i.e., we regress fourth-quarter financial measures on eco-efficiency scores that are dated 
September). Over the period 1996-2004, the average rating decreases from 3.04 to 2.30. 
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The median rating decreases from 3 to 2. The standard deviation varies only mildly over 
time. 
The table also reports the frequency of the eco-efficiency score broken up into 
seven categories. Statistics on the number of firms within each rating category explain the 
decrease in average eco-efficiency rating. The number of firms that receive an eco-
efficiency score below 3 increases more strongly compared to the number of firms that 
have a score of 4 or higher.  
The number of firms in the sample increases considerably over time. Our data set 
includes scores for 154 companies at the end of December 1996 and 519 firms at the end of 
September 2004. 
 
Financial Data 
To accomplish our objective of investigating the association between eco-efficiency and 
several dimensions of corporate financial performance, we first analyze the connection 
between eco-efficiency and operating performance. Our primary interest is in a broad 
measure of operating performance that addresses both profitability and efficiency. Inspired 
by Barber and Lyon (1996), we measure operating performance by the company’s return 
on assets. Our set of control variables is similar to Waddock and Graves (1997). We 
control for the influence of firm size and the firm’s riskiness. We measure size by the 
firm’s total assets and by total sales. The debt-to-asset ratio represents risk. We use data 
from Compustat to construct all variables. 
Next, we turn our attention to the role of eco-efficiency in firm valuation, using 
the Tobin’s q measure. Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we compute Q as the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is 
defined as the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock 
outstanding minus the sum of the book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred 
taxes. Although there are more sophisticated approaches to computing Q, we use the most 
efficient approximation to ensure sufficient data availability throughout our sample period. 
Further, as shown by Perfect and Wiles (1994), and by Chung and Pruitt (1994), this proxy 
for Q is highly correlated with estimates that are more complex.  
Our Tobin’s q analysis accounts for potentially confounding influences. Because 
researchers such as Hirsch (1991) show that recent sales growth is positively related to 
company valuation, we include past two-year sales growth as a control variable. 
Furthermore, related work, including Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000), King and Lenox 
(2002), and Konar and Cohen (2001), suggests that firm value is positively related to R&D 
expenses. To parse out this relationship, our control set contains research and development 
expenses scaled by sales as an additional explanatory variable. To condition on differences 
in operating performance we use return on assets. Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), we use the logarithm of the book value of assets to account for differences in firm 
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size. We also include firm age. As an approximation of the firm’s age, we compute the 
difference between the first trading day and the respective date of the analysis. Since the 
database “Exshare”, from which we retrieve the first trading days, was established in 
November 1984, we lack information before 1984. If firms were founded before this date, 
we still assume that founding occurred in 1984.  
 
 
 TABLE 1. Summary Statistics on Eco-Efficiency Scores 
The table summarizes the mean eco-efficiency and median scores, the standard deviation 
of the score, and the number of firms with a given score, observed at the end of 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, and September 2004, respectively. The Change column gives changes 
in these values over the beginning and the end of the sample period. 
 
  Dec.-96 Dec.-98 Dec.-00 Dec.-02 Sept.-04 Change (‘96-‘04) 
       
Eco-Efficiency Ratings      
       
Mean Rating 3.04 2.82 2.71 2.49 2.30 -0.74 
       
Median Rating 3 3 3 2 2 1.00 
       
Standard Deviation 1.80 1.94 1.88 1.83 1.68 0.03 
       
       
Number of Companies      
       
Eco-Efficiency = 0 19 46 79 65 71 52 
Eco-Efficiency = 1 13 39 54 99 133 120 
Eco-Efficiency = 2 28 39 63 66 109 81 
Eco-Efficiency = 3 28 43 102 65 70 42 
Eco-Efficiency = 4 27 46 64 62 67 40 
Eco-Efficiency = 5 27 37 45 43 49 22 
Eco-Efficiency = 6 12 28 42 30 20 8 
       
Total 154 278 449 430 519 365 
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Finally, we consider a dummy variable that is equal to unity if the firm is listed on the 
Nasdaq exchange and zero otherwise. The dummy controls for atypically high Tobin’s q 
values of Nasdaq firms that may have occurred during the stock market hype of the late 
nineties. We construct all variables other than firm age using data from Compustat. 
 
 
   
TABLE 2. Summary Statistics on Tobin’s q and ROA 
Cross-sectional statistics are reported for the first quarter (Q1) of 1997, 1999, 
2001, 2003 and the last quarter of 2004. 
 
  1997 Q1 1999 Q1 2001 Q1 2003 Q1 2004 Q4 
      
Tobin’s q (Q)      
      
Mean Q 1.73 2.30 2.22 1.75 1.99 
Median Q 1.46 1.55 1.56 1.30 1.61 
Standard Deviation 1.00 1.87 1.68 1.16 1.23 
Skewness 2.91 2.41 2.30 2.68 2.68 
Kurtosis 14.83 9.21 9.50 13.29 13.36 
      
Return on Assets (ROA)     
      
Mean ROA 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Median ROA 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Standard Deviation 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Skewness 0.08 0.51 0.38 0.89 0.59 
Kurtosis 5.60 3.66 5.90 6.42 5.16 
          
  
 
 
 
To show the distribution of ROA and Q, Table 2 reports descriptive statistics pertaining to 
five specific dates. The distribution of ROA is quite symmetric. Median and mean values 
for ROA do not display a large discrepancy, being similar in value and time invariant. As 
for the distribution of Tobin’s q, we can see that there is some non-normality in the data. Q 
has a distribution that is peaked and leptokurtic, as indicated by the high values for 
skewness and kurtosis. Arguably, the stock market fad of 2000 plays an important role in 
explaining the long right tail in the Q data. Further, we observe differences in the cross-
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sectional median Q and the mean Q over time. The median values for Tobin’s q remain 
relatively stable but mean values are much higher during the technology boom and bust 
period. We alleviate potential problems associated with non-normality by doing robustness 
tests after having industry-adjusted, taken in logs, and trimmed the data, respectively. The 
dummy variable for companies listed on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange captures potentially 
extreme Tobin’s q values during the technology bubble. 
 
 
4.6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Eco-Efficiency and Return on Assets 
In order to analyze the relation between eco-efficiency and operating performance, we 
follow the multivariate model of Waddock and Graves (1997). Cross-sectional analysis is 
most suitable for testing our hypotheses. Since our data are longitudinal in nature, 
periodical regressions can be performed. We estimate the following cross-sectional models 
quarter by quarter from 1997 to 2004: 
 
ROAit = αi + β1Eco-Efficiencyit + γit Xit + εit,                                (1) 
 
ROAit = αi + β0High Eco-Efficiencyit + β1Low Eco-Efficiencyit + γit Xit + εit,             (2) 
 
where ROAit denotes return on assets. We consider modeling both ROA and the firm’s 
ROA relative to the industry median ROA. Eco-Efficiencyit in model (1) represents the 
firm’s eco-efficiency score. This model, therefore, assumes linear relations. To account for 
the possibility of nonlinearity in the relation between eco-efficiency and our financial 
measures we develop an alternative model. In specification (2), we replace the absolute 
eco-efficiency score with two dummy variables that specify whether firm i is the most or 
the least eco-efficient. High Eco-Efficiencyit (Low Eco-Efficiencyit) is equal to one if firm i 
is rated five or six (zero or one) at t, and zero otherwise. Xit is a vector of control variables 
and γ is a vector of coefficients. We allow for permutations of the regressors. Candidate 
control variables include the firm’s size measured either by total assets or by total sales, 
and the debt-to-asset ratio. Using a variant of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method, we 
compute time-series averages of the 32 cross-sectional regression coefficients. We 
calculate corresponding t-statistics based on standard errors from the 32 parameter 
estimates which we obtain for each variable.  
Table 3 reports the time-series average coefficients and corresponding t-statistics. 
We note that the coefficient estimates for all control variables are consistent with those 
reported by Waddock and Graves (1997). With the exception of total sales, they are all 
statistically significant at the usual cut-off levels. 
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In panel A of Table 3, we report coefficients on the eco-efficiency score. ECOit 
has a coefficient that is positive and significant at the 1% level. All specifications indicate 
that the positive relation between eco-efficiency and ROA is robust to changes in the set of 
dependent and control variables. The results of replacing Eco-Efficiencyit with High Eco-
Efficiencyit and Low Eco-Efficiencyit are shown in Panel B of Table 3. There is weak 
evidence of an asymmetry in the relation between eco-efficiency and operating 
performance. Our estimates suggest that the underperformance of the least eco-efficient 
firms (relative to the reference group) is almost twice as large as the outperformance of the 
most eco-efficient companies. Moreover, the operational underperformance associated 
with environmental laggards is significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The 
outperformance of environmental leaders is marginally significant.  
From an economic perspective, eco-efficiency relates sizably to operating 
performance. The increase in absolute ROA resulting from a one-point rise in eco-
efficiency ranking is estimated at 0.09 percentage points, ceteris paribus, which is about 
2.2 percent of the sample average ROA we observe in Table 2. To get an impression of the 
asymmetrical influence of eco-efficiency on operating performance, we can estimate how 
much loss in ROA a firm in the reference group (category 2, 3 and 4) would prevent by 
avoiding a low eco-efficiency ranking. Panel B points out that the loss prevention amounts 
to about 0.32 percentage points, which is 8.4 percent of the average ROA. The gain a firm 
can achieve by obtaining a high eco-efficiency rating is approximately 0.14 percent points, 
which is about 3.6 percent of the average ROA.  
In support of H1, we find a positive relation between eco-efficiency and operating 
performance. Our evidence also suggests that the relation is asymmetric, for which we 
offer two explanations. First, although our ratings are converted into numbers, they have 
no real unit of measurement. Caveats associated with ordinal data could prevent us from 
accurately measuring differences in eco-efficiency and induce false suggestions of an 
asymmetry. A second explanation is that the negative financial impact resulting from poor 
environmental governance is mostly tangible of nature and therefore visibly reflected in 
operating performance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the clean-up costs associated 
with oil spills and hazardous waste sides might directly decrease earnings. In addition, the 
reputational damage resulting from environmental accidents can lead to customer boycotts 
which directly affect sales and profits. In contrast, strong environmental policies might 
largely be associated with intangible benefits, such as strong management skills, 
technological innovativeness and brand reputation that materialize slowly.  
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TABLE 3. Eco-Efficiency and Return on Assets 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series mean coefficient and the 
corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses). Note: Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 1. 
High-Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. To compute the difference between the 
coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency coefficient from the coefficient of the 
High Eco-Efficiency dummy. The coefficients are multiplied by 100. Ind-Adj. ROA is 
industry-adjusted return on assets. The sample period is 1997-Q1 – 2004-Q4.  
 
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
 
 Panel A: Equation (1)  
  ROA  
Ind.Adj. 
ROA  ROA  
Ind.Adj. 
ROA  
Intercept     4.19***      0.20***     4.17***      0.20***  
 (26.70) (3.76) (26.31) (3.72)  
Eco-Efficiency       0.09***      0.09***      0.08***      0.08***  
  (8.05) (6.69) (7.22) (6.55)  
Low Eco-Efficiency       
      
High Eco-Efficiency        
       
       
Difference: High - Low 
Eco-Efficiency      
      
Control variables:       
Book Value of Assets    -4.74 E-6 ***   -2.23 E-6 ***    
 (-11.81) (-4.98)    
Debt/Assets -3.17***     -1.86*** -3.27***    -1.91***  
 (-6.45) (-5.83) (-6.77) (-5.88)  
Sales   -5.32 E-6     -7.39 E-6 *  
        (-1.54)  (-2.01)   
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TABLE 3 Continued. Eco-Efficiency and Return on Assets 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series mean coefficient and the 
corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses). Note: Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 1. 
High-Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. To compute the difference between the 
coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency coefficient from the coefficient of the 
High Eco-Efficiency dummy. The coefficients are multiplied by 100. Ind-Adj. ROA is 
industry-adjusted return on assets. The sample period is 1997-Q1 – 2004-Q4.  
 
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
 Panel B: Equation (2)  
  ROA  
Ind.Adj. 
ROA  ROA  
Ind.Adj. 
ROA  
Intercept     4.50***     0.51***    4.45***    0.50***  
 (27.42) (8.61) (26.50) (8.24)  
Eco-Efficiency       
       
Low Eco-Efficiency     -0.34***    -0.32***    -0.31***    -0.31***  
 (-7.45) (-6.49) (-6.63) (-6.33)  
High Eco-Efficiency      0.19**  0.11*   0.15** 0.10  
  (2.60) (1.75) (2.20) (1.64)  
       
Difference: High - Low 
Eco-Efficiency      0.52***     0.43***     0.46***     0.41***  
 (9.05) (6.98) (7.92) (6.86)  
Control variables:       
Book Value of Assets    -4.64 E-6 *** -2.17 E-6 ***    
 (-10.90) (-4.89)    
Debt/Assets     -3.20***    -1.89***    -3.31*** -1.94***  
 (-6.38) (-5.74) (-6.69) (-5.80)  
Sales     -4.70 E-6   -6.25 E-6   
        (-1.30)  (-1.69)   
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Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value 
To examine empirically the relation between eco-efficiency and firm valuation, we 
estimate quarterly the following cross-sectional models:  
 
Qit = αi + β1 Eco-Efficiencyit + γit Xit + εit,                    (3) 
Qit = αi + β0 High Eco-Efficiencyit + β1Low Eco-Efficiencyit + γit Xit + εit                   (4) 
 
In model (3), Qit denotes Tobin’s q for firm i in quarter t, and Eco-Efficiencyit represents 
the eco-efficiency rating of firm i at t. Xit is a vector of control variables and γ denotes a 
vector of coefficients. In model (4), we replace Eco-Efficiencyit with two dummy variables 
that indicate whether firm i is eligible for inclusion in a high-ranked portfolio or a low-
ranked portfolio similar to that of Derwall et al. (2005); see Chapter 3. The variable High 
Eco-Efficiencyit (Low Eco-Efficiencyit) is equal to unity if firm i is rated five or six (zero 
or one), and zero otherwise.  
 Because we consider several model specifications, Xit contains permutations of 
the following candidate regressors: the firm’s two-year sales growth, firm age, firms size 
measured by the logarithm of the book value of total assets, return on assets, R&D 
spending, an interaction term between sales growth and R&D spending, and a dummy 
variable for Nasdaq companies. From the 32 quarterly regressions, performed over the 
period January 1997 to December 2004, we compute Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series 
averages and their respective t-statistics. We also allow for some variation in the dependent 
variable by repeating the estimation of (1) and (2) using, respectively, an industry-adjusted 
Q (Q minus the industry median Q), Q in logs, and a trimmed Q as a dependent variable. 
Trimming mitigates the effect of potential outliers in Tobin’s q. We adopt the trimming 
approach of Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) and remove observations using the 0.995 
percentile and the 0.005 percentile as upper and lower boundaries. 
Table 4 shows the results for the main model specifications. Panel A of Table 4 
reports the results of estimating equation (3). The first column of this panel reports the 
results of a regression based on a standard, unmodified Q. The additional columns present 
the results of using, respectively, industry-adjusted Q (Q minus the industry median Q), Q 
in logs, and trimmed Q. Taken as a whole, regardless of the choice of the dependent 
variable, the coefficients on most control variables (sales growth, size and ROA and firm 
age) are significant and carry signs that are consistent with a priori expectations and with 
previous research. The only exceptions are the age variable, for which the coefficient 
weakens once we use industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, and the sales growth variable, which 
becomes insignificant when we take the logarithm of Q as a dependent variable. 
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TABLE 4. Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value (Tobin’s q) 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series mean coefficient and the 
corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses). Note: Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 1. 
High-Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. To compute the difference between the 
coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency coefficient from the coefficient of the High 
Eco-Efficiency dummy. Ind.-adj. Q is the industry-adjusted Q. Sample period: 1997-Q1 – 
2004-Q4. 
 
 Panel A: Equation (3) 
  Q  Ind. Adj. Q  Log(Q)  Trimmed Q 
      
Intercept      1.59***    -0.78**      0.49***      1.55*** 
 (4.75) (-2.62) (4.51) (4.93) 
Eco-Efficiency      0.07***     0.05***      0.03***      0.07*** 
 (5.46) (6.45) (8.16) (5.35) 
Low Eco-Efficiency      
     
High Eco-Efficiency      
     
     
Difference: High-Low  
Eco-Efficiency     
     
Control variables:     
Sales Growth    0.15**    0.13** 2.78E-3 0.13* 
 (2.30) (2.10) (0.21) (2.03) 
Firm Age   -0.02** -0.02*    -8.72E-3***   -0.02** 
 (-2.28) (-1.73) (-3.30) (-2.37) 
Log (Book Value of 
Assets)     -0.10*** 1.85E-3     -0.05***     -0.09*** 
 (-4.07) (0.10) (-6.48) (-3.86) 
Return on Assets      38.89***      30.94***      13.98***       37.03*** 
  (17.65)  (19.02)  (22.91)  (16.76) 
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 4 Continued. Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value (Tobin’s q) 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series mean coefficient and the 
corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses). Note: Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 1. 
High-Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. To compute the difference between the 
coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency coefficient from the coefficient of the High 
Eco-Efficiency dummy. Ind.-adj. Q is the industry-adjusted Q. Sample period: 1997-Q1 – 
2004-Q4. 
 
 Panel B: Equation (4) 
  Q  Ind. Adj. Q  Log(Q)  Trimmed Q 
      
Intercept      1.78***     -0.70**      0.57***      1.75*** 
 (4.89)  (-2.21) (4.88) (5.06) 
Eco-Efficiency     
     
Low Eco-Efficiency      -0.28***     -0.21***      -0.11***     -0.29*** 
 (-8.96) (-7.55) (-7.37) (-8.59) 
High Eco-Efficiency     0.10**    6.02E-3     0.07***    0.10** 
 (2.09) (0.18) (6.89) (2.28) 
     
Difference: High-Low  
Eco-Efficiency      0.39***     0.22***     0.17***     0.39*** 
 (5.87) (5.60) (8.53) (5.89) 
Control variables:     
Sales Growth    0.15**    0.13** 2.07E-3    0.13** 
 (2.29) (2.07) (0.15) (2.04) 
Firm Age  -0.02* -0.02     -0.01***    -0.02** 
 (-2.00) (-1.46) (-3.10) (-2.06) 
Log (Book Value of 
Assets)     -0.09***    8.73E-3      -0.05***     -0.09*** 
 (-3.93) (0.48) (-6.40) (-3.73) 
Return on Assets     38.85***     31.00***     13.98***      36.99*** 
  (17.55)  (18.88)  (22.58)  (16.61) 
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 5. Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value: Robustness Checks 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series mean coefficient and the 
corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses). Note: Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 
1. High-Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. To compute the difference between the 
coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency coefficient from the coefficient of the 
High Eco-Efficiency dummy. Ind.-adj. Q is the industry-adjusted Q. Sample period: 1997-
Q1 – 2004-Q4. 
 
 Panel A: Equation (3) 
  Q  Q  Q  Q   
         
Intercept     1.59***  0.62* 0.53*    0.65**  
 (4.75)  (2.02) (1.83) (2.55)  
Eco-Efficiency      0.07***      0.04***     0.04***     0.05***  
  (5.46)  (4.45) (4.69) (4.95)  
Low Eco-Efficiency        
       
High Eco-Efficiency         
        
        
Difference: High-Low  
Eco-Efficiency      
        
Control variables:        
Sales Growth    0.15**      0.67*** -0.04 0.09*  
 (2.30)  (3.61) (-0.31) (1.92)  
Firm Age   -0.02**  -0.01 -0.01 -4.45E-3  
 (-2.28)  (-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.55)  
Log (Book Value of 
Assets)     -0.10***    -0.05** -0.03 -0.03  
 (-4.07)  (-2.34) (-1.38) (-1.60)  
Return on Assets       38.89***       41.11***     41.18***      38.41***  
  (17.65)  (26.50) (23.96) (20.05)  
R&D / Sales        9.48***    7.91***   
    (7.37) (11.27)   
R&D*Sales Growth         10.66***   
     (4.23)   
Nasdaq Dummy            1.61***  
           (6.45)   
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 5 Continued. Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value: Robustness Checks 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) time-series mean coefficient and the 
corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses). Note: Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 
1. High-Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. To compute the difference between the 
coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency coefficient from the coefficient of the 
High Eco-Efficiency dummy. Ind.-adj. Q is the industry-adjusted Q. Sample period: 1997-
Q1 – 2004-Q4. 
 
 Panel B: Equation (4) 
  Q  Q  Q  Q   
        
Intercept     1.78***    0.72**     0.63** 0.78***  
 (4.89)  (2.27)  (2.09) (2.81)  
Eco-Efficiency      
      
Low Eco-Efficiency      -0.28***   -0.12*     -0.13***     -0.17***  
 (-8.96)  (-1.98) (-2.78) (-5.23)  
High Eco-Efficiency     0.10**   0.13* 0.09    0.12**  
 (2.09)  (1.72) (1.56) (2.32)  
       
Difference: High-Low  
Eco-Efficiency     0.39***      0.25***     0.22***     0.29***  
 (5.87)  (4.73) (4.74) (5.22)  
Control variables:       
Sales Growth    0.15**      0.66*** -0.03  0.09*  
 (2.29) (3.51) (-0.22) (1.88)  
Firm Age -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -3.38E-3  
 (-2.00) (-0.71) (-0.70) (-0.40)  
Log (Book Value of 
Assets)     -0.09***    -0.05** -0.03 -0.03  
 (-3.93) (-2.36) (-1.42) (-1.46)  
Return on Assets     38.85***     41.12***     41.22***     38.43***  
 (17.55) (26.28) (24.05) (20.03)  
R&D / Sales      9.62***     8.05***   
  (7.16) (10.95)   
R&D*Sales Growth        10.30***   
   (4.21)   
Nasdaq Dummy        1.60***  
           (6.18)   
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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The observation most relevant to our study is that under all scenarios, the coefficient on 
Eco-Efficiencyit is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Our estimate of the 
eco-efficiency coefficient (β1) in equation (3) is approximately 0.07 when Q is the 
dependent variable. The coefficient decreases due to rescaling when Q is taken in log, but 
remains highly significant. Furthermore, we note that neither industry adjustment nor 
trimming of Tobin’s q affects the coefficient estimates substantially. The latter observation 
is important because it suggests our results are not driven by outliers arising from, for 
instance, the stock market crash of 2000. Overall, these parameter estimates support H2b. 
Panel B of Table 4, adds to understanding the positive association between ECO 
and Q. The panel reports the outcomes of replacing Eco-Efficiencyit with the dummy 
variables High Eco-Efficiencyit and Low Eco-Efficiencyit (equation (4)). The results 
indicate a slightly asymmetric relationship between eco-efficiency and Q: The negative 
coefficient on the Low Eco-Efficiency dummy is larger in magnitude than the positive 
coefficient on the High Eco-efficiency dummy. However, evidence of asymmetry varies 
across the specifications and should be handled with care. Most important to our research 
question is the fact that the most eco-efficient firms have a significantly higher valuation 
than their least eco-efficient counterparts.  
To evaluate the robustness of the relationships further, we estimate additional 
models that include different sets of control variables. Table 5 presents the outcomes for 
these alternative specifications. For reasons of comparison, we import the initial results 
pertaining to equations (3) and (4) from the previous table. In line with Konar and Cohen 
(2001) two alternative models augment the first set of control variables by R&D 
expenditure. In the second model, we also add an interaction term between sales growth 
and R&D expenditure. We note that the inclusion of R&D spending decreases our sample 
size substantially, since this information was not available for a large number of firms. The 
last alternative specification expands the first model by the Nasdaq dummy.  
In panel A, the results show that even in the presence of additional control 
variables, the sensitivity of Q with respect to the eco-efficiency score remains positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate of Eco-Efficiency decreases somewhat 
once we include R&D spending as an additional control. However, because limited 
availability of (cross-sectional) R&D data induces a small sample problem, the results we 
find under the third and fourth set of control variables should be interpreted with caution. 
The results of replacing Eco-Efficiencyit with High Eco-Efficiencyit and Low 
Eco-Efficiencyit are given in Panel B of Table 5. Again, the evidence supports H2b. After 
the inclusion of the additional control variables, the asymmetry weakens. Independent of 
the set of control variables, we find a significant valuation differential between the most 
eco-efficient and the least eco-efficient firms. 
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In order to assess the economic significance of eco-efficiency, we can estimate how much 
a firm would enjoy an increase in valuation resulting from a unit increase in eco-efficiency 
ranking. Table 4, panel A, suggests that the impact of a one-point increase in eco-
efficiency ranking on Tobin’s q amounts to 0.07, ceteris paribus, which is approximately 
3.2 percent of the average Q we observe for all firms in the sample. To address the 
asymmetrical influence we estimate how much loss in Q a firm in the reference group 
would prevent by avoiding a low eco-efficiency ranking. Panel B suggests that the loss 
avoidance varies from 9 percent to 13 percent of the sample-average Q, depending on the 
choice of model. The gain from receiving a high eco-efficiency rating is in the range of 
almost 0 to 7 percent.  
 
Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value: Tests for a Time-Varying Market Response 
A positive (though potentially asymmetrical) relation between eco-efficiency and firm 
value is consistent with the notion that eco-efficiency is a “priced” factor, i.e., that 
investors drive up the value of environmental leaders by lowering their expected stock 
return and their cost-of-capital. However, up to this point, the association between Tobin’s 
q and eco-efficiency does not reconcile with the evidence in Chapter 3 that eco-efficient 
stock portfolios have realized anomalously high risk-adjusted returns relative to their least 
eco-efficient counterparts. Their results raise the possibility that the market has 
undervalued eco-efficient firms relative to less eco-efficient companies. In an equilibrium 
setting, the expected returns on a group of eco-efficient companies can be lower than the 
returns on a group of less eco-efficient companies because eco-efficient firms are deemed 
less risky. After adjustment for these risk differences, there should be no abnormal 
difference in return. However, under the hypothesis that the market reacts to eco-efficiency 
with a drift, firms can be under- or overvalued and risk-adjusted portfolio returns can be 
anomalous.  
In Chapter 3, the zero investment portfolio of the most eco-efficient firms versus 
the least eco-efficient firms earns an average abnormal return in the order of 2.2 percent to 
8.6 percent per annum, depending on the portfolio construction method and the 
performance attribution model used. By examining the sensitivity of Tobin’s q to corporate 
eco-efficiency under each separate cross-sectional regression, we can investigate whether 
the superior stock performance associated with eco-efficiency translates into a higher 
valuation over time for eco-efficient companies relative to their eco-inefficient 
counterparts. We could expect the abnormal returns associated with eco-efficient firms to 
induce an upward trend in their Tobin’s q values.  
To shed more light on the nature of the large return differential documented in 
Chapter 3, we now exploit the attractive features of the Tobin’s q measure and of the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression technique. First, we divide our sample period into two 
subperiods. Table 6, which reports regression results for Tobin’s q broken up into two 
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TABLE 6. Eco-Efficiency and Firm Value: Subperiod Results 
Reported are the time-series mean coefficients and the t-statistics (in parentheses) of the 
difference between High Eco-Efficiency and Low Eco-Efficiency based on equation (4). 
Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 1. High Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. 
To compute the difference between the coefficients, we subtract the Low Eco-Efficiency 
coefficient from the coefficient of the High Eco-Efficiency dummy. The subperiods are 
1997-Q1 to 2000-Q4 and 2001-Q1 to 2004-Q4.  
 
  Fama-MacBeth Time-series Average Coefficients 
    Q  
Ind.Adj. 
Q  Log(Q)  
Trimmed 
Q   
       
Subperiod 1 (1997 Q1 to 2000 Q4) 
Difference: 
 High-Low Eco-Efficiency 0.20* 0.13*    0.08*** 0.22*  
  (1.82) (1.93) (3.61) (1.90)  
Subperiod 2 (2001 Q1 to 2004 Q4) 
Difference:  
High-Low Eco-Efficiency    0.57***   0.31***   0.26***   0.56***  
  (15.19) (10.05) (24.89) (15.84)  
Complete Period       
Difference: 
 High-Low Eco-Efficiency    0.39***   0.22***   0.17***   0.39***  
    (5.87)  (5.60)  (8.53)  (5.89)   
* Significant at 10% level, *** at 1% level  
 
 
 
subsamples, confirms our expectations. The table shows time-series average coefficients 
for the 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 periods, respectively. The subsample results indicate a 
strong time variation in the difference between the coefficients on High Eco-Efficiency 
and Low Eco-Efficiency. In the later subperiod, eco-efficient companies were selling at a 
premium more than twice as large as that in the earlier subperiod, consistent with a 
scenario that investors have changed their view on the value of eco-efficiency.  
In Table 7, we express the time-varying market response to eco-efficiency by 
estimating a trend in the relation between eco-efficiency and Tobin’s q. More specifically, 
we perform a time-series regression using the differences between the quarterly estimates 
of the cross-sectional coefficients on the two dummy variables (β0 High Eco-Efficiency - 
β1 Low Eco-Efficiency) as the dependent variable and time as the regressor. To account for 
potential autocorrelation, we compute t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) 
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autocorrelation-robust standard errors. Results based on conventional standard errors are 
qualitatively similar and are not reported. Our findings are similar and available upon 
request.  
Table 7, Panel A, reports the annual increases in valuation differential based on 
the specifications described in Table 4, whereas Table 7, Panel B, presents those 
corresponding to Table 5. Independent of the specification, we find that the trend in 
valuation is significantly different from zero. The intercept combined with the time 
coefficient demonstrate that although eco-efficient firms were not selling at a relative 
premium at the beginning of the sample period, the premium increases strongly over time. 
Equally important is the economic interpretation of the trend. Our estimates of the trend 
range between 2.8 percent and 5 percent. These percentages resemble the abnormal returns 
outlined in Chapter 3.  
The subperiod results as well as the upward-sloping trend line support H2c. The 
time-varying pattern may indicate that the value of eco-efficiency is not well understood 
by capital markets. Although finding that environmental information is priced gradually 
seems to contradict the notion that markets are efficient, our study is not the first to show 
that some information about companies is slowly incorporated into stock prices. For 
example, there is evidence that stock repurchases (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen  
(1995)) and dividend omissions (e.g., Michaely, Thaler, Womack (1995)), all of which are 
arguably more concrete events than environmental events, have a post-event drift.  
At the very least, our results suggest the market shows increased interest in 
information about the environmental management of the firm. Alternatively, investor 
surprise about the economic benefits to strong environmental governance could lie at the 
heart of the observed patterns in valuation. We advance on this possibility in the next 
section. 
 
Eco-Efficiency and Analyst Forecast Errors 
Finally, we study the association between eco-efficiency and investor surprise about the 
future operating cash flow of firms using analyst forecast data from the IBES detail files. 
We use one-year ahead earnings forecast as a proxy for investors’ expectations about 
firms’ performance. We define the consensus earnings forecast as the median of individual 
analysts’ forecasts and then compute the forecast errors as the actual earnings per share 
(EPS) minus the median forecast of earnings per share. The error is scaled by the end-of- 
prior-year stock price to arrive at the earnings forecast error central to our tests. A negative  
error implies a negative earnings surprise (or equivalently, a too optimistic forecast), 
whereas a positive error implies a positive earnings surprise (a too pessimistic forecast). 
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TABLE 7. Trend in Eco-Efficiency Premium 
Based on the difference between β0 and β1 for each quarterly estimation of 
equation (4): Qit = αi + β0 High Eco-Efficiencyit + β1 Low Eco-Efficiencyit 
+ γit Xit + εit, we estimate the time trend: β0 - β1 = α + β2 timet + εt , where 
time ranges from 1 to 32. We compute Newey-West (1987) adjusted 
standard errors. Panel A reports the coefficients of time and the 
corresponding t-statistics for all specifications shown in Table 4. Panel B 
shows the time trend coefficient and t-statistics for all estimations 
presented in Table 5.  
 
Panel A     
  Intercept Annual % Trend
Q -0.02     4.32*** 
 (-0.15) (3.56) 
Ind.Adj. Q -0.01     2.42*** 
 (-0.14) (4.47) 
Log(Q) 0.01     3.83*** 
 (0.36) (5.65) 
Trimmed Q -0.01     4.30*** 
  (-0.10) (3.61) 
 
Panel B     
  Intercept Annual % Trend
Q -0.02     4.98*** 
 (-0.15) (3.56) 
Q -0.07     3.34*** 
 (-0.81) (4.28) 
Q -0.08     3.16*** 
 (-1.45) (5.18) 
Q -0.08     3.93*** 
  (-1.13) (4.16) 
*** Significant at 1% level  
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Formally, our main model takes the form: 
 
EFSit = αi + β0 High Eco-Efficiencyit + β1Low Eco-Efficiencyit it
K
k
itkk X εγ ++∑
=
−
1
1,       (5) 
 
Where EFSit is the earnings surprise for firm i, which we define as the price-deflated 
difference between a firm’s realized earnings per share in year t and the median of the one-
year-ahead EPS forecasts for year t, and where X is a vector of lagged controls. The 
control variables price-to-book and firm size (as measured by either market value of equity 
or total assets) in logarithmic form are the most conventional controls in studies on 
earnings surprises, and we thus include them in our specification (see, for example, Core, 
Guay and Rusticus (2006) and Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki (2004)). We control for 
time variation in earnings surprises using year fixed effects. Our main attention goes to the 
two dummy variables that identify firms with a high eco-efficiency ranking and those with 
a low ranking. Because our sample of annual forecasts spans only a limited number of 
years we prefer a pooled cross-sectional regression to the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
methodology. Table 8 reports on fixed-effects models with White standard errors.38  
Consistent with our expectation, the results suggest that firms deemed most eco-
efficient are associated with significantly higher (more positive or less negative) earnings 
surprises. The positive and significant coefficient on the high eco-efficiency dummy 
variable reinforces the hypothesis that investors underestimate the implications of eco-
efficiency for performance and that their positive surprise underlies the abnormal return on 
the eco-efficient stock portfolio discussed previously. Since Chapter 3 finds no abnormal 
return for a portfolio of least eco-efficient companies, we expect a non-significant loading 
on the low-eco-efficiency dummy variable. This is indeed what we find. When we replace 
the eco-efficiency indicator variables by the absolute eco-efficiency score, we find no 
significant coefficient on this score. Hence, the results altogether imply non-linearity in the 
relation between eco-efficiency and earnings surprises, and suggest that investors 
misunderstand the economic consequences of strong eco-efficiency but not those of 
weaker eco-efficiency. 
                                                          
38 Despite limited annual observations on earnings surprises, we obtain qualitatively similar results 
when we deviate from fixed effects and choose a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression with size and 
price-book as controls. The time-series average of the eight cross-sectional coefficients on the high 
eco-efficiency dummy is positive and significant at the 10% level  when we control for size using  
total assets, and significant at 5% when we control for size using the market value of equity. Also 
here, neither the coefficient on the low eco-efficiency dummy nor that on the absolute eco-efficiency 
score is statistically significant at the conventional cut-off levels. All controls have loadings that are 
also similar to those reported in Table 8, in terms of sign and statistical significance. 
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TABLE 8: Eco-Efficiency and Analyst Forecast Errors 
We define the earnings forecast error as the price-deflated difference between a firm’s 
realized earnings per share in year t and the median of the one-year-ahead EPS forecasts 
for year t. We use a fixed-effects model that reports t-statistics (in parentheses) based on 
White standard errors; see equation (5). Low Eco-Efficiency = 1 if firm ranked ≤ 1. High 
Eco-Efficiency =1 if firm ranked ≥ 5. Yearly observations span the period 1997-2004. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
(Actual – 1-yr Forecast EPS) / Share Price 
 Model (5a) Model (5b) Model (5c) 
    
Intercept              -0.01   0.01           -0.01 
  (-0.50) (0.52) (0.72) 
High Eco-Efficiency         0.5 E-2 **         0.5 E-2 **  
 (2.23) (2.16)  
Low Eco-Efficiency     0.3 E-2     0.3 E-2  
 (1.61) (1.63)  
Eco-Efficiency        4.09 E-5 
   (0.07) 
Price / Book Value         0.44 E-2 **      0.39 E-2 *      0.43 E-2 ** 
 (2.12) (1.11) (2.02) 
Log (Market Value of 
Equity)    -7.46 E-5     - 9.76 E-5  
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Log (Total Assets)       -0.25 E-2  
  (-0.95)  
    
# Observations 1669 1672 1669 
Adj. R-2 0.29 0.29 0.28 
*Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level. 
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4.7. CONCLUSION 
 
Can corporate environmental management be aligned with the economic objectives of a 
firm? This study provides new answers to this question. Focusing on the concept of eco-
efficiency, we perform an extensive analysis on the relation between corporate eco-
efficiency and several dimensions of financial performance. Using a large database 
containing monthly scores for the period December 1996 - December 2004, we find 
evidence suggesting that the virtues of a strong corporate eco-efficiency policy can be 
significant from a financial perspective. 
Our study points to a positive and slightly asymmetric relation between eco-
efficiency and operating performance. Firms that are deemed eco-efficient have only a 
slightly superior return on assets than the control group. The least eco-efficient firms show 
strong operational underperformance. Overall, our findings strongly reject the notion 
expressed by CSR skeptics, that the benefits of adopting a strong environmental policy are 
unlikely to outweigh the costs. 
Our study provides new evidence of a positive and time-varying relation between 
eco-efficiency and firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s q. An exploration into the time-
varying sensitivities of firm value with respect to the eco-efficiency scores shows that 
environmental winner companies initially did not trade at a premium relative to losers. 
Over time, the valuation differential between winners and losers widened substantially. 
The observed upward trend in relative firm valuation offers an explanation for the portfolio 
return evidence detailed in Chapter 3. This trend suggests that the shares of most eco-
efficient firms relative to the least eco-efficient firms were initially undervalued but later 
experienced an upward price correction. At the very least, Tobin’s q regression results 
suggest, that these days, the market assigns more value-relevance to environmental 
information about firms.  
We more explicitly test the possibility of investor mispricing by studying 
analysts’ earnings expectations. We find that analysts’ surprises about future earnings are 
more positive (less negative) when firms rank high on eco-efficiency, controlling for other 
factors. These patterns in earnings surprises complement the investment portfolio study of 
Derwall, who document abnormal returns on a portfolio on eco-efficient companies over 
the period 1995-2003, as well as our conjecture that that these returns induce a positive 
time trend in the association between eco-efficiency and Tobin’s q. Our evidence on 
earnings forecast errors is consistent with investors’ underestimating the economic benefits 
to environmental management: our results support the hypothesis that the positive 
abnormal returns associated with environmental leaders are realized because investors are 
positively surprised by the reported earnings of eco-efficient companies. 
We believe the results of this paper have implications for both managers and 
investors. It appears that managers have little reason to worry that an environmental policy 
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conflicts with the company’s primary financial objectives. Investors may interpret our 
results as evidence that corporate environmental performance is a potential source of 
information that helps them generate superior excess returns. As for these excess returns, it 
is an open question whether the upward trend in the valuation differential between 
environmental winners and losers, combined with the errors in analysts’ expectations, 
reflect a learning phase for investors that persists into the future. 
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Chapter 5.  
Human Capital Management and Financial Markets 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Major publicly traded companies portray an image of being actively involved in human 
capital management. Indeed, many managers and academics agree that more than ever 
before, firms must rely on human resources to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage 
through process innovation and better product quality (see, for example, Porter (1985), 
Pfeffer (1994, 2001), Zingales (2000)). Increased globalization has fueled the need for 
companies to manage human resources in a way that fosters their objective to increase 
shareholder wealth. Several surveys point out that over the last decades, firms have shifted 
from traditional personnel management to so-called performance-oriented workplace 
innovations. (See, for example, Osterman (2000)). 
Because the competitive arena is so hungry for well-performing human capital, 
companies seek perfect ways to put HCM to work. There is an abundance of research that 
offers alternative ways in which firms can successfully manage their pool of human 
resources. (We use the terms "human capital (management)" and "human resources 
(management)" interchangeably.) For example, some researchers, such as Chambers et al. 
(1998), believe that superior corporate performance is achieved by winning the “war for 
talent” with performance classification and generous compensation packages, while others 
assert that firms exploit the potentials of their current employees through employee 
development programs, such as training, appraisal, teamwork, and information-sharing 
systems (e.g., Pfeffer (2001)). In addition, more and more often, financial markets offer 
incentives that shape the behavior of corporate management to achieve not only 
financially, but also socially desirable, outcomes. In response to the growth in socially 
responsible investment (SRI), companies increasingly blend strong business ethics and 
concerns for the well-being of employees with principal financial objectives.  
The problem with HCM is that although its (strategic) benefits to shareholders are 
theoretically justifiable, they are costly at the outset. Moreover, although high-performance 
work practices to shape the workforce might require a large initial outlay, much of the 
economic value they create, if any, might be intangible and materialize only slowly. A 
sound judgment on the added value of human capital management is further clouded by 
underdeveloped accounting standards, which have not adapted to the rise of the people-
sensitive business environment (Grossman (2005), Chen and Lin (2005)). Accounting 
conventions tend to abide by the logic that given their unsure contribution to corporate 
performance, investments in HCM should not be capitalized, but instead expensed through 
the income statement. These complexities raise the question of whether investors fully 
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understand the sources of cash flow created by human capital management practices 
(Bassi, Harisso, Ludwig and McMurrer, henceforth BHLM, (2001)). 
In this study, we carry the topic of human capital management over to a financial 
market perspective and ask several important empirical questions: Do HCM practices 
improve profitability? Is corporate investment in human capital management systems 
value-relevant to investors? Is the value of HCM understood by financial markets? We use 
an empirical setting that ultimately helps us to determine whether investors indeed respond 
favorably to HCM practices.  
To accomplish our objective of testing the financial consequences of human 
capital management, we examine both the tangible and intangible effects of adopting HCM 
practices. We first use firms’ returns on assets (ROA) to assess the relation between HCM 
and profitability. The hypothesis we implicitly test with this measure is that HCM systems 
enhance operating performance by, for example, improving employee motivation and 
increasing labor productivity. Next, we use Tobin’s q, i.e., the market value of the firm 
divided by the replacement value of the firm’s tangible assets. We use Q to quantify the 
intangible value directly assigned to HCM practices. Stock markets offer an excellent 
laboratory to test such intangible benefits. Because market prices change in response to 
value-relevant information, finding a significant relation between the HCM indexes and 
Tobin’s q would be consistent with the hypothesis that human capital management is an 
intangible asset for which investors are willing to pay a premium above the firm’s book 
value.  
After examining the operational benefits and intangible value associated with 
human capital management, we explore whether HCM variables are useful predictors of 
stock returns. At the core of return predictability lies the possibility of mispricing. Given 
the complex nature of human capital management and the scarcity of well-developed 
human capital accounting standards, investors may find it complicated to accurately assess 
the (intangible) value associated with HCM policies. The idea that expensed sources of 
cash flow are difficult to capitalize and amortize accurately is not unique to this study. For 
example, prior studies have hypothesized that investors face such difficulties for research 
and development and advertising (see, e.g., Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001)). 
However, human capital investments are more difficult to capitalize than other common 
sources of intangible value. Unlike with R&D and advertising, key inputs to valuing 
human capital investment are often not provided as one consolidated item in accounting 
statements. Moreover, the problem of determining the amortizable life of human capital is 
exacerbated by the fact that human capital is mobile, unlike fixed assets (Damodaran 
(2002)). These and other complications raise the question whether the market 
systematically under- or overestimates the value created by HCM policies. If so, then 
unexpected rises or declines in firms’ market values should in part be traceable to human 
capital management practices.  
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We examine the role of HCM variables as candidate stock-return predictors along 
several lines. Since returns in efficient markets are generally unpredictable and reflect a 
premium for firms’ exposure to systematic risk factors, we estimate cross-sectional models 
for raw returns as well as returns independent of firms’ risk sensitivities (betas). We also 
adopt a portfolio formation approach under which we allocate firms to mutually exclusive 
investment portfolios. To do so, we use the HCM indexes as discriminating criteria. We 
then investigate the extent to which the portfolios earn a return beyond that suggested by 
their risk factor sensitivities.  
To examine a possible mispricing story in greater length, we analyze analysts’ 
earnings forecasts to test whether investor surprises about firms’ realized earnings can be 
linked to HCM practices. Our idea is that if financial markets do not understand the 
economic implications of HCM, then analysts are surprised by unexpectedly high (low) 
earnings caused by HCM systems.  
We illustrate the possible pathways leading human capital management practices 
to measures of corporate financial performance and stock market performance using four 
alternative indexes of HCM practices. Our first index of human capital management 
practices reflects a Talent Attraction and Retention system that captures issues such as 
employee selection rigor, employee turnover, and the degree to which a firm makes use of 
different compensation schemes. Our second index is called Human Capital Development. 
This index tracks employee training and appraisal instruments, skill gap management, and 
the formal controlling of human resource policies. Our third index is Organizational 
Learning. It quantifies the use of learning and knowledge management systems, which are 
typically aimed at deepening employees’ understanding of the firm’s strategy and its core 
activities and building intellectual capital. Our fourth index, Labor Practices, measures 
firms’ disclosure quality with respect to typical corporate social responsibility issues, such 
as workforce diversity, healthy and safe working conditions, grievance procedures, and 
employee layoffs.  
Since the choice of HCM practices has been hotly debated in different research 
areas, the different HCM indexes we investigate should add new and interesting 
perspectives. Our unique, comprehensive sample covers firms from many countries around 
the world, all of which have been systematically and consistently evaluated on their HCM 
practices. The indexes of practices we use in this study are bundles or “systems” of HCM 
practices that have gained acceptance in different academic fields (e.g., Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990, 1995), Huselid (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997)). The 
systems approach stems from the prevailing view that individual HCM initiatives adopted 
in isolation yield only marginal organizational benefits. In contrast, HCM systems 
comprise a set of mutually reinforcing instruments that jointly contribute to better firm 
performance. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a theoretical 
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background. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
5.2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Various academic fields offer theoretical predictions to explain the effects of human 
capital management on financial performance. For example, Zingales (2000) suggests that 
classical finance theory implicitly assumes that firms are (physical) asset intensive and 
vertically integrated. The traditional agency problem mainly concerns the balance of power 
between top executives and shareholders, because firms have a high degree of control over 
non-executive employees. In today’s landscape, employees not only form a large portion 
of the firm’s intellectual backbone, but also enjoy more leeway in exploiting alternative 
employment opportunities. That is, employees can extract (human) capital from the 
company. 
One role HCM can play in modern organizations is that of creating a competitive 
advantage by shaping human capital in ways that make it an asset that has value to the 
firm, but not to its competitors. This role is consistent with the resource-based view 
towards HCM that has gained acceptance in the area of strategic management (Barney 
(1991)). Alternatively, firms may engage in a “war for talent”. Chambers et al. (1998) posit 
that the most successful companies are those that are willing to pay high prices for winning 
the talent war. Pfeffer (2001) differs from this view, and points to the adverse effects that 
talent wars have on corporate performance. First, by being obsessed with attracting talent, 
companies can create an organizational environment that provokes internal competition 
rather than creating a teamwork environment. Second, glorifying outside people can have 
an adverse effect on the morale, motivation, and productivity of a firm’s current personnel. 
Third, fighting a talent war does not encourage company loyalty: employees who come for 
money easily go for money.   
The fields of corporate social responsibly (CSR) and socially responsible 
investing focus on the ethical (or social) dimensions of labor practices. CSR is a broad, but 
also contentious, concept that deals with companies’ concerns about their performance 
with respect to environmental, moral, and social issues. Common examples of labor-
related CSR issues are employee diversity, equal employee treatment, employee health, 
and workplace safety.  
The value relevance of CSR is the subject of ongoing discussions. Critics warn 
that the concept is too ambiguous to be implemented effectively, and inherently demand 
the sacrifice of financial resources that could have been used for value-maximizing 
purposes. (See, for example, Friedman (1962) and Henderson (2001).) However, 
Rappaport (1998) explains that market forces are increasingly causing value-maximizing 
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managers to make decisions with socially desirable consequences. Unsafe working 
conditions are accompanied by higher wages that employees demand for bearing extra 
risk. Further, accidents in the workplace might affect the morale and productivity of the 
workforce and increase safety costs. In addition, a firm might be able to enjoy reputational 
advantages and the prospect of attracting motivated, skilled employees by being perceived 
in markets as a socially responsible employer (Kreps and Spence (1985), Turban and 
Greening (1996)). In this framework, embracing CSR through HCM systems that maintain 
high-quality workplace conditions can lead to significant financially desirable outcomes. 
Also, the choice of specific HCM practices is still open to debate. For example, 
several theories cast doubt on the effectiveness of incentive pay mechanisms when adopted 
in isolation. To illustrate, Kandel and Lazear (1992) focus on the motivational effects of 
partnerships and profit-sharing. They argue that a free-rider problem plagues the 
motivational influence of profit-sharing due to a lack of peer pressure among workers. 
Their model suggests that the effectiveness of profit-sharing depends on a firm’s 
investment in stimulating empathy and trust, two potentially critical drivers of the peer 
pressure needed to achieve the intended outcome of incentive pay. Kandel and Lazear’s 
theoretical framework implicitly points out that the effectiveness of one HCM practice 
depends on the presence of other HCM instruments, consistent with the “systems” view 
that has received considerable attention in recent decades. Many studies, including those 
by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1995), Huselid (1995), and Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi (1997), assert that these systems, or bundles of internally coherent and mutually 
enforcing practices, are more effective than the individual policies as such. Under the 
systems view, the whole of the coherent mechanisms yields more economic virtues to a 
firm than just the sum of its parts.  
Koch and McGrath (1996) derive one set of potentially important elements in 
such a system These authors consider that there are three broad HCM practices which are 
critical for enhancing labor productivity: (i) human resource planning, such as a constant 
evaluation of a firm’s needs in changing conditions and a formal assessment of human 
resource policies that allows a firm to learn from mistakes of the past; (ii) an employee 
hiring process that incorporates productivity-related information about applications; (iii) an 
employee development system that realizes the ultimate potential of each employee, such 
as training and “promotion-from-within”. The last element is underpinned theoretically by 
the view that the more that employees are trained and allowed to enjoy internal 
promotions, the more firm-specific and value relevant their skills become over time. 
Human resource management studies provides empirical evidence on a wide array 
of systems. Using a sample of 968 U.S. firms, Huselid (1995) takes a factor-analytical 
approach to derive two systems of human resource practices and to investigate their 
relation to an array of corporate performance measures. The first system, called “employee 
skills and organizational structures”, comprises information sharing, formal job analysis, 
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information-sharing programs, grievance procedures, profit-sharing plans, training, and 
talent attraction, among other things. The second system, “employee motivation”, includes 
performance appraisals, promotion rules, and other items that could reinforce desired 
employee behavior. In Huselid’s work, the HRM variables are mostly positively related to 
profitability, Tobin’s q, and productivity (measured by sales per employee), and negatively 
associated with turnover.  
Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler (1997) expand on previous work by distinguishing 
“technical” HRM from “strategic” HRM systems. Their evidence, which they obtain from 
a sample of 293 U.S. companies, suggests that strategic, but not technical, HRM measures 
influence firm performance. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that only 
strategic measures of HRM offer firms a way to differentiate themselves from competitors. 
However, we note that these authors somewhat subjectively label their HRM items 
strategic (e.g., teamwork, employee and manager communications, developing talent to 
meet future business needs) or technical (activities pertaining to traditional personnel 
management, such as recruitment and selection, performance appraisal, and training). 
Another broad construct from HRM is “organizational learning”. Watkins and 
Marsick (1997) define a learning organization as one that strategically integrates learning 
with regular work practices. For example, such firms promote dialogue and inquiry, thus 
empowering employees to develop a collective vision and to establish methods that 
continuously capture and share learning information.  
Even though the concept of the learning organization has gained momentum in 
theoretical work, it has received little attention in empirical research. An exception is a 
study by Ellinger, Ellinger, Yang, and Howton (2002), which investigates the economic 
information content of seven learning dimensions learning that were originally identified 
by Watkins and Marsick (1997). Using a sample of approximately 200 U.S. firms, Ellinger 
et al. show that the learning system is positively related to both objective financial 
measures (ROA, ROE, market value added, and Tobin’s q) and subjective measures (i.e., 
performance perceived by a firm’s representative). 
A concept related to organizational learning is total quality management (TQM). 
As with HCM, the definition of TQM is ambiguous, but the central tenet of TQM systems 
is that a continuous focus on employee involvement and development, jointly with process 
innovation, product quality, and customer orientation, is critical to a successful competitive 
strategy. Easton and Jarell (1998) investigate the performance of 108 U.S. firms that they 
identify though interviews as having seriously implemented a TQM procedure. Using an 
approach similar to event study methodology, they report that firms that adopt TQM 
substantially improved their performance over the subsequent five-year period in terms of 
both unexpected accounting performance and cumulative stock returns.  
Evidence on the relation between human capital management and corporate 
financial performance is not limited to the United States. Guest, Mitchie, Conway, and 
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Sheehan (2003) collect data from 366 U.K. companies on 48 items that cover nine 
dimensions of HRM. Their regressions show that these firms' overall HRM score is 
positively associated with profits per employee. However, this relation seems to prevail 
only in the manufacturing sector, not in the service sector. The Guest et al. evidence does 
not support a relation between human resource management and productivity, but it does 
support a negative association between HRM and labor turnover. However, their tests cast 
doubt on the direction of causality, since including previous firm performance in their 
models subsumes the relation between contemporaneous HRM practices and next-period 
performance measures. 
In contrast to studies of HRM, most financial scholars focus on a single 
dimension of employee motivation practices that could easily fit within the broader human 
capital management framework. For example, Frye (2004) studies the effect of equity-
based compensation (EBC) for executive and non-executive employees on firm 
performance and finds that equity-based compensation is positively associated with 
Tobin’s q. However, the relation between EBC and return on assets in the study is positive 
for an early-period sample but negative for a later sample. Bhargava (1994) uses data for 
the period 1979-1989 on 114 U.K. companies to investigate the effect of profit sharing on 
profitability. The results of Bhargava’s panel data regressions suggest that the introduction 
of a profit-sharing scheme positively affects a firm’s profitability. The results also suggest 
that profit sharing does not increase profitability once it is existence. 
Elayan, Swales, Maris, and Scott (1998) use an event-window analysis to test the 
influence of corporate layoff announcements on share price returns. Their evidence 
suggests that layoff announcements lead to negative abnormal stock returns although 
layoffs positively influence a firm’s operational performance. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that markets interpret layoff news as an indication that a firm’s 
investment opportunities are declining. Similar studies that find either a negative effect or 
no wealth effect in response to layoff announcements include Abowd, Mickovich, and 
Hannon (1990) and Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990).  
The event window setting used by previous research that relates HCM to stock 
returns builds on a rational expectations framework in which information relevant to the 
present value of firms’ expected future cash flows is quickly factored into stock prices. 
However, there are theoretical justifications for the belief that stock-return effects from 
HCM show up beyond a short-term event window. Several observers, such as Grossman 
(2005), assert that financial markets focus on short-term performance and cost-control 
metrics to determine the values of companies. Other scholars, such as Porter (1992) and 
Hall (1993), suggest that a short-term performance focus in financial markets causes 
investors to underappreciate rewards to long-term investment. If so, investors’ fixation on 
short-term performance may cause them to, for example, overlook the intellectual capital a 
company sacrifices by making layoff decisions. In addition, investors may find it 
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complicated to assess a firm’s HCM practices or its implications for stock prices, the 
benefits of which may largely be intangible and far from certain. This problem is 
exacerbated by underdeveloped accounting principles, which do not accurately reflect the 
contribution of human resource investments to corporate value (see for example Chen and 
Lin (2004)). These complications make it difficult for investors to make portfolio decisions 
based on HCM information (BHLM (2001)).  
There is one segment of the financial market that does actively incorporate into its 
investment decisions the information on a firm’s employee policies. Investors who 
incorporate social responsibility criteria, including HCM practices, into their portfolio 
management promote the idea that socially responsible practices have economic 
consequences. Many of these socially responsible investors contend that corporate social 
responsibility conveys value-relevant information that could be overlooked by mainstream 
investors (e.g., Kurtz (1997)).  However, empirical studies to validate this claim report 
mixed evidence and call for further research; see Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005), Van de 
Velde, Vermeir, and Corten (2005) and Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis for recent evidence 
on SRI performance. 
 
 
5.3. DATA 
 
Data on Human Capital Management 
We study a unique, proprietary, database of firms’ human capital management practices 
provided by SAM Sustainable Asset Management (SAM).39 SAM is an asset management 
firm exclusively focused on sustainability investing and, among other activities, provides 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) based on a broad set of indicators of 
corporate sustainability.40 An important subset of their sustainability database deals with 
human capital management practices of publicly listed firms around the world. With 
SAM’s indicators, we examine the economic benefits of human capital management 
practices.  
Our data set covers 633 companies from 31 countries, all of which have been 
systematically and consistently assessed by SAM. SAM selects firms out of the largest 
2500 companies of the Dow Jones Global Index for inclusion in the DJSI. Our database is 
longitudinal, covering HCM practice indicators for firms that SAM published during the 
years 2003 and 2004.  
SAM groups information from more than 35 assessment questions into four 
categories to construct composite indexes of HCM that rank firms on a one to 100 scale. 
                                                          
39 www.sam-group.com 
40 http://www.sustainability-index.com/ 
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We explain how the indexes are developed, because current research does not have a 
consensus approach to quantifying human capital management practices.  
Although some studies use factor analysis to derive indexes of human capital 
management (such as Huselid (1995)), Wood (1999) suggests that these statistical 
approaches are likely to deliver theoretically counterintuitive solutions. Also, factor 
analysis research implicitly assumes that all variables data are nondiscrete, which might 
not always be the case.  Nonlinear methods that deal with both continuous and discrete 
data are relatively underdeveloped. Therefore, the most straightforward alternative 
approach is to bundle several inter-related HCM practices into clusters that are based on 
sound theoretical rationale. This somewhat supervised clustering method most closely 
resembles the research approach that underlies our HCM data. 
The database of human capital management indicators comprises four broad 
clusters. These clusters span different dimensions of human resource practices, all of 
which are well-known practices in both human capital management studies and practice. 
The four scores are like indexes that reflect “systems” of human capital management in the 
tradition of those described in prior studies. 
The first index concentrates on Talent Attraction and Retention. This index ranks 
firms annually on: 
 
• Employee selection rigor (i.e., how many employees are subjected to a formal 
selection test).  
• Employee turnover, and employee outplacement due to underperformance of the 
worker. 
• The degree to which the performance-related compensation is used throughout the 
company, such as profit shares and sales commissions. 
• The use of additional benefits, such as health insurance and pension plans.  
• The ways in which a firm tracks employee satisfaction. 
 
Generally, increases in the number of employees who are hired based on formal 
assessment, greater use of employee satisfaction tracking methods, and performance-
related compensation schemes, and decreases in employee turnover lead to a higher rating 
along this index.  
To some extent, this index relates to the war for talent, a phenomenon that gained 
substantial attention after a number of McKinsey publications (such as Chambers et al. 
(1998)) advocated a talent mindset in firms, accompanied by proactive and possibly 
expensive strategies to recruit. We note that most of the compensation plans in this index 
are traditionally used by firms to reward top management and key employees and to link 
their interests with shareholders. However, more companies now consider that most or all 
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employees are key members of their business, which explains why such compensation 
schemes are increasingly deemed organization-wide instruments of talent retention.  
The second index is Human Capital Development. This index represents the 
following areas: 
 
• The number of employees covered by a formal company training program. 
• The degree to which the firm uses formal appraisal methods.  
• The degree to which the firm controls potential skill gaps due to a mismatch 
between either the number or the skills of current employees vis-à-vis those 
required to execute a business plan. 
• The use of formal, quantitative, indicators to measure the success human resource 
policies. 
 
Greater use of employee training, review, and appraisal methods, and of the quantitative 
measures for controlling human resource management policies and skill gaps leads to a 
higher index value. Many businesses regard the components of this index as performance-
enhancing instruments. For example, a survey undertaken by the European Foundation for 
Living and Working Conditions (2001) indicates that a substantial number of European 
companies intend to protect their workforce investments through a combined use of 
training and appraisal, in conjunction with other common practices. 
The third index refers to Organizational Learning (or Knowledge Management). 
Companies typically put learning systems into operation with the intention of enhancing 
support innovation, deepening workers’ understanding of the firm’s strategy, and enlarging 
intellectual capital. These systems may include intranet-based learning and knowledge 
networks integrated into the firm’s daily processes, bonuses related to sharing knowledge 
and communication, expert directories, and company “academies”. Surveys suggest that 
firms use formal organizational learning or Knowledge Management systems to strengthen 
their competitive position (KPMG (2000)). Broadly, the Organizational Learning Index 
ranks firms on: 
 
• The number of employees involved in learning or knowledge sharing systems. 
• How important several common learning systems are deemed by the company, 
with respect to expanding employees’ knowledge about the firm’s strategy, 
support innovation, building intellectual capital, and structuring information. 
 
Firms that report a higher importance assigned to learning systems receive higher index 
values.  
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Our last index of HCM is Labor Practice Indicators. This index primarily measures the 
disclosure of fair labor practices and other issues related to labor relations. To construct 
this index, SAM queries firms on: 
 
• The quality of disclosure concerning workforce diversity policies (e.g., the 
distribution and salaries of males and females at different levels within the 
company, and a breakdown of the workforce based on cultural or ethnic 
backgrounds), employee layoffs, and policies that ensure healthy, safe working 
conditions. 
• The ability of the firm’s employees to associate with unions and bargaining 
agreements. 
• Systems to collect and handle employee grievances and complaints. 
• The firm's public commitment to human rights issues.  
 
Arguably, most of the system’s constituents reflect an ethical side to labor practices. This 
ethical side is not unique to HCM studies, but it has attracted considerable interest by 
corporate social responsibility scholars and socially responsible investors.  
We study the four indexes individually, but we also build an aggregate index 
composed of all four measures. We compute the aggregate human capital management 
index, which we call “Total HCM”, by taking the equal-weighted average of the four 
subindexes.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the HCM practice indicators per country. 
Since we do not adjust the HCM variables for each country, we can develop an impression 
of whether the human capital management ratings differ around the world. The country 
averages of the total HCM scores and those of the subscores do not display sizable cross-
country variation. Only a small number of countries score atypically high (low) on specific 
dimensions, but these countries have noisy averages due to very low firm coverage. We 
can conclude that an exploration into whether country-level differences in corporate 
valuation can be traced to differences in human capital management systems is not 
suitable. Therefore, our study focuses entirely on human capital management at the firm 
level. However, these exploratory results do not imply that there is a universal framework 
of human capital management around the world. Several papers illustrate the fact that 
human capital management (and human resource management) is a broad, 
multidimensional concept.  Further, HCM practices are not necessarily independent of the 
legal and cultural environment (e.g., Brewster (1994), Ichniowski and Shaw (1999)). Our 
intention is not to model the HCM construct as such, but to investigate the association 
between the financial performance of firms and the four indexes of human capital 
management, based on large-scale and standardized survey data. Whether the data we use 
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TABLE 1. Firm-Average HCM Scores per Country 
 
  Average Scores 2003 
  
Total 
HCM 
Human 
Capital 
Development 
Organizational 
learning 
Labor 
Practice 
Indicators 
Talent 
Attraction & 
Retention 
Australia 51 57 45 57 45 
Austria 56 59 57 61 45 
Belgium 56 62 46 63 52 
Brazil 59 71 53 59 54 
Canada 57 63 56 58 50 
Chile 64 67 52 86 50 
Denmark 52 53 52 60 44 
Finland 56 67 51 59 47 
France 56 63 51 65 47 
Germany 58 64 57 60 50 
Greece 57 75 49 57 49 
Hong Kong 57 72 60 48 50 
Indonesia NA NA NA NA NA 
Ireland 56 61 62 58 44 
Italy 44 48 40 46 42 
Japan 54 62 51 54 47 
Luxembuorg 50 64 61 18 57 
Malaysia 57 76 62 46 43 
Netherlands 56 64 53 58 48 
Norway 63 66 65 63 57 
Portugal 52 52 46 57 54 
Singapore 55 77 53 60 32 
South Africa 65 75 66 69 49 
South Korea 58 80 49 53 50 
Spain 62 74 59 64 50 
Sweden 47 49 44 53 41 
Switzerland 51 54 50 55 45 
Taiwan 66 96 57 58 54 
Thailand NA NA NA NA NA 
United 
Kingdom 56 61 54 64 46 
United States 54 56 57 57 46 
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TABLE 1Continued. Firm-Average HCM Scores per Country 
 
  Average Scores 2004 
  
Total 
HCM 
Human 
Capital 
Development 
Organizational 
learning 
Labor 
Practice 
Indicators 
Talent 
Attraction & 
Retention 
Australia 59 70 55 59 54 
Austria 53 54 48 58 52 
Belgium 56 55 57 54 59 
Brazil 66 77 60 67 59 
Canada 60 66 61 58 54 
Chile 65 80 59 66 57 
Denmark 60 65 66 61 49 
Finland 59 69 60 61 47 
France 60 65 58 67 50 
Germany 62 68 65 62 51 
Greece 59 69 56 57 54 
Hong Kong 59 71 61 51 55 
Indonesia 50 67 34 40 60 
Ireland 49 56 44 48 48 
Italy 56 63 50 58 53 
Japan 56 63 57 53 52 
Luxembuorg 71 75 86 75 49 
Malaysia 41 46 33 35 49 
Netherlands 60 62 64 60 52 
Norway 64 64 70 70 54 
Portugal 50 54 43 54 50 
Singapore NA NA NA NA NA 
South Africa 71 80 73 75 55 
South Korea 70 79 87 57 58 
Spain 65 75 66 64 57 
Sweden 56 61 56 62 46 
Switzerland 57 60 55 62 51 
Taiwan 65 85 74 50 52 
Thailand 70 92 78 72 40 
United 
Kingdom 
59 65 58 64 50 
United States 59 63 63 59 53 
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in this study fully capture the entire spectrum of HCM practices for any given country is 
beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Financial Data 
We use various alternative measures of financial performance to ensure that evidence on 
the link between HCM and corporate financial performance is not a statistical artifact.  
First, we explore the influence of human resource management policies on 
corporate valuation, using Tobin’s q as our measure of firm value. We adopt the pragmatic 
computation of Q values around the world described in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Schleifer, and Vishny (LLSV 2002). Although there are more sophisticated approaches to 
computing Q, we use the most efficient approximation to ensure sufficient data availability 
throughout our sample period. Further, as shown by Perfect and Wiles (1994), and Chung 
and Pruitt (1994), computationally efficient proxies for Q are highly correlated with 
estimates that are more complex.  
In brief, we define Tobin’s q as the ratio of the firm’s market value of assets to the 
book value of assets. We compute the market value of assets as the sum of market value of 
common stocks and the book value of assets minus the sum of book value of assets and 
balance sheet deferred taxes. Since q might have a fat-tailed and asymmetric distribution, 
we trim the outliers at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles.  
Our second financial measure examines the operational performance of a firm and 
reflects profitability. We use return on assets as our measure of operating performance. To 
make certain that the relationships we observe between our HCM indicators and the 
dependent variables are not due to other correlated factors, we collect data on a wide array 
of well-known control variables. The annual data for the controls include a firm’s total 
assets; three-year sales growth; the long-term debt-to-assets ratio a firm’s age, which we 
derive from the date of first stock exchange listing; and total sales. We also use country 
identifiers, Dow Jones market sector classifications, and primary SIC codes to develop 
country and industry dummy variables.  
 Our third financial criterion is stock return, which we analyze in two different 
ways. We model annual returns in a cross-sectional framework, using the HCM variables 
as predictors of interest and firm size (market value of equity), the price-to-book-ratio, the 
dividend yield, and firms’ prior three-year stock return as control variables. The controls 
account for most return anomalies described in Fama and French (1992, 1993), Jegadeesh, 
and Titman (1993) and Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998). We then compare 
the time-series variation in returns on portfolios of stocks sorted on their HCM ranking. To 
do so, we use a multifactor benchmark model that controls for the portfolios’ market risk 
and for their exposure to elementary investment styles unrelated to HCM, which are known 
to deliver anomalously high average returns.  
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To obtain the financial data, we match SAM’s data with the Thomson Financial 
and Worldscope databases, using firms’ Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL) 
codes as the primary matching criterion. As a rule, all financial data are from Thomson 
Financial. Exceptions are the items balance sheet deferred taxes, and end-of-year share 
price (close), which we obtain from Worldscope. We develop the monthly benchmark 
portfolio returns we use in our portfolio performance evaluation models with data from the 
Style Research database. Since we verify our stock return evidence with patterns in 
analysts’ earnings expectations, we collect IBES analysts’ earnings forecast data through 
the Wharton Research Database. 
The choice of financial measures warrants some justification. One strand of 
research suggests that motivational influences are best captured by a firm’s labor 
productivity (Batt (1999), Capelli and Neumark (2001)), as estimated by sales per 
employee, but this criterion overlooks the fact that HCM practices can be costly. (As a 
robustness check we do report on the productivity measure briefly.)  
Tobin’s q, which proxies for a company’s valuation, and return-on-assets, which 
represents operating performance and profitability, have attracted substantial attention in 
previous research. Q and ROA have several aspects in common, but they also differ in 
some important respects. ROA is primarily an accounting measure, and therefore sensitive 
to managers’ latitude. But Tobin’s q reflects the markets' expectations about the future 
growth potential of a firm. A firm’s ROA primarily represents tangible aspects of 
performance, since it is mostly based on realized income, but Tobin’s q is a forward-
looking measure that incorporates the intangible value that investors in capital markets 
assign to a company. However, it might not be clear when certain intangible advantages of 
a firm will materialize, which makes it possible for discrepancies to occur between a 
variable’s relation to ROA and its relation to Q.  
The added advantage of equity return is that directly measures value added to 
shareholders. Moreover, returns makes it possible to investigate whether investors are able 
to earn more than is suggested by a rational expectations framework that is based on the 
semi-strong form of market efficiency in which long-term shareholder return equals the 
cost of equity.  However, because stock returns are difficult to predict and to a great extent 
behave beyond the control of company management, it is complicated to directly link 
managerial actions to stock performance.   
The complementary features of all three measures of financial performance 
motivate us to include them in our research. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for Tobin’s q, ROA, total equity return, and 
our primary set of controls. Even though Q has displayed an unlikely distribution over the 
last decade due to the stock market boom, our research is not sensitive to possible 
skewness in the distribution of Q. In unreported tests we check the consistency of our 
results by using the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. The results 
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are qualitatively similar and do not affect our conclusions. In addition, we check whether 
our analysis of firm value is affected by atypical developments subsequent to the Nasdaq 
bubble of 2000. In another unreported sensitivity test, we check whether Nasdaq firms 
have atypical Q values that drive our results but find no evidence of that for our sample. As 
can also be seen from Table 2, the average company in the sample is large and reasonably 
mature. 
 
 
5.4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Human Capital Management and Tobin’s q  
Previous sections suggest that firms can manage their human capital in ways that make it a 
source of competitive advantages, which can translate into both tangible and intangible 
economic value. Intangible assets need not necessarily be incorporated in firms’ 
accounting statements under current reporting principles (Chan, Lakonishok, and 
Sougiannis (2001), BHLM (2001)), but financial markets impound both tangible and 
intangible value-relevant information into firms’ stock prices. If HCM practices constitute 
an intangible asset, we can expect that investors will assign a higher value to firms with 
strong HCM policies than is suggested by book values, all else equal. In this section, we 
use the Tobin’s q measure to investigate whether corporate valuation is tied to human 
capital management, and which subsets of HCM systems are valued most highly.  
To estimate our models we use regressions of Tobin’s q on the set of explanatory 
variables. These models take the form: 
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where Qit is Tobin’s q of firm i in period t, Hjt is human resource practice variable j 
observed at t, and J denotes the number of human resource variables included in the model. 
Equivalently, Ckt is the value for control variable k at t and K indicates the number of 
controls. Since our data set is longitudinal in nature, we use pooled regression methods. 
The first approach we adopt is a pooled setup with a common intercept ( iα = 0α ), four 
human resource practice indicators, and several control variables. We also add country and 
industry dummy variables to the models to account for cross-country and cross-industry 
variation in corporate valuation.   
Although this model improves on pooled models with just one intercept, we can 
better capture the possibility of omitted variables by using firm fixed effects. For this 
reason, our second method involves a fixed-effects regression in which the independent
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TABLE 2. Summary Statistics on Firm Variables 
This table reports descriptive statistics on some firm variables for the firms in our 
sample. The pooled statistics are obtaining by stacking the data for the years 2003 and 
2004. Reported are the annual mean, median, and standard deviation. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Firm Variables for 2003    
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tobin's q 1.54 1.21 0.84 
ROA 4.16 3.8 6.1 
Annual Stock Return 21.56 20.21 40.32 
Assets (million USD) 56320.48 11322.05 152515.07 
Debt-Assets 27.73 26.93 17.10 
3-year Sales Growth 5.66 3.50 15.26 
Firm Age 19.57 20.00 11.42 
  
Panel B: Summary Statistics on Firm Variables for 2004  
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tobin's q 1.58 1.29 0.80 
Annual Stock Return 25.47 19.89 34.64 
ROA 5.64 4.72 5.80 
Assets (million USD) 67342.57 13098.98 188067.18 
Debt-Assets 26.47 25.49 16.70 
3-year Sales Growth 4.76 3.62 12.64 
Firm Age 20.57 21.00 11.42 
    
Panel C: Summary Statistics on Firm Variables for Stacked Sample  
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tobin's q 1.56 1.25 0.82 
ROA 4.89 4.41 6.00 
Annual Stock Return 23.97 20.54 36.38 
Assets (million USD) 59990.42 12049.85 167579.60 
Debt-Assets 27.13 26.33 16.74 
3-year Sales Growth 5.20 3.64 13.97 
Firm Age 20.67 21.00 11.23 
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variables are the HCM indexes, the control variables, and firm-specific terms ( iα ). Our 
decision to report estimates from both simple pooling and the fixed-effects model relates to 
the work of Hsiao (1986), who underlines that fixed-effects specifications can deliver more 
biased estimators in the presence of measurement error. 
Note that a plausible alternative to fixed effects would be to estimate all 
parameters with a random-effects specification. However, unreported tests show that such 
models produce counterintuitive coefficients on our control variables. Moreover, our 
untabulated Hausman (1978) test results consistently reject the random-effects 
specification in favor of fixed effects, independent of the financial variable we investigate. 
In both setups, our regressions produce parameter estimates along with White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
To control for the variation in Tobin’s q that is not attributable to HCM, we use 
permutations of several financial variables.41  Our first control is firm size, which we 
measure by the natural logarithm of total assets. Much of the recent empirical evidence 
finds a negative relation between size and Q. The second control variable is three-year 
sales growth, which is our proxy for firms’ potential investment and growth opportunities. 
Third, our models include the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio, which is our proxy for 
both leverage and risk. Fourth, we include an approximation of a firm’s age, which we 
derive from the date of first stock exchange listing. Fifth, we replace sales growth by the 
capital expenditures to sales ratio, which is another proxy for future growth opportunities. 
Last, to distinguish the effects of HCM practices on operating performance from those on 
firm value, we include ROA.   
We note that we could use the ratio of annual R&D expenses to sales as an 
additional candidate control variable. However, due to the scarcity of R&D data for 
companies around the world, including this variable would require our study to sacrifice a 
substantial number of observations. Like other globally oriented studies on corporate 
valuation, to avoid small sample issues we leave out this variable.42 
Table 3 reports the results for several models of Tobin’s q.  These models use 
Human Capital Management Indexes, firm size, sales growth, debt/assets, firm age, ROA, 
and fixed effects as explanatory variables. We report two separate analyses. Panel A shows 
results based on the entire international sample. Panel B reports results based on a sample 
that omits Japanese firms and firms with the Dow Jones financials industry classification. 
We choose to examine this second sample so as to ensure that the full sample results are 
not driven by unique features of the omitted subset. Because financial firms have a large 
                                                          
41 The variables our models include are well documented, in both empirical literature on Q 
(Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Hirschey (1985)) and literature related to HCM (see, e.g., Huselid 
(1995), Mehran (1995), and Frye (2004)). 
42 We expect much of the cross-sectional variation in R&D to be industry-dependent and thus 
captured by industry identifiers. 
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pool of human capital and relatively few fixed assets, the value-relevance of human capital 
is rather straightforward (Damodaran (2002)). In addition, both financials and Japanese 
firms have historically displayed unconventional valuation multiples.  
 Within each panel, we summarize four different estimations. Regressions 1 and 2 
include the four HCM indexes but differ in the choice of dummy variables. The first 
regression (Pooled) controls for country- and industry-wide differences in firm valuation, 
and the second model allows for firm-level fixed effects (FE). The last two specifications 
in each panel replace the HCM subindexes with the Total HCM index. We note that we 
multiply the coefficients on the four indexes by 100 in all Tobin’s q regressions. Most 
control variables have signs consistent with the findings in earlier studies. Those that do 
not carry the appropriate signs are typically not statistically significant. 
Our models in Table 3 consistently point to a positive relation between the Human 
Capital Development Index and firm value. The rise in Q resulting from a 100-point 
increase in human capital development (i.e., from the lowest to the highest possible score) 
ranges between 0.17 and 0.52, depending on the choice of model. The corresponding t-
statistics indicate that the estimated relation is highly significant (i.e., either below the 5% 
or 1% cut-off level), independent of which specification we use. Thus, Table 3 provides 
compelling evidence that companies with a relatively greater deployment of employee 
development systems are able to enjoy a relatively higher firm value, all other influences 
equal.  
In contrast, none of the reported coefficients on the Organizational Learning Index 
in Table 3 are statistically significant. This finding suggests that firms cannot differentiate 
themselves in terms of their valuation through so-called learning and knowledge-sharing 
practices. The estimated coefficients on the other two HCM variables are mixed.  
The Labor Practices Index displays no significant relation to corporate valuation 
in the full-sample regressions, but models that we derive from the sample of non-Japanese 
and non-financial firms suggest that a higher score on this index is associated with a lower 
Tobin’s q. In only one case is the coefficient on the labor practices variable significant 
below the 5% level.  
For the Talent Attraction and Retention Index, we find weak evidence that a 
greater use of systems aimed at attracting and retaining talented employees comes at the 
expense of a lower Tobin’s q. Again, we note that only one out of four specifications yields 
a negative coefficient that is significant at the 5% level. 
Overall, Table 3 points out that the economic significance of human capital 
management prevails only for specific systems. We find little evidence that the Total HCM 
index relates to corporate valuation, which is consistent with the predictions of the four 
subindex specifications. This observation could have important practical and research 
implications, because it suggests that too broad measures of human capital management 
might conceal information on the value added by HCM. 
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TABLE 3. HCM and Tobin’s q around the world: Pooled Cross Sectional Regressions 
Tobin’s q is explained by several indexes of human capital management (HCM), several 
financial variables, and either country and industry dummy variables (“Pooled”) or firm 
fixed effects (“FE”). “Total HCM Index” is defined as the average of the four HCM 
indexes: Organizational Learning, Human Capital Development, Labor Practice, and 
Talent Attraction and Retention. Controls are the log of a firm’s total assets, past three-
year sales growth, the debt-to-assets ratio, firm age, and return on assets. Pooled sample 
periods: 2003 and 2004. The first panel reports models derived from the entire global 
sample. The panel on the next page presents models derived from a sample that excludes 
Japanese and financial firms. Coefficients on the HCM indexes are multiplied by 100. 
T-statistics based on White (1980) errors are in parentheses. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q 
  Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes    
Total HCM Index   0.20 -0.05 
   (1.18) (-0.46) 
Organizational Learning 0.04 0.04   
 (0.41) (0.59)   
Human Cap Develop      0.35 ***     0.17 **   
 (2.74) (2.44)   
Labor practices -0.26        -0.09   
 (-1.64) (-1.61)   
Talent A & R -0.30   -0.30 **   
 (-1.23) (-1.98)   
Control Variables     
Log Assets      -0.07 ***     -0.87 ***      -0.07 ***     -0.88 *** 
 (-3.53) (-4.86) (-3.71) (-4.76) 
3-yr Sales Growth     0.9 E-3 -1.8 E-3   0.8 E-3   -1.6 E-3 
 (0.52) (-1.64) (0.51) (-1.45) 
Debt/Assets      -0.01 ***      -0.01 ***     -0.01 ***     -0.01 *** 
 (-4.52) (-2.70) (-4.41) (-2.37) 
Firm Age    -1.4 E-3      0.06 ***   -1.2 E-3      0.06 *** 
 (-0.72) (3.64) (-0.63) (3.78) 
ROA      0.06 ***    4.2 E-3       0.06 *** 4.4 E-3 
 (7.13) (0.86) (7.18) (0.88) 
Country & Industry 
Dummies Y  Y  
Adj. R2 0.56 0.94 0.56 0.94 
N*T (unbalanced) 942 942  942 942 
* Significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 3 Continued. HCM and Tobin’s q around the world 
Tobin’s q is explained by several indexes of human capital management (HCM), 
several financial variables, and either country and industry dummy variables 
(“Pooled”) or firm fixed effects (“FE”). “Total HCM” is defined as the average of four 
index of HCM: Organizational Learning, Human Capital Development, Labor Practice, 
and Talent Attraction and Retention. Controls are the log of a firm’s total assets, past 
three-year sales growth, the debt-to-assets ratio, firm age, and return on assets. Pooled 
sample periods: 2003 and 2004. The first panel reports models derived from the entire 
global sample. The panel on the next page presents models derived from a sample that 
excludes Japanese and financial firms. Coefficients on the HCM indexes are multiplied 
by 100. T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Q excl. Japan & Financials 
   Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes 
Total HCM Index      0.40 * -0.04 
    (1.83) (-0.30) 
Organization. Learning  0.10 0.03   
  (0.82) (0.32)   
Human Cap Develop      0.52 ***       0.22 **    
  (3.26) (2.34)   
Labor practices     -0.41 ** -0.12 *   
  (-2.00) (-1.69)   
Talent A & R  -0.29 -0.27   
  (-0.90) (-1.57)   
Control Variables      
Log Assets       -0.08 *** -0.93 ***      -0.09 ***     -0.95 *** 
  (-2.90) (-4.88) (-3.09) (-4.81) 
3-yr Sales Growth  1.8 E-3 -1.8 E-3 1.8 E-3 -1.6 E-3 
  (0.97) (-1.45) (0.97) (-1.30) 
Debt/Assets       -0.01 *** -0.01 **      -0.01 ***    -0.01 ** 
  (-4.01) (-2.44) (-3.94) (-2.21) 
Firm Age  -0.7 E-3 0.05 ** -4.9 E-4    0.05 ** 
  (-0.27) (2.27) (-0.20) (2.38) 
ROA       0.05 *** 2.8 E-3      0.06 *** 3.1 E-3 
  (6.69) (0.60) (6.74) (0.65) 
Country & Industry 
Dummies  Y  Y  
Adj. R2  0.55 0.94 0.54 0.94 
N*T (unbalanced)   680 680  680 680 
* Significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 4. HCM and Tobin’s q: sensitivity to changes in control variables 
See table 3 for a discussion of the specifications. In the first pair of specifications firm 
age is replaced by a year 2003 dummy variable. The second pair of models includes 
the capital expenditures-assets ratio instead of sales growth. The last pair of models 
(on the next page) replaces the logarithm of assets by the logarithm of total sales. 
Pooled sample periods: 2003 and 2004. Coefficients on the HCM indexes are 
multiplied by 100. T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q 
  Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes    
Organizational Learning  0.05 0.03  0.08 0.08 
 (0.49) (0.50)  (0.74) (1.13) 
Human Cap Develop  0.34 *** 0.18 ***  0.30 ** 0.15 ** 
 (2.65) (2.60)  (2.21) (2.14) 
Labor Practices -0.28 * -0.09  -0.31 ** -0.08 
 (-1.83) (-1.55)  (-1.89) (-1.35) 
Talent A & R -0.28 -0.31 **  -0.30 -0.23 
 (-1.14) (-2.05)  (-1.20) (-1.56) 
Control Variables      
Log Assets -0.07 *** -0.86 ***  -0.08 *** -1.11 *** 
 (-3.83) (-4.89)  (-3.61) (-6.78) 
3-yr Sales Growth 1.1.E-3 -1.9 E-3 *    
 (0.67) (-1.71)    
Debt/Assets -0.01 *** -0.01 ***  -0.01 *** -4.6 E-3 * 
 (-5.60) (-2.71)  (-4.33) (-1.67) 
Firm Age    -1.6 E-3 0.08 *** 
    (-0.79) (4.98) 
ROA 0.05 *** 4.2 E-3  0.05 *** 2.5 E-3 
 (7.21) (0.86)  (6.89) (0.62) 
Year 2003 Dummy 0.01 -0.06 ***    
 (0.17) (-3.68)    
Capital Expenditures / Assets    0.01 -0.01 *** 
    (0.98) (-2.95) 
Country & Industry Dummies Y  Y  
Adj. R2 0.57 0.94  0.55 0.95 
N*T (unbalanced) 948 942  888 888 
* Significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 4 Continued. HCM and Tobin’s q: sensitivity to changes in controls  
See table 3 for a discussion of the specifications. In the first pair of specifications 
firm age is replaced by a year 2003 dummy variable. The second pair of models 
includes the capital expenditures-assets ratio instead of sales growth. The last pair 
of models replaces the logarithm of assets by the logarithm of total sales. Pooled 
sample periods: 2003 and 2004. Coefficients on the HCM indexes are multiplied 
by 100. T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q 
  Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes  
Organizational Learning 0.02 0.02 
 (0.20) (0.24) 
Human Cap Develop    0.33 ***     0.20 *** 
 (2.59) (2.76) 
Labor Practices    -0.32 **    -0.15 ** 
 (-2.03) (-2.04) 
Talent A & R -0.29     -0.42 ** 
 (-1.20) (-2.28) 
Control Variables   
Log Assets   
   
3-yr Sales Growth 9.1 E-4      -3.8 E-3 *** 
 (0.55) (-3.42) 
Debt/Assets      -0.01 ***      -0.02 *** 
 (-5.91) (-5.63) 
Firm Age -1.9 E-3 0.02 
 (-1.00) (1.00) 
ROA      0.06 *** 0.01 
 (7.34) (1.24) 
Log Sales -0.04 ** -0.28 ** 
 (-2.17) (-2.28) 
   
   
Country & Industry Dummies Y  
Adj. R2 0.56 0.93 
N*T (unbalanced)   942 942 
* Significant at 5% level; *** at 1% level 
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We also test whether our evidence is robust across different specifications. Table 4 reports 
our regression results after we change the set of control variables. In the first set of models, 
we replace firm age with a year 2003 dummy variable. In the second set of models, we 
replace three-year sales growth with the capital expenditures to sales ratio, because we 
deem both variables a suitable proxy for firms’ potential investment opportunities (LLSV 
(2002), Lins (2003)). In the last set of models, we replace the natural logarithm of total 
assets with the logarithm of total sales. Given the bigger relative importance of the 
subsystems of human capital management, Table 4 does not report on the Total HCM 
index. The results from the alternative regressions consistently corroborate our finding that 
the Human Capital Development Index relates positively to Tobin’s q values. In all 
specifications, the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant at either the 1% or 
5% cut-off level.  
Also consistent with the results of Table 3, all regressions reported in Table 4 
suggest that investments dedicated to organizational learning do not lead to a higher 
corporate valuation. Furthermore, Table 4 sheds additional light on the economic relevance 
of socially desirable labor practices as measured by the labor practice index. Taken 
together, the results offer weak evidence of a negative relation between this index and 
Tobin’s q. The negative loading on labor practices is significant at the 5% level in three out 
of six models and significant at the 10% level in a fourth model. Finally, the coefficient on 
talent attraction and retention carries a negative sign but is significant only under two 
specifications.43  
Although the regression coefficients reported so far indicate a relation between 
human capital management and performance, they do not take into account potential non-
linearity in the relation between the HCM indexes and firm value. Table 5 further 
illuminates the economic value of human capital management by reporting differences in 
the levels of Tobin’s q between firms that rank high on an HCM index and those that rank 
low.  
In Table 5, we construct a dummy variable for firms with a ranking that equals or 
exceeds 60, and dummy variable that identifies firms with a ranking equal to or below 40. 
These specific breakpoints ensure that the firms in our sample are almost equally 
distributed across the two mutually exclusive categories. In Table 5, these dummy 
variables replace the HCM indexes from our initial models.  
The results for the dummy variables based on the four HCM subindexes are 
consistent with our previous evidence. Again, the Human Capital Development Index is 
often the most important for explaining differences in Tobin’s q. Companies that have a 
score higher than or equal to 60 are valued at a premium that ranges between 0.02 and 
                                                          
43 Unreported models containing a dummy variable for Nasdaq-listed firms and models that include 
the total number of employees instead of total assets yield similar results. 
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0.12. Companies that are ranked lower than or equal to 40 sell at a small (but statistically 
nonsignificant) discount relative to the remainder of firms in the sample. 
When we compare the dummy variable coefficients, we find that an F-test 
consistently points to a significant difference in Q between high-ranked and low-ranked 
companies. In both pooled setups, the difference is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, 
these results support our previous evidence that human capital development systems are 
tied to firm valuation. Results for the dummy variables that we derive from the Total HCM 
score suggest that in the model with country and industry identifiers, the Tobin’s q values 
of firms with a high HCM score exceed those of the remainder of firms by 0.07. Firms 
with low HCM scores have a lower valuation, but this discount is not statistically 
significant. However, in the firm fixed-effects model, a company does not sell at a 
premium when it has a high total HCM score, but is valued at a significant discount (-0.07) 
when it has a low ranking. The corresponding Wald test statistic indicates that the null 
hypothesis of a zero difference between the two dummy variable coefficients is rejected, 
although only in the firm fixed-effects model (F = 3.89, p < 5%). 
 Taken as a whole, the important message that emerges from the analyses so far is 
that some, but not all, elements of human capital management display a relation with firm 
valuation. Although there is evidence that human capital management systems contribute 
to enhancing performance, our work strongly suggests that the specific constituents of the 
HCM concept are the most value relevant, most notably the human capital development 
practices that comprise a combination of skill gap management, employee training and 
appraisal practices, and the controlling of human capital policies. 
  
Human Capital Management and Profitability 
Here, we examine the effects of HCM on firm operating performance. We use ROA as our 
operating performance measure. We describe the models we estimate as: 
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where ROAit is the annually reported return on assets for firm i, Hjt is human capital 
management score j, and J denotes the number of HCM included in the model. Ckt is the 
value for control variable k and K represents the number of control variables. 
 As in the previous section, the models we estimate also include either country and 
industry dummy variables or firm fixed effects. The financial control set we use in our 
main specifications includes the natural logarithm of total assets, past three-year sales 
growth, the debt-to-assets ratio, and firm age.   
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TABLE 5. HCM Dummy Variables and Firm Valuation 
We construct a dummy variable for firms with a ranking that equals or exceeds 60, and one 
for firms with a ranking equal to or below 40. Wald tests on differential coefficients are 
reported in brackets. T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. F-test 
statistics appear in brackets. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Tobin's q 
  Pooled FE Pooled FE 
Total HCM Score ≥ 60    0.07 * 1.4 E-3 
   (1.65) (0.08) 
Total HCM Score ≤ 40   -0.03    -0.07 ** 
   (-0.40) (-2.28) 
Difference   0.09    0.08 ** 
   [2.05] [3.89] 
Organizational Learning ≥ 60 -0.07  -0.03 *   
 (-1.64) (-1.94)   
Organizational Learning ≤ 40 -0.07 -0.03   
 (-1.36) (-1.33)   
Difference 0.00 0.00   
 [0.00] [1.20]   
Labor Practices ≥ 60 0.02 4.6 E-3   
 (0.52) (0.31)   
Labor Practices ≤ 40      0.19 ** 0.01   
 (2.23) (0.40)   
Difference  -0.17 * -0.01   
 [3.83] [0.04]   
Human Cap. Development ≥ 60      0.12 *** 0.02   
 (2.90) (1.16)   
Human Cap. Development ≤ 40 -0.03 -0.05   
 (-0.44) (-1.60)   
Difference    0.15 **      0.07 **   
 [5.25] [4.32]   
Talent A & R ≥ 60 -0.05 -0.01   
 (-0.94) (-0.24)   
Talent A & R ≤ 40 0.06   0.04 *   
 (1.14) (1.72)   
Difference -0.11 -0.05   
 [2.28] [0.01]   
Control Variables     
Financials / C&I Dummies Y / Y Y / N Y / Y Y / N 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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In Table 6, we present our results in two sets of regressions, based on different 
international samples.  Panel A reports results of using the entire sample. Panel B reports 
results based on the sample non-Japanese and non-financial companies. Overall, Table 6 
points out that the relations we observe between the HCM indexes and return on assets are 
not sensitive to the choice of sample. The regression results confirm our previous evidence, 
suggesting that the Human Capital Development Index is positively related with 
performance. A 100-point increase in human capital development is associated with an 
increase in return on assets of about 4 percentage points, all else equal. Under almost all 
specifications, the positive relation between this index and ROA is significant at the 5% 
level. 
Operational performance benefits involving the other HCM indexes are much less 
pronounced. Neither the Talent Attraction and Retention Index nor the Labor Practices 
variable exhibits a statistically significant association with ROA. The relation between the 
Organizational Learning Index and ROA is marginally significant according to the firm 
fixed-effects models, but not significant in all other models.  
As in previous tables, results for the Total HCM index are mixed. The coefficient 
on the aggregate HCM variable is significant (at the 1% level) only in the country- and 
industry-fixed effects model. Alternative models that include the four indexes of human 
capital management along with different sets of controls, presented in Table 7, tell a 
similar story. All regressions summarized in Table 7 yield coefficients in magnitude 
similar to our baseline results.  
To account for nonlinear relations between operating performance and the HCM 
variables, we develop two dummy variables identical to those described in the previous 
section. We repeat our regression, but now we replace the standard HCM indexes by the 
dummy variables. Table 8 reports the results for different models. 
Although we find some evidence that the Total HCM dummy variables can 
differentiate companies with higher than average ROA values from those with lower ROA 
values, the dummy variables that attract the most attention in Table 8 pertain to the human 
capital development index. Companies that rank high on the Human Capital Development 
Index experience a higher level of return on assets. The magnitude of operational 
outperformance is around 1.3 percentage points, which is not only statistically significant 
but also economically large. Results for lower-ranked firms are less stable. When a firm 
has a low ranking on the human capital development spectrum, it experiences an 
economically large operational underperformance (-1.51 percentage points) according to 
the firm fixed-effects model. However, low-ranked firms do not perform worse than the 
reference sample according to the pooled model with country and industry controls. Not 
surprisingly, the Wald test statistic for the difference in ROA between high-ranked on low-
ranked companies reveals a strong, highly significant performance differential in the firm-
fixed effects model but not in the pooled model. 
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TABLE 6. Human Capital Management and ROA: Pooled Cross-Sectional 
Regressions 
Reported are the results for different pooled cross-sectional models of ROA. In the 
models, ROA is explained by several indexes of human capital management, several 
financial variables, and either country and industry dummy variables (“Pooled”) or 
firm fixed effects (“FE”). “Total HCM Index” is defined as the equal-weighted average 
of four sub-indexes of HCM: Organizational Learning, Human Capital Development, 
Labor Practice, and Talent Attraction and Retention. The financial variables we use as 
controls are the log of a firm’s total assets, past three-year sales growth, the debt-to-
assets ratio, and firm age. Pooled sample periods: 2003 and 2004. T-statistics based on 
White errors appear in parentheses. 
 
 Models for ROA (Full Sample) 
  Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes     
Total HCM Score        0.04 *** 0.01 
    (2.61) (0.39) 
Organizational Learning -0.01   -0.02 *    
 (-0.53) (-1.95)    
Human Cap Develop  0.02 *    0.04 **    
 (1.94) (2.33)    
Labor Practices 1.80E-3 -1.58E-3    
 (0.12) (-0.11)    
Talent A & R 0.03 -4.92E-3    
 (1.41) (-0.19)    
Control Variables      
Log Assets 0.22 -8.61  0.20 -8.81 
 (0.57) (-1.40)  (0.50) (-1.40) 
3-yr Sales Growth 0.03 0.04 *  0.03  0.04 * 
 (1.03) (1.82)  (1.05)  (1.87)  
Debt/Assets     -0.06 *** -0.13 *      -0.06 ***  -0.13 * 
 (-3.73) (-1.85)  (-3.67) (-1.76) 
Firm Age 0.03 *     1.41 ***  0.03     1.41 *** 
 (1.68) (3.41)  (1.59) (3.36) 
Country & Industry 
Dummies Y   Y  
Adj. R2 0.16 0.68  0.16 0.68 
N*T (unbalanced) 997 997  997 997 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 6 Continued. Human Capital Management and ROA: Pooled Cross-
Sectional Regressions 
Reported are the results for different pooled cross-sectional models of ROA. In the 
models, ROA is explained by several indexes of human capital management, several 
financial variables, and either country and industry dummy variables (“Pooled”) or 
firm fixed effects (“FE”). “Total HCM Index” is defined as the equal-weighted 
average of four sub-indexes of HCM: Organizational Learning, Human Capital 
Development, Labor Practice, and Talent Attraction and Retention. The financial 
variables we use as controls are the log of a firm’s total assets, past three-year sales 
growth, the debt-to-assets ratio, and firm age. Pooled sample periods: 2003 and 2004. 
T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. 
 
  Models for ROA (Excl. Japan & Financials) 
   Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
     
Total HCM Score         0.06 *** 0.02 
    (2.74) (0.51) 
Organizational Learning  -0.01   -0.02 *    
  (-0.52) (-1.81)    
Human Cap Develop     0.04 **    0.05 **    
  (2.37) (2.01)    
Labor Practices  0.01  -7.12E-4    
  (0.25) (-0.04)    
Talent A & R  0.03 1.05E-3    
  (1.00) (0.03)    
Control Variables       
Log Assets  -0.02 -9.27  -0.04 -9.48 
  (-0.07) (-1.43)  (-0.16) (-1.41) 
3-yr Sales Growth     -0.04 ** 0.05    -0.04 ** 0.05 
  (-2.38) (0.93)  (-2.47) (1.02) 
Debt/Assets      -0.07 *** -0.16     -0.07 *** -0.14 
  (-3.51) (-1.62)  (-3.49) (-1.51) 
Firm Age  0.02     1.41 ***   0.02     1.44 *** 
  (0.85) (3.24)  (0.71) (3.22) 
Country & Industry 
Dummies  Y   Y  
Adj. R2  0.18 0.54  0.18 0.54 
N*T (unbalanced)   688 688  688 688 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 7. HCM and Operating Performance: Sensitivity to Changes in Control 
Variables 
See table 6 for a discussion of the pooled specifications. In the first pair of 
specifications, firm age is replaced by a year 2003 dummy variable. The second pair of 
models replaces the logarithm of assets by the logarithm of total sales. Pooled sample 
periods: 2003-2004.  T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. 
 
 Dependent Variable: ROA (Full Sample) 
  Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes     
Organizational Learning -0.01  -0.02 * -0.01   -0.02 ** 
 (-0.68) (-1.94)  (-0.58) (-2.25) 
Human Cap Develop  0.02 *   0.04 **   0.03 **   0.04 ** 
 (1.76) (2.32) (2.34) 2.24 
Labor Practices -3.85 E-3 -1.73 E-3 -3.60 E-3 -0.01 
 (-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.02) (-0.33) 
Talent A & R 0.02 -4.51 E-3 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.93) (-0.17) (1.18) (-0.54) 
Control Variables     
Constant 4.00    4.38 *  
 (1.01)  (1.77)  
Log Assets 0.30 -8.62   
 (0.76) (-1.41)   
3-yr Sales Growth 0.03   0.04 * 0.02 -0.01 
 (1.02) (1.83) (0.71) (-0.39) 
Debt/Assets      -0.06 *** -0.13 *     -0.07 ***   -0.27 ** 
 (-3.82) (-1.85) (-4.21) (-2.02) 
Firm Age   0.02      0.64 *** 
   (1.04) (2.81) 
Year 2003 Dummy    -1.15 ***    -1.40 ***   
 (-3.17) (-3.41)   
Log Sales   0.12 1.49 
   (0.60) (0.76) 
     
Country & Industry 
Dummies Y  Y  
Adj. R2 0.16 0.68 0.22 0.6 
N*T (unbalanced) 997 997 997 997 
* Significant at 10% level, **  at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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TABLE 8. HCM Dummy Variables and Operating Performance 
We constructed a dummy variable for firms with a ranking that equals or exceeds 60, and 
dummy variable f firms that have a ranking equal to or below 40. Wald tests results are 
reported in brackets. T-statistics based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. F-
test statistics appear in brackets. 
 
  Pooled Cross-Sectional Models for ROA 
  Pooled FE  Pooled FE 
Total HCM Score ≥ 60      1.30 ***  0.42 
    (3.24) (1.09) 
Total HCM Score ≤ 40     -0.96  -1.39 
    (-1.30) (-1.93) 
Difference      2.27 ***   1.82 * 
    [10.08] [5.18] 
Organizational Learning ≥ 60   0.62   0.21    
 (1.31) (0.66)    
Organizational Learning ≤ 40   0.77   1.14 **    
 (1.35) (2.35)    
Difference -0.15 -0.93 *    
 [0.07] [3.29]    
Labor Practices ≥ 60   0.62  -0.05    
 (1.47) (-0.14)    
Labor Practices ≤ 40   0.27  -0.11    
 (0.31) (-0.20)    
Difference   0.35 0.06    
 [0.17] [0.01]    
Human Cap. Development ≥ 60  1.25 ***  1.36 ***    
 (2.57) (3.19)    
Human Cap. Development ≤ 40   0.47  -1.51 *    
 (0.75) (-1.75)    
Difference   0.78   2.87 ***    
 [1.15] [10.05]    
Talent A & R ≥ 60   0.77 -0.61    
 (1.36) (-1.41)    
Talent A & R ≤ 40  -0.18 0.56    
 (-0.34) (1.04)    
Difference   0.95 1.17    
 [1.59] [2.28]    
Control Variables      
Financials / C&I Dummies Y / Y Y / N  Y / Y Y / N 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
  172 
 
 
Consistent with the Tobin’s q section, the results of this section suggest that a subset of the 
aggregate HCM index is the one most closely tied to operating performance. Again, the 
evidence points to the value of the human development system. 
 
Robustness: Local Evidence, Endogeneity, Causility, and Productivity Effects  
 
Country-specific evidence 
To coordinate our results with previous research that has primarily collected evidence from 
U.S. and U.K. samples, we also present results specific to these two countries. Also due to 
data limitations, our country-specific analyses are confined to the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Thus, our U.K. and U.S. results should still be interpreted with caution 
because the cross-section of firms in these two countries remains quite small.  
Table 9 documents the estimation results for different models that use Q and ROA 
as the regressant. Despite the fact that the country-specific analyses are potentially 
vulnerable to a small-sample bias, the majority of regressions support those based on the 
global sample. We observe positive coefficients for the Human Capital Development 
Index, regardless of the choice of dependent variable. The coefficient on this index is 
statistically significant below the conventional cut-off levels in six out of eight cases. The 
small-sample problem seems to show up in the magnitude of the coefficients, which varies 
substantially across the different models. Country-specific regressions with the alternative 
controls, including a year dummy variable, capital expenditures/assets, and the logarithm 
of sales, produce similar results and confirm our conclusion. However, the parameter 
instabilities suggest that the results require careful economic interpretation. 
  
Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions 
 Here, we discuss a robustness test to manage possible endogeneity bias in our research 
design. We follow Huselid (1995), who uses a two-stage least squares approach to check 
the robustness of the link he observes between human resource management and 
performance. Our focus is on the Human Capital Development Index, which consistently 
displays a relation to both Q and ROA. In some robustness tests, we investigate the 
coefficient on the Human Capital Development Index by using two-stage least squares, 
which allows this index to be endogenous.  
One of the main problems of the approach concerns the identification of 
appropriate instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the errors of the structural 
equation (with performance as the dependent variable) and partially correlated with the 
endogenous independent variable. As a result, the findings in this section should be 
interpreted with care. 
 Table 10 shows results based on the fixed-effects models determined with the 
instrumental-variables (IV) approach. In this table, each model differs in either the choice
 17
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of financial dependent variable or the instruments.   
One set of (incremental) instruments includes a firm’s past annual stock return 
relative to sample average return, and firm age. We base our decision to rely on past excess 
stock returns on Lins (2003) and other work on corporate valuation. Although Lins (2003) 
uses this variable in the context of corporate governance, we hypothesize that high past 
returns motivate a company to put more emphasis on human capital development in 
response to investors' and competitors' increased interest in the firm. We assume that age 
effects on Tobin’s q are subsumed by the firm size variable in our structural model. A 
second instrumental set contains the Talent Attraction and Retention Index, building on the 
assumption that firms use human capital development practices to safeguard the success of 
their investments in talent attraction. The results corroborate our earlier findings. The 
positive index sensitivities, in both Tobin’s q and ROA models, remain significant at the 
5% level. However, the estimated magnitudes of the relation between human capital 
development and performance are somewhat unstable across the different models. 
 
Past Performance and Human Capital Management 
One question that arises frequently in theoretical literature on human resource management 
and related work on corporate social responsibility is whether greater useof human capital 
management practices explains better performance, or whether the use of HCM systems is 
a result of financial performance realized in the past. It is theoretically possible that firms 
that performed well in the past have more financial capacity available for investments in 
human capital management systems. This theory, which Waddock and Graves (1997) refer 
to as the slack resources theory suggests that past financial performance explains future 
values of our HCM indexes. Guest, Mitchie, Conway and Sheehan (2003) explore both 
possibilities for most commonly used HRM practices and Waddock and Graves (1997) 
examine financial factors that could affect a firm’s employee relations. Their results are 
inconclusive. 
In unreported robustness tests, we focused on the slack resources theory, where 
we estimated models that describe the HCM variables using two-year lagged values for the 
performance measures and controls as explanatory variables. Similar to Waddock and 
Graves (1997), we independently used each of the four indexes of human capital 
management as a dependent variable. Like earlier studies, our evidence is too inconclusive 
to make a strong case against the slack resources theory. However, we hasten to point out 
methodological limitations. An important avenue for further research would be to explore 
the theory using more rigorous causality tests for panel data, and using longitudinal than 
span much more than the two years covered by this study.  
 
Productivity effects 
Previous sections illustrate the explicit interest in financial measures that are common to 
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most financial studies on factors that affect corporate performance. There is also research 
that prefers productivity as the output variable rather than profitability measures and 
Tobin’s q. The choice of outcome variable is the subject of debate in HCM papers. Several 
studies advocate tying HCM to variables other than profitability and market valuation 
measures. The underlying rationale is that there are factors that interfere with the link 
between HCM practices and conventional financial criteria, for example, the effect of 
human capital management systems on labor productivity. On the other hand, productivity 
measures cannot adequately describe the true value of HCM, since they disregard costs that 
adversely affect profitability.  
Nevertheless, to ensure that our study covers all the possibilities, we also test 
whether a greater deployment of HCM practices translates into higher productivity in our 
pooled cross-section setup. Using Batt’s (1999) and Capelli and Neumark’s (2001) 
productivity measure, which we define as the natural logarithm of the ratio of sales to total 
employees, we estimate  models similar to those outlined previously. In specifications for 
return on assets, we replace the ROA variable with productivity and separately estimate a 
model with country and industry dummies and a model with fixed-effects. The results of 
these unreported robustness test support our base results: the evidence suggests that the 
Human Capital Development Index is positively and significantly associated with 
productivity, even at the 5% level, but in almost all of the models we investigate, the 
coefficients on all other HCM indexes are not statistically significant. Consequently, 
although the productivity benefits of human capital management are not the central theme 
of our paper, our work can be reconciled with research that documents positive 
productivity effects from HCM investments (see, e.g., Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 
(1997), Ichnioswki and Shaw (1999), Cappeli and Neumark (2001), Black and Lynch 
(2004)) . 
 
Human Capital Management and Stock Returns 
Having explained the degree to which human capital management enhances firm value and 
operating performance, we now investigate whether human capital variables are useful 
predictors of stock returns. Prior research links human capital management decisions to 
stock price reactions by using an event window method, under the assumption that the 
market quickly and accurately impounds new value-relevant information into firms' equity 
prices. In that framework, firms’ long-run stock return is equal to the cost of equity and 
purely a function of nondiversifiable risk factors. Here, we investigate whether HCM 
indexes can explain stock returns beyond a short-run event window.  
One the one hand, conventional asset pricing theories posit that firm-specific 
characteristics help to explain the cross-section of stock returns because these firm-specific 
features are proxies for priced risk factors, rather than instruments for identifying 
mispriced securities. In the context of human capital, this possibility has been raised, for 
  177 
example, by Hansson (2004), who argues that labor-intensive firms behave like value 
stocks. On the other hand, predictable patterns could point to a mispricing story such as 
that in Lakonishok, Schleifer, and Vishny (1994). To deepen our understanding of the 
nature of a possible predictive relation, we examine whether HCM variables explain raw 
returns as well as risk-adjusted returns. 
We can state the cross-sectional models for describing raw individual firm returns 
as: 
 
   it
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itkk
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,                            (3) 
 
where rit - Rft indicates the return on firm i or in excess of the risk-free rate of return after 
log transformation, H is the value corresponding to human capital management variable j, 
C is the value for control variable k, and jβ  and kγ  denote the coefficients on the j-th and 
k-th regressor.  
The control variables in C are well documented in empirical return predictability 
literature.  (See, e.g., Fama and French (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Brennan, 
Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998).) First, because much research finds a negative 
relation between stock returns and firm size (e.g., Banz (1981)) the control set includes the 
firm’s market capitalization after logarithmic transformation as an explanatory variable. In 
response to Fama and French’s (1993) evidence of a pervasive value effect in stock returns, 
we also include the logarithm of the ratio of the company’s price-to-book ratio. Third, we 
include a firm’s annual dividend yield. Our last control variable describes the return history 
of the stock.  Research finds that this variable captures return reversal patterns and/or stock 
price momentum (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), De Bondt and Thaler (1985)), and 
we define our price history variable as the cumulative three-year return observed over the 
last year. The variables are lagged one year to avoid look-ahead bias and to ensure their 
predictive nature.  
The risk-adjusted returns we utilize in a second model are incrementally valuable 
for understanding the nature of a possible relation between predictor variables and returns. 
The intuition of widely popularized asset pricing theories underpinning equation (3), such 
as the equilibrium version of the APT, tells us that returns depend only on risk 
characteristics. To test the predictive ability of HCM variables beyond any risk-return 
relationship we follow the two-stage approach advanced by Brennan, Chordia, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), which ultimately involves the following regression: 
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where *itR  is a measure of risk-adjusted return that we derive in the following manner: 
because our sample is globally oriented, we first develop a series of expected annual 
returns for these firms, as predicted by a market equilibrium model with four risk factors 
introduced by Fama and French (1993) and extended by Carhart (1997).  Our four factor-
mimicking portfolios are global variants of their U.S. counterparts, which we developed 
after sorting all stocks in the global Worldscope universe on firm size, the book-to-market 
ratio, and past returns. To obtain firms’ expected returns according to a global four-factor 
model, we estimate their sensitivity annually for the four factors, using a 60-month rolling 
window framework: 
 
( ) *4321 ittwitwitwiftwtiiit MOMHMLSMBRRr εββββα ++++−+=               (5) 
 
where ftwt RR −  is the monthly return on the world market proxy based on the 
Worldscope universe above the risk-free rate of return, SMBw is the return differential 
between a global small firms portfolio and a large firms portfolio, HMLw is the return 
difference between a global portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low 
book-to-market stocks, and MOMw is a momentum portfolio that buys stocks with the 
highest prior 12-month return and sells short past 12-month losers, and where SMBw, 
HMLw and MOMw are constructed in line with the sorting procedure outlined in Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Using the OLS estimates obtained for the four factor 
loadings at the end of year t-1, we risk-adjust the annual returns realized in year t in the 
following manner: 
 
( )[ ]twtitwtitwtiftwttiftitit MOMHMLSMBRRRrR 1,41,31,21,1* −−−− +++−−−= ββββ          (6) 
 
We provide further details on the construction of the global four-factor model in the 
appendix.  
We do not estimate equations (3) and (4) with pooled regressions because pooled 
cross-sectional models for stock returns are highly underdeveloped and the use of lagged 
dependent variables (i.e., past three-year returns) requires a dynamic panel structure. 
Instead, we choose to estimate two independent sets of cross-sectional models, that is, one 
set for explaining the cross-section of returns in 2003 and one set for 2004. Table 11 
presents the models for raw and risk-adjusted returns. Table 12 replaces the HCM variables 
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with the dummy variables that distinguish high-ranked from low-ranked firms based on a 
specific HCM index. (See previous sections for a description of the dummy variables.) The 
control variables carry signs according to expectation.  
The loadings on the HCM variables and their respective t-statistics tell a 
consistent story: although the HCM variables have been linked to firm performance, they 
are not significant predictors of individual stock returns. When we use the two extreme 
dummy variables for allocating firms to mutually exclusive categories with distinctive 
HCM scores, we find no material differences in returns. When we apply a Wald test to the 
difference between the coefficient on the high-ranked firms dummy and that on the low-
ranked dummy, the results suggest that high-ranked firms do not have a significantly 
higher or lower average return, irrespective of the HCM index we use for dummy 
classification.  
To overcome statistical caveats due to noisiness in individual security returns, we 
also form diversified portfolios. We note that the advantage of testing diversified portfolios 
comes at the expense of a small-sample problem, since we only have two years of data to 
develop portfolios of stocks sorted on human capital ranking. Therefore, we extend the 
2003 data backwards three additional years and the 2004 data forward one year, under the 
assumption that the ratings are time-invariant over this period. Given this assumption, the 
portfolio analysis that follows can be incrementally informative about the predictive ability 
of HCM variables, but it cannot be considered an explicit test of mispricing. It is not clear 
whether investors could have foreseen the return patterns in real time.  
Beginning with the end of June, starting in 2000 and ending in 2005, we rank all 
available stocks on one of the four HCM variables. We then allocate all firms rated 60 or 
higher to a high-ranked portfolio, which is in line with the breakpoints we adopted to 
construct the two dummy variables in the regressions. The low-ranked portfolio covers all 
companies that have a ranking of 40 or less. We keep the portfolio composition simple. We 
equal-weight the two portfolios and ignore transaction costs. After controlling for the 
portfolios’ market risk and their investment style characteristics, we report the average 
annual return of the portfolios, as measured by the global four-factor model described 
earlier, in Table 13. The performance evaluation period is July 2000-December 2005.The 
most interesting results are the positive excess returns on, respectively, the stock portfolio 
of companies that rank low on the Labor Practice Index and the portfolio of companies 
ranked highest on the Talent Attraction Index. The positive returns on these portfolios are 
economically and statistically significant. The portfolio of firms with weak labor practice 
indicators earned 5.3 percent per year on a risk- and style-adjusted basis, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  Its performance relative to its high-ranked 
counterpart is more than 7 percent and highly significant. The excess return on the strong 
Talent Attraction portfolio is in the order of 7 percent and significant at the 5% level. In 
contrast, the portfolios developed using the other HCM indexes do not produce statistically 
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TABLE 11. Cross-Section Regressions of Stock Returns 
The table reports year-by-year cross-sectional regressions with, respectively, raw 
excess return and risk-adjusted return as dependent variable. Risk-adjusted return is 
defined as: 
 ( )[ ]twtitwtitwtiftwttiftitit MOMHMLSMBRRRrR 1,41,31,21,1* −−−− +++−−−= ββββ  
 
where SMBw, HMLw and MOMw are constructed in line with the sorting procedure of 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The controls are the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity, the natural logarithm of the price-to-book ratio, the dividend 
yield, past 3-year stock return, and country and industry dummies. Each model 
includes one-year lagged values of the explanatory variables. T-statistics based on 
White (1980) errors appear in parentheses. 
 
 Raw Excess Return Risk-Adjusted Return 
  2003 2004 2003 2004 
Human Capital Management Indexes    
Organizational Learning 7.73E-4 -2.88E-4 1.27E-3 -3.06E-4 
 (0.90) (-0.43) (0.75) (-0.44) 
Human Cap. Develop 1.65E-4 2.37E-4 -1.29E-4 4.49E-4 
 (0.17) (0.30) (-0.14) (0.57) 
Labor Practices -1.18E-3 1.39E-4 -1.83E-3 -4.31E-5 
 (-1.01) (0.14) (-1.50) (-0.04) 
Talent A & R 1.51E-3 9.70E-4 2.04E-3 2.39E-4 
 (0.83) (0.71) (1.13) (0.18) 
Control Variables     
Intercept 0.20    0.21 * 0.11    0.29 ** 
 (1.11) (1.77) (0.75) (2.37) 
Log (Market Value Equity) -0.02    -0.02 * -0.01    -0.02 ** 
 (-1.55) (-1.82) -(0.43) (-2.11) 
Log (Price-to-Book)     -0.06 ** -0.04    -0.07 ** -0.04 
 (-2.16) (-1.64) -(2.56) (-1.45) 
Dividend Yield 0.02   0.01 * 0.01   0.01 * 
 (1.65) (1.74) (1.36) (1.65) 
Past 3-year Return (log)      0.02 ***      0.07 *** 0.02      0.07 *** 
 (4.11) (2.78) (0.06) (2.73) 
Country & Industry 
Dummy Y Y Y Y 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.34 
N 445 440 407 412 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
 
  181 
TABLE 12. Regressions of Stock Returns on HCM Dummies  
The year-by-year cross-sectional regressions include, respectively, raw excess return 
and risk-adjusted return as dependent variable; see Table 11 for details. We constructed 
a dummy variable for firms with a HCM ranking that equals or exceeds 60, and a 
dummy variable for firms that have a ranking equal to or below 40. T-statistics [F-
statistics] based on White (1980) errors appear in parentheses [brackets]. 
 
 Raw Excess Return  Risk-Adjusted Return 
  2003 2004 2003 2004 
Human Capital Management Dummies    
High Talent A&R Dummy 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 (1.28) (-0.91) (1.26) (-0.95) 
Low Talent A&R Dummy -0.01      -0.08 ** -0.02    -0.06 * 
 (-0.26) (-2.32) (-0.40) (-1.93) 
Difference 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 
 [1.11] [2.40] [1.48] [1.24] 
High Labor Practice Dummy -0.03 0.01    -0.06 * 0.01 
 (-0.89) (0.24) (-1.82) (0.27) 
Low Labor Practice Dummy 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.55) (0.07) (0.15) (0.20) 
Difference -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 
 [1.14] [0.00] [1.55] [0.00] 
High Human Cap. Develop 0.01   0.05 * 0.01 0.05 
 (0.15) (1.67) (0.19) (1.58) 
Low Human Cap. Develop -0.02    0.08 * -0.03 0.07 
 (-0.56) (1.94) (-0.62) (1.65) 
Difference 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 
 [0.40] [0.52] [0.57] [0.27] 
High Organizational Learning -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 
 (-0.87) (-1.30) (-0.61) (-1.51) 
Low Organizational Learning    -0.07 * -0.01    -0.08 * -0.02 
 (-1.71) (-0.24) (-1.92) (-0.50) 
Difference 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.02 
 [1.00] [0.44] [1.90] [0.26] 
Control Variables     
Financials / C&I Dummies Y / Y Y / N Y / Y Y / N 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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significant excess returns. This result suggests that information about human capital 
development and organizational learning practices is not a source of abnormal return.  
The results of this section are mixed, but also intriguing. Not finding a significant 
predictive relation in the set of regressions suggests that stock prices accurately incorporate 
the value relevance of firms’ human capital management systems. However the portfolio 
study paints a different picture. The two indexes of HCM that almost consistently failed to 
be capable of explaining operating performance (ROA) and firm value (Tobin’s q) seem to 
convey information about (risk-adjusted) stock returns in our portfolio analysis. 
 
Human Capital Management and Earnings Surprises  
Generally, there are three ways to interpret abnormal returns. The first explanation is that 
the abnormal differential returns between two portfolios arise because of a risk factor or 
other attribution factor that is omitted from the performance evaluation model. A second 
possibility is that the results are due to sample-specific issues, data snooping, bias 
emerging from extending the indexes backwards, or random luck.  A third explanation is 
that financial markets “misprice” HCM-based sources of firms’ cash flow to investors. 
Studies on return anomalies suggest that abnormal returns trace back to errors in analysts’ 
earnings expectations (e.g., La Porta (1996)). To add insights to our mixed return evidence, 
this section builds on the same intuition to explore whether investors are surprised by the 
earnings of firms that differ in HCM policy. For example, under an errors-in-expectations 
hypothesis, we can explain the relative outperformance of a stock portfolio of firms with 
poor Labor Practice Index ratings by pointing to investors’ mistakes about the operating 
performance of these companies. Since our regressions do not show any significant relation 
between the Labor Practice Index and operating performance, one hypothesis supporting 
the portfolio return patterns, subject to our other results, would be that investors expect 
firms with poor labor practice values to display inferior operating performance while these 
companies actually did not.  
As a proxy for investor earnings surprise, we use analysts’ earnings forecasts data 
from IBES to derive consensus earnings forecast errors. We define such errors as the 
difference between companies’ actual earnings at the end of a fiscal year and the mean 
one-year forecast earnings for that year, following the approach of Laporta (1996), Levis 
and Liodakis (2001), and Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2005). The implicit assumption we 
make is that investors’ forecasts are at least equally informed as analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. We regress the earnings forecast error against the four HCM indexes and a set of 
controls that are sources of abnormal return (see the previous section). The base model is:  
 
ititititit
J
j
itjjiit YearYPRDYPBSizeHEPSERROR εγγγγγβα +++++++= ∑
=
20033 43221
1
,          (7) 
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We define EPSERROR as the price-deflated difference between the actual earning per 
share and the mean earnings per share forecast. We measure firm size by the natural 
logarithm of market value of equity. PB is the logarithm of the price-to-book ratio, DY is 
the annual dividend yield, PR3Y is past three-year return, and Year2003 is a year dummy. 
  Table 14 reports pooled models with country and industry dummies and the fixed 
model. To increase the number of observations, we also report models that omit past 
returns. Overall, the regression results contrast with the stock portfolio evidence. Table 15 
displays a significant, positive coefficient on the Labor Practice Index in fixed-effect 
models and a positive but nonsignificant coefficient in pooled models with country and 
industry dummies. Only a negative loading on this index would be consistent with the 
stock portfolio evidence. However, according to our models, the actual-expected earnings 
gap widens positively (becomes less negative) as a company’s performance on the Labor 
Practice Index increases. The coefficients on the other HCM indexes are not significantly 
different from zero. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the value relevance 
of human capital systems is correctly embedded in market prices. 
Overall, the results support the view that investors accurately assess the economic 
consequences of HCM. Our findings suggest that evidence of abnormal stock (portfolio) 
returns from HCM practices is either a chance outcome, or else is caused by other factors 
correlated with HCM. 
 
 
5.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Human resources play an important role in firms’ ability to create value. There are many 
possible benefits to managing human capital, if it is managed in the right way, and 
inherently there are associated costs that warrant careful attention, with the net effect being 
an empirical question. Using a sample of firms around the world, our study's goal is to 
determine whether – and which – systems of human capital management contribute to 
enhancing firm performance.  
Our results partially support the view that HCM practices relate to firm value and 
operating performance. Investments in human capital management systems can foster 
better corporate financial performance, but it becomes apparent that some but not all 
systems are economically valuable. One important conclusion that we can derive from our 
results is that too aggregated measures of HCM performance might conceal financially 
relevant information. By contrast, research on HCM at disaggregated levels yield 
interesting results. 
Despite being popularized in several media, in our sample firms’ talent attraction 
and retention does not account for better profitability and firm valuation. Instead, we find 
that a human capital development system, one that utilizes skill gap management,
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Table 14. Earning Forecast Errors and HCM Indexes 
Reported are pooled cross-sectional regressions with the earnings forecast error as the 
dependent variable. We estimate both a pooled model with country and industry 
dummies and a fixed effects model. Controls are a year 2003 dummy and one-year 
lagged values of firm size (market value of equity), price-to-book, dividend yield,  
and past three-year return. Pooled cross-section period: 2003-2004. T-statistics based 
on White errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
(Actual EPS - Forecast EPS) / Pricet-1 
  Pooled FE Pooled FE 
Human Capital Management Indexes    
Talent A & R -0.04   0.1 E-2   -0.04 * 0.01 
 (-1.63) (0.06) (-1.72) (0.48) 
Human Cap Develop -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 
 (-1.00) (-1.65) (-0.85) (-1.48) 
Organizational Learning    0.2 E-2 -0.01  -0.6 E-4 -0.01 
 -0.24 (-0.90) (-0.01) (-0.94) 
Labor Practices 0.04    0.05 ** 0.04     0.04 ** 
 (1.43) (2.02) (1.56) (2.06) 
Control Variables     
Constant 4.54  4.34  
 (1.63)  (1.63)  
Log (Market Value Equity) -0.20 * 1.45 *    -0.17 **   1.29 * 
 (-1.85) (1.88) (-2.05) (1.71) 
Log (Price-to-Book) -0.14 1.80 -0.16 1.32 
 (-0.62) (1.56) (-0.67) (1.46) 
Dividend Yield -0.04  -0.33 ** -0.11   -0.30 ** 
 (-0.60) (-2.02) (-0.64) (-1.98) 
Past 3-Year Return (log) -0.80 -0.50   
 (-0.06) (-0.30)   
Year 2003 Dummy -0.33   -0.66 ** -0.27  -0.50 * 
 (-0.86) (-2.42) (-0.71) (-1.92) 
Country & Industry Dummies Y   Y   
N*T (unbalanced) 642 642  708 708 
* Significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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employee training and appraisal methods, and which controls human capital management 
effectiveness, contributes positively to corporate economic performance. Our regressions 
indicate that greater use of human capital development practices is associated with a higher 
Tobin’s q and a higher return on assets. The ties to both Q and ROA suggest that human 
capital development practices not only improve operating performance, but also encompass 
sources of intangible value. These findings display parallels with Pfeffer (2001), who 
suggests that a company benefits from the potentials of its current employees by allowing 
them to undergo constant development through, e.g., training, appraisal, and teamwork. 
Parts of the benefits may be realized because employees develop skills that are firm-
specific and of little use to direct competitors, as Koch and McGrath (1996) and Rappaport 
(1998) suggest. 
Not finding a relation between talent attraction and retention systems and 
performance could possibly be harmonized with Pfeffer (2001), who asserts that  in waging 
“the war for talent”, a firm creates an organizational culture (i) that fosters internal 
competition rather than a teamwork environment, (ii) demotivates employees within the 
firm because it glorifies the idea that better human capital is found outside the 
organization, and (iii) that ultimately harbors a pool of overconfident and “money-minded” 
workers instead of company-loyal and productive ones. 
  Evidence for the other two indexes of HCM practices is not pronounced. 
Organizational learning systems do not seem to relate to Q and ROA. Admittedly, the 
functioning of knowledge management systems can be hampered by a free-rider problem 
similar to that plaguing incentive pay plans. Conflicts of interest may cause employees not 
to share their knowledge and expertise among co-workers unless the firm guarantees 
appropriate compensation (Cabrera and Cabrera (2002)).  
The evidence on the Labor Practices Index contributes to ongoing discussions on 
the CSR-financial performance relation. The disclosure of socially desirable labor practices 
is neither associated with operating performance nor with intangible value. While this 
observation might imply that the social side of HCM practices is viewed neither favorably 
nor unfavorably by capital market investors, possibly because CSR is considered a 
contentious concept, we note that the measure we use in our study reflects information 
transparency and offers no content on firms’ socially responsible labor practices as such. 
Last, we lay the foundations for research on markets’ assessment of the value 
added by HCM and its implications for both mainstream and socially responsible investors. 
If HCM is not well understood in financial markets, the possibility of return predictability 
due to misprising arises. We investigate associations between the HCM indexes and 
variation in stock returns and earnings surprises. Our three tests produce mixed results and 
jointly do not provide compelling evidence that predictable patterns in stock returns could 
emerge because investors fail to accurately understand the economic implications of 
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human capital management. As more time-series data becomes available, future research 
should explore the stock return implications of HCM practices in greater length. 
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APPENDIX: Global Four Factor-Mimicking Benchmark Portfolios 
 
To evaluate and risk-adjust international equity portfolio returns, we estimate for each 
portfolio a global version of multifactor performance models originally developed by 
Fama and French (1993) and extended by Carhart (1997). We build the global factor-
mimicking portfolios by using all stocks around the world covered by the Worldscope 
database. One important benefit of the Worldscope stock data is that it covers over 98% of 
total market capitalization. The Carhart (1997) model comprises four tradable portfolio 
return series.  
We construct the first portfolio return series by deducting the monthly U.S. T-bill 
rate from the monthly return on the Worldscope global market proxy. Following Fama and 
French (1993), we add two regressors, SMBw and HMLw.  SMBw is the return difference 
between a small-cap portfolio and a large-cap portfolio. HMLw is the difference in return 
between a value (high book-to-market stocks) portfolio and a growth portfolio (low book-
to-market). We obtain our versions of Fama and French’s SMB and HML by composing 
the six value-weighted portfolios that we form based on firms’ market value and the book-
to-market ratio.  The small-cap-value, small-cap-neutral and small-growth portfolios cover 
the bottom 20% of total market capitalization after we rank all stocks according to size. 
We allocate the remaining part (large value, large neutral, and large growth) to the large 
cap portfolio. Within each size segment, the value and growth portfolios both cover 30% 
of total capitalization and the neutral portfolio covers the remaining 40%. We compute 
SMBw as the average return on the three small-stock portfolios minus that of the three 
large-stock portfolios:   
       
SMBw =  1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth)  - 1/3 (Large Value 
+ Large Neutral + Large Growth).    
  
      
We define HMLw as the average return on the two value-stock portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth-stock portfolios,   
       
HMLw = 1/2 (Small Value + Large Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Large Growth).    
  
The fourth factor, MOMw, is the return on a global momentum portfolio. We define 
MOMw as: 
 
MOMw = the monthly return difference between a prior 12-month return winners 
portfolio and a prior 12-month returns losers portfolio.  
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After sorting all stocks on their previous 12-month returns, we classify the top 30% of the 
market (in terms of market capitalization) as winners and the bottom 30% as losers. We 
rebalance all portfolios annually at the end of June and ignore transaction costs. Table 15 
presents summary statistics on the portfolios.     
 
 
 
TABLE 15. Statistics on Global Four-Factor Benchmark Portfolios 
The global benchmark portfolio returns were developed in line with Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997). Rm-Rf is the return on a global market 
portfolio based on all stocks in Worlscope minus the U.S. Treasury-Bill rate 
from Ibbotson Associates. SMB is the return differential between a small stock 
cap portfolio and a large cap portfolio. HML is the difference in return between 
a high book-to-market and low book-to-market portfolio. SMB and HML are 
obtained after developing 6 portfolios formed on the basis of firm size (market 
value of equity) and book-to-market. MOM buys prior 12-month winner return 
stocks and sells short prior 12-month losers. Mean return and standard deviation 
are annualized. 
 
Global portfolios Mean Return Standard Deviation # Firms 
Small Value 17.86 16.78 8358 
Small Neutral 10.86 14.72 6805 
Small Growth 5.21 22.44 4506 
Large Value 11.23 16.43 727 
Large Neutral 6.44 16.10 861 
Large Growth 3.17 20.68 545 
    
Prior Winners 10.94 17.26 6808 
Prior Losers 5.62 21.34 9014 
    
Rm-Rf 4.13 16.11  
SMB 4.37 7.94  
HML 10.36 14.45  
MOM 5.33 14.93  
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Chapter 6.  
CSR and the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial markets have become increasingly responsive to the social, ethical, and 
environmental consequences of decisions made by publicly listed companies. Nevertheless, 
social responsibility in the setting of stock markets continues to be hotly debated in 
academic studies because neither the economic rationale behind SRI policies nor the 
effects of such policies on public firms are entirely clear. According to a survey undertaken 
by Lewis and Mackenzie (1999), investors are attracted to socially responsible mutual 
funds because they believe that SRI can change the behavior of companies. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that social investors believe their decisions promote corporate change by 
influencing firms’ cost of capital (Haigh and Hazelton (2004)), but studies cast doubt on 
the validity of that argument (e.g., Malkiel and Quandt (1971), Rudd (1981), Haigh and 
Hazelton (2004)). 
 This chapter describes in greater length how publicly listed companies are 
affected by a financial market in which there are agents who integrate traditional financial 
criteria as well as social responsibility criteria into their investment decisions. At the heart 
of our study is the relation between firms’ social responsibility and their cost of equity 
capital. We provide a number of hypotheses that help to understand the effects of social 
norms in markets on the cost of equity capital and the stock price of the firm. We present 
empirical evidence to quantify the effects of investors’ concerns for a number of corporate 
social responsibility attributes on expected returns (i.e., the cost of equity). While prior 
empirical research revolves around the association between corporate responsibility 
measures and a firm’s market value, none of them explicitly isolates the cost-of-equity 
component that is critical to portraying equity markets’ attention to social responsibility.   
To better understand the price impact of social norms present in markets, it can be 
useful to distinguish investors who monitor CSR attributes for financial reasons from those 
who enjoy non-financial utility by being socially responsible in investing. According to a 
non-financial explanation, financial markets have discriminatory tastes against (in favor of) 
socially controversial (responsible) companies beyond any risk or profit motive. Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2006) suggest that “sin” companies, i.e., those earning substantial revenues 
from tobacco, alcohol and gambling, are more cheaply priced because they are disliked by 
an important set of norm-constrained institutional investors. Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner 
(2001) present a calibrated equilibrium model that allows so-called green investors to 
influence the expected return of polluting firms relative to that of non-polluters in the form 
of boycotts to polluters. In their theoretical setup, markets can drive up the cost of capital 
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of firms with low environmental standards because the presence of environmental norms 
affects the risk-sharing opportunities of investors holding controversial stocks. The model 
predicts that investors demand a higher expected return as a compensation for holding 
more shares of environmentally controversial firms than they would hold in a market free 
of boycotts from environmentally conscious investors.  
This hypothesis, which we dub the discriminating tastes hypothesis, is not 
necessarily confined to environmental issues and could theoretically apply to any other 
criterion within the CSR domain. Constrained risk sharing due to non-financial tastes is an 
effect in markets much like that of any ordinary boycott that introduces capital market 
imperfections, i.e., deviations from a frictionless market with complete information. There 
are parallels with Merton’s (1987) equilibrium model, in which neglected stocks have 
higher expected returns because these stocks suffer from, e.g., a smaller investor base, 
asymmetric information problems, and a lower liquidity.44 Implicit in our social taste-based 
discrimination framework is the assumption that the number of investors who pursue social 
or environmental criteria is sufficiently large to materially impact risk sharing. This 
assumption is unrealistic according to some authors (e.g., Haigh and Hazelton (2004) and 
Rudd (1981)) but not according to others (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk (2006)). Moreover, 
when investors are homogeneous in their tastes (i.e., in investment decisions based on 
corporate social responsibility), the risk sharing impact of social norms will more quickly 
materialize than when they are not.  
Although some scholars deem CSR a pure non-financial concept, others suggest 
that investments based on corporate social responsibility criteria need not be solely driven 
by agents with non-financial tastes. The asset pricing implications of responsible corporate 
behavior could thus be explained in a traditional rational-expectations framework when 
CSR is informationally relevant to markets. According to another hypothesis, which we 
call the value relevance hypothesis, markets are rationally responsive to social 
responsibility because CSR conveys clear financial information about a firm’s risks and 
cash flows. One implication of this hypothesis is that investors carrying the official SRI 
label may not be the only ones in the market who are responsive to certain social, moral, 
and environmental issues.  
To begin with, the old-school prediction adopted by SRI skeptics is that CSR is 
costly, because it requires the sacrifice of resources needed to operationalize shareholder 
value-enhancing projects (e.g., Henderson (2002)). Alternatively, better CSR has been 
linked to lower litigation risks, increased investor trust, and other intangible advantages, 
which suggests that there are clear financial motivations for eschewing socially 
controversial companies. Indeed, Kahn, Lekander and Leimkuhler (1997) observed that 
                                                          
44 The deviation from the perfect capital markets assumption also implies that idiosyncratic risk is 
non-diversifiable due to limited risk sharing or asymmetric information, and thus priced in 
equilibrium. 
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many U.S. states view the threat of negative long-term consequences of litigation as a valid 
financial argument for tobacco stock divestment. Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly (2005) find that 
the magnitude of share price responses to environmental violations fully reflects investors’ 
anticipation of legal sanctions, consistent with CSR being informationally relevant to the 
market instead of being merely considered by taste-constrained investors.  
Because both hypotheses are not necessarily mutually exclusive, our work does 
not intend to show how well these theoretical predictions fare against each other. Instead, 
we consider the price-discount effects of CSR an important empirical question. We 
explicitly quantify the cost of capital implications of CSR policies, and in doing so, we 
provide a vehicle for measuring the impact of investors’ attention to social, moral and 
environmental issues on corporate behavior. Our interests go to the financial effect 
although it is plausible that socially controversial firms will reform to better CSR when the 
cost-of-capital effect outweighs the cost of reforming. 
There are several other reasons why this study is not confined to purely theoretical 
predictions a là Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001). In essence, conceptual models in this 
area rest on assumptions that make it complicated to understand their practical relevance. 
To illustrate, earlier work on the effects of socially aware investors on the behavior of 
companies implicitly assume that social norms in markets purely manifest in the avoidance 
of socially undesirable stocks, particularly sin stocks and polluting firms. In practice, the 
decision not to invest in a company due to its controversial practices is often weighed 
against other positive CSR yardsticks. Moreover, investors might even choose not to divest 
from controversial firms because of a shareholder activism policy, or because they follow 
indexing strategies that preclude selling shares. 
Using a panel of U.S. firms with diverse CSR attributes, we investigate whether 
investors’ concerns about corporate social responsibility policies manifests in expected 
equity returns (the cost of equity). We use the ex ante cost of capital implied in 
contemporaneous stock price and analyst forecast data for this purpose. Unlike earlier 
theoretical studies, we do not consider a binary classification to distinguish socially 
responsible firms from non-responsible firms. Our study includes a rich array CSR features 
that are adopted by a multitude of social investors in the United States, using the well-
established and widely monitored data from KLD Research & Analytics.  
One of the key distinctions of this study is that we investigate corporate social 
responsibility beyond the aggregate level. We expect that CSR as such is too much a 
contentious concept to display a conclusive relation with expected returns. Because 
corporate social responsibility is a multidimensional construct that includes a broad range 
of specific issues, it is questionable whether one hypothesis holds for all individual CSR 
criteria. Some CSR performance dimensions are sensitive to subjective interpretation 
whereas others are more objectively measurable and theoretically strongly linked to 
financial risk. Our expectation is therefore that those CSR attributes that have a more 
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natural risk-interpretation are relevant to expected returns according to our value relevance 
hypothesis. Those that are ambiguous can only be a predictor of expected returns under the 
discriminating tastes hypothesis, i.e., in a market comprising a sufficient number of 
discriminatory taste-driven investors with homogenous beliefs about defining CSR. 
Several studies suggest that investors display heterogeneity concerning social 
responsibility screens (e.g., Barnett and Salomon (2002)), thereby leaving it an empirical 
question whether investors’ beliefs about a company’s overall social responsibility 
performance are sufficiently congruent to influence the cost of capital. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets employed in 
this study. Section 3 discusses the methodology and empirical results. Section 4 provides 
an extended discussion of the results and concludes this chapter. 
 
 
6.2. DATA 
 
Measuring Corporate Social Responsibility 
We use the academic database from Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Research & Analytics, 
Inc. (KLD) to measure firms’ performance along various CSR dimensions. The KLD 
sample is the most widely used database in academic studies on corporate social 
responsibility. KLD now screens approximately 3,000 U.S. companies on various CSR 
attributes and assigns a strength/weakness indicator to each firm annually. 
 The social responsibility dimensions covered by KLD are as follows.  The first 
dimension is dubbed “community involvement”. Broadly, KLD assigns 
strengths/weaknesses to firms based on (i) their charitable and innovative givings to, e.g., 
the economically disadvantaged and non-profit organizations, (ii) their support to 
educational programs and housing initiatives for economically disadvantaged people, (iii) 
support for job-training programs, and (iv) decisions or fines related to the community in 
which the firm operates. 
 The second dimension is termed “employee relations” and covers (i) a firm’s 
relations with unions, (ii) layoffs, (iii) decisions and penalties involving employee safety, 
(iv) pension plans, profit shares and other benefits (v) and the degree to which employees 
are involved in the firm, for example, in decision-making processes. 
 The third dimension covered by KLD is called “diversity”. Here, KLD evaluates 
companies on (i) their dedication to appointing women and minorities for positions at the 
executive and non-executive levels, (ii) innovative hiring and employee development 
policies aimed at providing job opportunities to the disabled, and (iii) benefits programs 
directed at work/family issues, and (iv) progressive gay and bisexual policies. 
The fourth area is labeled “product & service quality” and incorporates (i) 
marketing related strengths and controversies (e.g. lawsuits involving advertisements, or 
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consumer dissatisfaction), (ii) product innovation as witnessed by, for example, R&D, (iii) 
the extent to which a firm has quality programs, and (iv) the degree to which products 
serve the needs of economically disadvantaged. 
 The fifth area covers the “environment” criterion. To measure environmental 
performance, KLD looks at whether a company has (i) significant liabilities due to 
hazardous wastes sites, (ii) involvement in Superfund sites, (iii) fines and penalties from 
environmentally controversial activities, (iv) toxic emissions, and other environmental 
controversies. Areas of strength incorporated by KLD include (v) policies to eliminate 
emissions, (vi) the extent to which the firm makes use of environmentally friendly assets 
and materials, and (vii) the extent to which the firm earns revenues from the development 
or sales of alternative fuels that are environmentally friendly. 
The sixth aspect of CSR covered by KLD is “human rights”. Included in this 
category are (i) firms’ involvement with politically incorrect regimes and operations in 
controversial countries, (ii) indigenous peoples relations, (iii) labor rights, and (iv) other 
exceptional human rights initiatives, such as transparency or industry leadership with 
respect to human rights issues not covered by the other criteria in this category.  
The last KLD category we include in this study is termed “governance”, although 
this measure does not capture the entire spectrum of mechanisms that are generally 
believed to promote strong corporate governance (see, e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Lafond (2006)).45 Included here are (i) 
compensation to top management and board members, where limited compensation is 
deemed a strength, (ii) ownership of other socially responsible firms, (iii) transparency 
with respect to reporting on social and environmental performance measures, (iv) political 
accountability (defined as transparency and accountability regarding involvement in U.S. 
and non-U.S. politics), and (v) “other” noteworthy initiatives that fit within this category. 
Between 2001 and 2003, KLD covered a smaller universe of public companies 
(about 1000 firms). Before 2001, their coverage mainly involved the S&P 500 constituents. 
We choose to analyze firm-year observations for the period 2001 onwards to ensure the 
sample is sufficiently representative of the U.S. equity market.  
In transforming the strength/weakness indicators into indexes with numerical 
values, we are guided by prior studies that employ the KLD database. Like Hillman and 
Keim (2002), we construct an index of CSR by assigning the value of 1 to each strength 
and -1 to each weakness. The index comprises the sum of all scores and thus reflects the 
sum of all strengths net of all weaknesses. One of the key distinctive features of this study 
is that it evaluates CSR at both aggregated and disaggregated levels. We disaggregate the 
total CSR index into four subsets: environmental performance, governance, product 
quality, and social performance, where the social performance index bundles the diversity, 
                                                          
45 Derwall and Verwijmeren (2006) use a methdodologically identical approach to examine a broader 
corporate governance measure and find similar cost of capital effects. 
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human rights, community involvement, and labor relations indicators provided by KLD. 
Our decision to distinguish environmental, social, and governance issues is motivated by 
the rise of a universal framework that is gaining momentum in the financial community 
and that circumvents the somewhat contentious term corporate social responsibility by 
directly identifying these three (so-called “ESG”) areas as primary CSR constituents. Note 
that our social index is a composite of four social dimensions, which we consider 
interconnected because KLD has occasionally transferred social performance indicators 
from one dimension to one of the three other dimensions; see Kinder, Lydenberg and 
Domini (2005). We examine the product quality index separately as well, since we see no 
reason to assume that product and services quality issues relate to the other categories.46 
 
Financial Data 
The equity cost of capital central to this study is the rate that equates expected cash flows 
over a specified period to the current stock price. Our implied cost-of-equity models rely 
on analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts from IBES. We collected the mean 1-year ahead 
and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts as well as the 5-year earnings growth forecast. All 
models require that we collect dividend and price information, which we obtain from 
Compustat. Because some models assume that growth in abnormal earnings beyond a 
specific year equals the rate of expected inflation, we collect expected 1-year inflation data 
from the Consumer Opinion Survey (University of Michigan). 
In our investigation into the relation between firm’s social responsibility attributes 
and the cost of equity, we control for other firm characteristics correlated with the 
dependent variable. Our cost of equity models control for traditional risk proxies: U.S. 
stock market sensitivity (beta) observed over the previous calendar year, where the Fama-
French (1993) market proxy is used to describe daily market return variation, the book 
value of leverage (debt / assets), firm size measured by the market value of equity after 
lognormal transformation, and the price-to-book ratio truncated at the 1% level. Returns 
data are from the CRSP daily stock database. All other data are from Compustat. 
 
 
6.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We examine the association between CSR and firms’ cost of equity capital using the 
abnormal earnings growth valuation models of Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2000).  
The Easton (2004) implied cost-of-equity model takes the form: 
                                                          
46 Another advantage of our CSR benchmarking approach is that it keeps the CSR ratings easily 
replicable. See Graafland, Eijffinger and Smid (2004) for a discussion of different CSR 
benchmarking methods. 
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Pt = (xt+2 + rpeg * dt+1 – xt+1)/ r2peg,                            (1) 
 
where Pt is a firm’s market price in year t, x is the expected future earnings per share, d is 
the expected future net dividends per share, and rpeg is the implied cost of equity capital. 
The intuition behind Easton’s price-earnings-growth ratio model is fairly straightforward 
and the model requires only a limited number of inputs. By using analysts’ forecast for the 
expected earnings and dividends, we solve for the internal rate of return, which is the 
implied cost of equity capital. 
 The abnormal earnings growth valuation model by Olhson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2000) is described as: 
 
Pt = (xt+1 / rOJ)* (gst + rOJ * dt+1 / xt+1 – glt) / (rOJ - glt),             (2) 
 
where we use one-year ahead predicted earnings and dividends per share and forecasts of 
short-term and long-term abnormal earnings growth. Dividends are set equal to a constant 
fraction of the predicted earnings. We follow Hail and Leuz (2006) and estimate the short-
term growth rate gst as the average between the forecasted percentage change in earnings 
from year t+1 to t+2 and the five-year growth forecast from IBES. A positive change in 
forecasted earnings is necessary to obtain a numerical solution. The long-term earnings 
growth rate glt incorporates the assumption that growth in abnormal earnings per share 
beyond year t+1 equals the expected rate of inflation. We use the Consumer Opinion 
Survey data from the University of Michigan to incorporate inflation expectations into the 
equation. Year-by-year optimization of (2) by means of an iterative algorithm solves for 
the expected return for each firm in the sample. 
To some extent, the preference for these models is arbitrary. Hail and Leuz (2006) 
describe these and other models that enable computation of the implied cost of capital, 
such as the residual income models of Claus and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swamanithan (2001). Because Hail and Leuz (2006) find that all four models yield 
comparable results, we choose the computationally most efficient specifications. 
Moreover, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) compare alternative cost of equity estimators 
derived from valuation models and conclude that the implied premium from the Easton 
(2004) model is superior to most other expected return estimates, based on the correlation 
between the implied rate of return and well-known risk proxies. Gode and Mohanram 
(2003) find that the Ohlson-Jeuttner implied rate gives a robust estimate of the markets’ 
perception of risk and that it correlates significantly with traditional risk proxies and ex 
post returns. 
The advantage of implied cost of equity estimates is that they reflect ex ante 
expected returns and do not explicitly depend on conventional pricing models using 
realized returns, which are potentially prone to misspecification.  The misspecification 
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problem is a reason for us to eschew existing expected return models that make use of 
realized returns, especially because none of these models explicitly incorporates factors to 
describe premiums for the corporate social responsibility attributes of stocks. One critique 
towards implied cost of capital models concerns the validity of the proxies as a 
consequence of, for instance, analyst forecasts that are sluggish with respect to information 
in past stock returns (Guay, Kothari and Shu (2004)). Although we are not primarily 
interested in the absolute cost-of-capital estimates but in cross-sectional differences in the 
estimates across firms, limitations to implied models brought forward in earlier work 
suggest that our results should be handled with appropriate caution.  
After having solved for firms’ implied cost of equity, we estimate the following 
pooled regression model: 
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where rit is either rpeg or rOJ in for firm i in year t, CSRit  is a vector that consists of either 
the Total CSR Index or the subindexes we derived from the KLD data, and Cit is a vector 
of (financial) control variables. The controls we use are common to studies on expected 
returns (e.g., Fama and French (1992), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Lafond (2006), Hail 
and Leuz (2006)).  
We note that the baseline regression does not explicitly account for fundamental 
differences in cost of equity across industries because social responsibility is not regarded 
as an industry-neutral construct in the U.S. A number of businesses have a long-standing 
tradition of being regarded as socially controversial by investors, in particular those 
enjoying revenues from gambling, alcohol, weapons and defense, and tobacco. However, 
recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of social investors that screen firms 
according to a “best-in-class” approach, which evaluates the social responsibility attributes 
of a company relative to those of industry peers. (See Chapters 1 and 3 for more complete 
descriptions of best-in-class analysis.) While removing industry effects could theoretically 
induce false inferences on the cost of capital effects associated with corporate social 
responsibility, our analysis will cover various possibilities and show that industry-wide 
variation in the cost of equity does not drive the results of this study. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on some basic financial data and CSR data 
used in this study. The average implied cost of equity capital is in the order of 11 percent, 
independent of the cost of equity model we use. It is also interesting to observe that the 
four mutually exclusive subindexes of corporate social responsibility that we use in our 
regressions (i.e., environmental, social, governance, and product quality) are not highly 
correlated. The strongest correlation, namely that between the environmental and the
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          Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panels A and B of Table 1 report the mean, median and standard deviation 
for CSR variables and a number of standard financial variables based on 
pooled cross-sectional data over the period 2001-2005. The Total CSR 
index is defined as the sum of all strengths a company has along the CSR 
dimensions identified by KLD minus the sum of all weaknesses. The 
Environmental, Social, Governance, and Product Quality Indexes comprise 
subsets of the Total CSR Index. The Environmental Index adds all strength 
indicators along a number of environmental dimensions and subtracts all 
environmental weaknesses reported by KLD. In a similar manner, the 
Social, Governance and Product Quality Indexes accumulate all strengths 
and subtract weaknesses in their respective areas. All firms are evaluated 
along the same set of dimensions. Panel C presents correlations based on 
the pooled cross-sectional data. 
 
Panel A: CSR Variables       
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 
Total CSR Index -0.04 0.00 1.99 
Environmental Index -0.03 0.00 0.63 
Social Index 0.19 0.00 1.67 
Governance Index -0.13 0.00 0.67 
Product Quality Index -0.07 0.00 0.61 
    
Panel B: Other Firm Attributes       
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. 
Implied Cost of Equity    
Easton Model 0.11 0.10 0.05 
OJN Model 0.11 0.10 0.03 
    
Market Value of Equity (millions) 9799.83 2225.12 27479.25 
Book Debt / Assets 0.25 0.23 0.19 
Price / Book Value (Truncated) 3.16 2.38 2.77 
Return on Assets (%) (Truncated) 5.39 5.08 9.03 
 
            Panel C: Correlations among CSR variables 
 Total Env. Social Gov. Prod. 
Total CSR Index 1.00 0.46 0.79 0.21 0.44 
Environmental Index 0.46 1.00 0.05 0.03 0.30 
Social Index 0.79 0.05 1.00 -0.19 0.02 
Governance Index 0.21 0.03 -0.19 1.00 0.09 
Product Quality Index 0.44 0.30 0.02 0.09 1.00 
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     Table 2. Total CSR index and the cost of equity: pooled regression results 
Table 2 shows the outcome of estimating models for the implied cost of equity, 
where the cost of equity for U.S. firms is computed using the Easton (2004) 
computation in Panel A, and where the independent variables are the market value 
of equity after log transformation, the firm’s beta based on daily stock returns over 
the last calendar year, the book debt-to-assets ratio, the price-to-book ratio 
(truncated at the 1% level), year fixed effects, and the aggregate corporate social 
responsibility index (Total CSR). The first model reported additionally controls for 
whether the firm is a financial services company according to the industry 
classification scheme of Fama and French (1997). The second model contains all 
industry dummy variables based on Fama and French’s 48 industry classifications. 
The last model omits financial and utility companies from the sample. The table 
reports pooled OLS coefficients with t-statistics (in parentheses) based on White 
(1980) standard errors. Pooled sample period: 2001-2005. 
 
  Panel A: Easton implied cost of equity model 
    All firms All firms Excl. fin. & util. 
Intercept        0.12 ***       0.12 ***       0.13 *** 
  (29.72) (25.70)  (22.86) 
Total CSR Index     -0.17E-3    0.17E-3     -0.17E-3 
  (-0.60) (0.60) (-0.51) 
Log (Market Value 
Equity)         -5.04E-3 ***         -5.12E-3 ***          -5.77E-3 *** 
  (-11.08) (-11.09) (-9.32) 
Beta           1.83E-2 ***          1.43E-2 ***     1.52E-2 
  (12.03) (8.75) (9.32) 
Debt / Assets       0.04 ***       0.05 ***       0.05 *** 
  (10.02) (10.74) (10.43) 
Price / Book Value          -2.59E-3 ***         -2.60E-3 ***         -2.34E-3 *** 
  (-9.53) (-9.34) (-8.29) 
Year Fixed Effects  Y Y Y 
Financials Controlled Y Y Y 
All Industries  
Controlled  N N N 
# Observations  4390 4390 3136 
Adj. R-squared  0.21 0.20 0.14 
     * Significant at 10% level, *** at 1% level 
  203 
      Table 2 Continued. Total CSR index and the cost of equity: pooled regressions 
Table 2 shows the outcome of estimating models for the implied cost of equity, 
where the cost of equity for U.S. firms is computed using the Olhson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2000) method in Panel B, and where the independent 
variables are the market value of equity after log transformation, the firm’s beta 
based on daily stock returns over the last calendar year, the book debt-to-assets 
ratio, the price-to-book ratio (truncated at the 1% level), year fixed effects, and 
the aggregate corporate social responsibility index (Total CSR). The first model 
additionally controls for whether the firm is a financial services company 
according to the industry classification scheme of Fama and French (1997). The 
second model contains all industry dummy variables based on Fama and 
French’s 48 industry classifications. The last model omits financial and utility 
companies from the sample. The table reports coefficients with t-statistics (in 
parentheses) based on White (1980) standard errors. Sample period: 2001-2005. 
 
  Panel B: OJN implied cost of equity model 
    All firms All firms Excl. fin. & util. 
Intercept       0.11 ***      0.11 ***      0.11 *** 
  (31.37) (27.69) (26.26) 
Total CSR Index       -3.78E-4 *    -2.15E-4          -8.27E-4 *** 
  (-1.72) (-1.10) (-3.00) 
Log (Market Value 
 Equity)          -1.91E-3 ***         -1.93E-3 ***         -2.15E-3 *** 
  (-5.30) (-5.16) (-4.95) 
Beta           0.98E-2 ***           0.67E-2 ***          4.49E-5 *** 
  (9.00) (5.52) (5.52) 
Debt / Assets        0.03 ***      0.03 ***       0.03 *** 
  (9.08) (10.29) (6.37) 
Price / Book Value        -1.80E-3 ***        -1.90E-3 ***         -2.20E-3 *** 
  (-8.66) (-8.83) (-8.05) 
     
Year Fixed Effects  Y Y Y 
Financials Controlled Y Y N 
All Industries  
Controlled  N Y N 
# Observations  3796 3796 2692 
Adj. R-squared  0.14 0.18 0.24 
      * Significant at 10% level, *** at 1% level
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product quality index, is 30 percent. Since it appears that each score captures a unique 
dimension of CSR, multicollinearity is not a concern to our pooled regressions. 
To describe the association between the cost of equity and CSR at the aggregate 
level, we present pooled regressions of the implied cost of equity on the traditional risk 
factors (size, beta, leverage, and price-to-book) and the Total CSR index. Table 2 shows 
the results of using the Easton (2004) implied cost of equity estimates (in Panel A) and the 
Olhson and Juettner-Nauroth (OJN, 2000) estimates (in Panel B) as the dependent 
variable. Leverage effects are motivated by Modigliani and Miller (1958), who state that 
the cost of equity should be an increasing function of the amount of debt in a firm’s capital 
structure. The effects of beta, size, and price-to-book are also well tested. Earlier research 
suggests that the cost of capital is negatively associated with firm size and price-to-book, 
and positively associated with stock beta, because these variables are proxies for sources 
of priced risk; see, for example, Fama and French (1992, 1993). It appears that the 
coefficients on the control variables are significant and carry the expected signs in our 
models.  
In line with our expectations, the models in Table 2 do not make a compelling 
case for an association between the aggregate CSR measure and the cost of equity. Under 
the Easton model, the relation between the Total CSR Index and the implied cost of equity 
is not significantly different from zero. Under the OJN model, we observe a negative 
association, but the coefficient on the aggregate CSR index is highly significant in only 
one of three reported specifications. Overall, the evidence that firms with higher values for 
the aggregate social responsibility index experience of lower cost of equity capital is weak. 
In Table 3, we present pooled regression results after breaking up the aggregate CSR 
measure into four elementary subsets. Consistent with our prediction, disaggregated CSR 
attributes display a significant relation to the cost of equity. The models consistently 
suggest that leaders along the dimensions environmental performance, product quality, and 
governance enjoy a lower cost of equity capital, than do laggards. From an economic 
perspective, this relationship is quite strong and economically feasible: the percentage 
point decrease in the cost of equity associated with a one-point increase in the 
environmental responsibility measure, equivalent to one extra strength or the 
disappearance of one weakness, is in the order of 0.25 to 0.55 percent. A one-point 
increase in the governance index is associated with a decline in the cost of equity in the 
order of 0.24 to 0.49 percentage points. A similar improvement in product quality is 
associated with a decrease in the cost of equity that is in the range of 0.18 to 0.35 
percentage points. 
By contrast, better performance measured by the Social Index is associated with a 
higher cost of equity according to the majority of models reported in Table 3. Although the 
rise in the cost of equity resulting from a one-point increase in social index performance is 
in magnitude relatively smaller (i.e., in the range of 0.07 – 0.23 percentage points), it is 
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statistically significant under most specifications. It thus appears that financial markets 
penalize a firm’s investment in social practices via an increase in expected return. 
We performed several robustness tests on samples that omit firms with implied risk 
premiums below a certain threshold, thereby raising the sample-average implied return. 
We allowed the minimum premium, i.e., the minimum required cost of equity in excess of 
the annual risk-free rate from Fama and French (1993), to vary up to 5 percent. None of 
these (unreported) robustness tests affects our conclusions, and none of the threshold 
levels reduces sample size substantially.   
 
 
6.4. SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter discussed the cost of capital implications of social norms in financial markets. 
We observe a relation between CSR attributes, as defined by KLD, and the cost of equity 
capital. Our findings also suggest that the cost of capital implications to corporate social 
responsibility depend on the choice of CSR attribute. We document a negative and 
statistically significant association between three of four CSR indexes and our implied cost 
of equity capital measures. Firms with leading track records in the areas of environmental 
performance, governance, and product quality, have a lower implied cost of equity capital 
than laggards, controlling for other well-known predictors. By contrast, the relation 
between a social index (which covers diversity, human rights, employee relations, and 
community involvement) and the cost of equity is positive. The net effect of these mixed 
relationships is that CSR at the aggregate level does not relate to the implied cost of 
equity. 
The results support a number of theoretical frameworks that have helped to 
understand how the corporate social responsibility attributes central to this study factor 
into implied risk premiums. Translated into a taste-based explanation in the tradition of 
Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001), the evidence suggests that investors with 
discriminatory tastes against companies with controversial environmental, governance and 
product quality characteristics affect the investor base of these firms, thereby reducing risk 
sharing. The effect is consequential to investors not avoiding these shares, who command 
a premium for holding more of a controversial firm than they would otherwise hold. 
Implicit in this framework is the assumption that CSR is not informationally relevant to 
markets, but that there are sufficient taste-driven agents to influence a firm’s investor base. 
Another explanation for our results is that all four indexes are informationally 
relevant to rational agents because the four CSR dimensions convey information about 
firm risk that is of hedging concern to investors. Thus, the negative association between 
the cost of equity and, respectively, environmental performance, governance, and product 
quality, could signal that the market associates better performance along these three   
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Table 3. CSR subindexes and the cost of equity: pooled regression results 
Table 3 shows the outcome of estimating models for the implied cost of equity, where the 
cost of equity for U.S. firms is computed using the Easton (2004) computation in Panel A 
and the Olhson and Juettner-Nauroth (2000) method in Panel B, and where the independent 
variables are the market value of equity after log transformation, the firm’s daily beta, the 
book debt-to-assets ratio, the price-to-book ratio (truncated at the 1% level), year fixed 
effects, and the four corporate social responsibility subindexes (Environmental, Social, 
Governance, and Product Quality). The first model additionally controls for whether the 
firm is a financial services company according to the industry classification scheme of 
Fama and French (1997). The second model contains all industry dummy variables based 
on Fama and French’s 48 industry classifications. The last model omits financial and utility 
companies from the sample. The table reports pooled OLS coefficients with t-statistics (in 
parentheses) based on White (1980) standard errors. Pooled sample period: 2001-2005. 
 
  Panel A: Easton implied cost of equity model 
    All firms All firms Excl.fin. & util 
Intercept       0.14 ***      0.14 ***      0.15 *** 
    (30.71) (25.03) (23.76) 
Environmental            -5.53E-3 ***         -4.53E-3 ***         -4.92E-3 *** 
  (-6.40) (-4.81) (-5.15) 
Social           1.79E-3 ***         2.33E-3 ***        2.29E-3 *** 
  (5.05) (6.62) (5.19) 
Governance           -3.91E-3 ***         -4.03E-3 ***         -3.34E-3 *** 
  (-3.85) (-4.04) (-2.68) 
Product Quality        -1.82E-3 **         -2.58E-3 ***         -3.15E-3 *** 
  (-2.04) (-2.87) (-2.89) 
Log (Market Value 
Equity)          -7.59E-3 ***         -7.95E-3 ***         -8.41E-3 *** 
  (-13.79) (-13.02) (-12.39) 
Beta            1.84E-2 ***         1.39E-2 ***         1.55E-2 *** 
  (15.16) (8.55) (9.59) 
Debt / Assets        0.04 ***       0.05 ***       0.04 *** 
  (13.08) (10.56) (10.10) 
Price-Book Ratio          -2.47E-3 ***        -2.44E-3 ***         -2.20E-3 *** 
  (-10.47) (-8.92) (-7.86) 
     
Year Fixed Effects  Y Y Y 
Financials Controlled Y Y N 
All Industries  
Controlled  N Y N 
# Observations  4390 4390 3136 
Adj. R-squared  0.18 0.23 0.24 
   ** Significant at 5% level, *** at 1% level 
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Table 3 Continued. CSR subindexes and the cost of equity: pooled regressions  
Table 3 shows the outcome of estimating models for the implied cost of equity, where the 
cost of equity for U.S. firms is computed using the Easton (2004) computation in Panel A 
and the Olhson and Juettner-Nauroth (2000) method in Panel B, and where the independent 
variables are the market value of equity after log transformation, the firm’s daily beta, the 
book debt-to-assets ratio, the price-to-book ratio (truncated at the 1% level), year fixed 
effects, and the four corporate social responsibility subindexes (Environmental, Social, 
Governance, and Product Quality). The first model additionally controls for whether the 
firm is a financial services company according to the industry classification scheme of 
Fama and French (1997). The second model contains all industry dummy variables based 
on Fama and French’s 48 industry classifications. The last model omits financial and utility 
companies from the sample. The table reports pooled OLS coefficients with t-statistics (in 
parentheses) based on White (1980) standard errors. Pooled sample period: 2001-2005. 
 
  Panel B: OJN implied cost of equity model 
    All firms All firms Excl.fin. & util 
Intercept       0.12 ***      0.12 ***      0.12 *** 
   (32.73) (27.89) (26.07) 
Environmental            -2.45E-3 ***         -2.26E-3 ***         -2.40E-3 *** 
  (-3.60) (-3.58) (-7.56) 
Social           0.91E-3 ***         1.13E-3 ***        0.73E-3 ** 
  (3.35) (4.40) (2.21) 
Governance           -4.86E-3 ***         -3.12E-3 ***         -2.42E-3 *** 
  (-4.33) (-4.20) (-2.68) 
Product Quality           -3.50E-3 ***         -2.56E-3 ***          -3.10E-3 *** 
  (-4.50) (-4.31) (-3.90) 
Log (Market Value 
Equity)         -3.65E-3 ***       -3.68E-3 ***       -3.56E-3 *** 
  (-8.49) (-8.17)  (-6.93) 
Beta           0.96E-2 ***          0.64E-2 ***        0.68E-2 *** 
  (10.17) (5.31) (5.69) 
Debt / Assets       0.03 ***      0.04 ***      0.03 *** 
  (11.04) (9.94) (7.93) 
Price-Book Ratio          -1.72E-3 ***        -1.77E-3 ***         -1.67E-3 *** 
  (-8.94) (-8.18) (-7.56) 
     
Year Fixed Effects  Y Y Y 
Financials Controlled Y Y N 
All Industries  
Controlled  N Y N 
# Observations  3796 3796 2692 
Adj. R-squared  0.15 0.20 0.19 
   *** Significant at 1% level
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corporate social responsibility dimensions with lower investment risk. However, while the 
idea that better CSR lowers risk is a widely spread view among CSR advocates in practice, 
how these risks manifest is not well explained. Indeed, there are several studies that 
support the idea thatweaker environmental performance (Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly 
(2005)), poor product quality (Pruitt and Peterson (1986)), and weak performance on 
governance issues (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Lafond (2006)) are relevant in a market 
that behaves according to the traditional rational-expectations framework. Some of these 
studies suggest that firms with weaker CSR are more frequently subjected to lawsuit 
filings. This higher litigation risk, which is further fuelled by discriminatory tastes, could 
then contribute to a higher risk premium. 
It is unavoidably difficult to determine which explanation dominates because 
investors who seek to maximize financial utility and those who incorporate non-financial 
objectives in investment decisions coexist. However, the results for the social CSR index 
seem to point away from the discriminating tastes hypothesis. One possible explanation 
for the positive association between social performance and the cost of equity is that the 
market views corporate investment in social attributes as investment in a vague and costly 
concept, in the tradition of Henderson (2002) and others.47 Barnea and Rubin (2006) even 
go as far as claiming that CSR could be a source of agency costs because a firm’s insiders 
have an incentive to promote CSR investment beyond financially optimal levels in order to 
gain reputational benefits. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and Lafond (2006) offer evidence 
that investors protect against sources of agency risk by driving up the cost of capital, thus 
making an agency risk-based explanation consistent with our findings. One possible 
reason why such agency problems underlie the observed cost of capital effect is that 
ambiguous CSR practices adopted by firms increase uncertainty and drive up monitoring 
costs borne by investors. Our results, then, motivate further research on the connection 
between CSR and traditional risk issues raised by corporate governance literatures.  
 It is interesting to note that our empirical findings reconcile with studies on 
investors’ beliefs about the importance of specific social responsibility attributes in 
markets. Epstein and Freedman (1994) asked individual shareholders from all U.S. states 
to state their demands for information about firms’ performance on financial, social and 
environmental spectrums. Their survey results from a randomly selected group suggest 
that investors assign most importance to environmental performance and the quality of 
products, consistent with our evidence that environmental performance and product 
quality are factors that determine share prices. By contrast, they find that individual 
investors assign the least importance to community involvement, charity donations, and 
diversity policies involving benefits to women and minorities.  
                                                          
47 From conversations with professional CSR rating agencies we indeed learned that rating social 
performance is generally much more complex than, e.g., assessment of a firm’s environmental 
management. 
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At the level of shareholder activism by investors, a number of studies lend 
support to similar conclusions about the importance markets assign to environmental, 
product, and governance issues relative to social issues. Rehbein, Waddock and Graves 
(2004) show that shareholder activists file shareholder resolutions involving product 
quality and corporate environmental performance particularly when a firm displays 
controversial behavior in these areas, whereas the relation between firms’ track record and 
the number of respective filings in other CSR areas was much less pronounced. Monks, 
Miller and Cook (2004) study proposals at large U.S. firms over the period 2003-2003 and 
find that of the 671 proposals filed, more than half concerned traditional corporate 
governance issues while nearly half dealt with CSR. Of those CSR-related proposals, the 
strongest shareholder support pertained to climate change and renewable energy. 
The implications that our results carry for managers are twofold. First, the results 
suggest that firms can reduce the cost of equity by simply undertaking activities to 
strengthen their track record with respect to three of the four CSR dimensions in this 
study. Alternatively, firms with relatively weak performance along these dimensions could 
deal specifically with the channels through which CSR affects capital costs under our 
hypotheses. Two concrete measures of action for firms are improving transparency 
concerning CSR activity and increasing analyst coverage. An increase in analyst coverage 
would reduce information uncertainty and asymmetry (Easley and O’hara (2004)) and 
improve stock liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson (2000)) and increase investor attention, 
all of which could ultimately counterbalance the neglect effect caused by societal norms in 
markets.48 Transparency improvement might help investors better understand the value 
relevance of CSR investment, as Graafland and Eijffinger (2004) suggest. This policy 
recommendation implicitly involves the role of corporate governance, and particularly 
governance mechanisms that improve the quality of reporting, in the construction of value-
enhancing corporate social responsibility plans. An interesting avenue for further research 
would be to test whether the higher cost of equity capital that we associate with better 
social performance is conditional on the quality of information that a firm provides about 
its policies, so that better social performance could be tied to lower capital costs when a 
firm’s investment in CSR is better understood by the market.  
Furthermore, a natural extension of this study would be to translate our findings 
based on implied rates of return into models that use realized returns to measure the cost of 
equity. Evidence on the explanatory power of models that expand mainstream asset 
pricing models, such as the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model, with firms’ 
sensitivities to factors (premiums) associated with CSR attributes is highly 
underdeveloped. However, a caveat that warrants careful attention concerns the 
                                                          
48 There now is some preliminary evidence that hints that “sin” firms, which earn revenues from 
alcohol, tobacco and gambling, indeed pursue such transparency strategies to mitigate capital market 
sanctions (e.g., Kim and Vankatachalam (2006)). 
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development of ad hoc factor-mimicking portfolios based on CSR attributes. Like any 
other factor premium obtained by sorting stocks on a firm-specific attribute, such as the 
book-to-market premium or small firm premium, the estimated CSR premiums can differ 
substantially from the true (unobservable) premiums.49 The addition of factor premiums 
should therefore be weighed against increased uncertainty about the magnitude of all these 
premiums in order to avoid that the resulting asset pricing model delivers more errors 
compared to more parsimonious specifications.  
                                                          
49 This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there is not yet enough time-series information 
on firm’ social responsibility attributes to estimate long-term CSR premiums. 
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Chapter 7.  
Summary and Concluding Comments 
 
 
7.1. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
 
This dissertation bundles six empirical studies about socially responsible investing and the 
related discipline of corporate social responsibility. By means these studies, we have aimed 
to deepen our understanding of the value of SRI and CSR policies from the perspective of 
both investors and companies. While there are several financially motivated arguments 
against, as well as arguments in favor of, adopting SRI and CSR, our empirical studies 
altogether offer support of the view that implementing these concepts does not come at the 
expense of a weaker “bottom line” performance.  
Chapter 1 offered the first globally oriented study on socially responsible mutual 
fund performance by evaluating SRI funds in many countries around the world in a 
systematic way. First, we showed that aggregate socially responsible fund performance is 
robust across different countries and similar to the returns of their conventional peers. 
Second, our results suggest that SRI fund performance is reasonably insensitive to the 
choice of social screening criteria and methodology. Neither the least stringent social 
screeners nor their most stringent counterparts underperform conventional mutual funds. 
Third, we tested for performance persistence. Portfolios of SRI funds identified as prior-
year “winners” outperform past losers significantly out-of-sample on a risk- and style-
adjusted basis. The general conclusion that emerged from Chapter 1 is that SRI equity 
mutual funds deliver competitive and highly similar returns compared to conventional 
funds, on a risk-adjusted basis, despite possible cross-country differences in SRI 
implementation. 
Heightened attention for SRI has mainly resulted in academic studies on equity 
SRI but not in research that expands its scope to include other asset classes. Remarkably, 
no attempts have been made to evaluate the performance of mutual funds that invest in 
socially responsible fixed-income securities. Chapter 2 filled that gap by measuring the 
performance of socially responsible bond and balanced funds relative to matched samples 
of conventional funds over a sizeable investment horizon. Using multi-index performance 
evaluation models, we showed that the average SRI bond fund performed similar to 
conventional funds, while the average SRI balanced fund outperformed its conventional 
peers by more than 1.3 percent per year. The expenses charged by SRI funds, match those 
charged by conventional funds and, evidently, do not cause SRI funds to underperform. 
Thus, Chapter 2 points out that the SRI concept can be implemented in a financially viable 
way through investment vehicles for the fixed-income industry. 
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Although socially responsible mutual funds have the advantage of representing 
practically relevant and investable portfolios, we posited that funds inadequately help to 
determine whether stock-return information is conveyed by specific constituents of the 
broad corporate social responsibility concept. In Chapter 3, we illustrated our point by 
testing self-composed equity portfolios based on a single CSR/SRI element.  
We added better insights to the corporate environmental-financial performance 
debate by focusing purely on the concept of eco-efficiency. Based on a new and unique 
database of corporate eco-efficiency scores, we constructed and evaluated two equity 
portfolios that differed in eco-efficiency. Contrary to studies on SRI mutual funds, we 
found that a high-ranked (i.e., environmentally responsible) portfolio not only provided 
substantially higher average returns than its low-ranked counterpart over the 1995–2003 
period, but also earned an average return beyond that suggested by the portfolio’s risk. We 
controlled for by differences in market sensitivity, investment style, or industry-specific 
factors. Moreover, the results remained significant for various levels of transaction costs, 
suggesting that the incremental benefits of SRI can be substantial. Our fresh portfolio 
approach thus points away from studying mutual funds and helps to obtain a more 
complete view of the risk-return characteristics associated with the social responsibility 
attributes of investment strategies. Very recent empirical work that follows our 
recommendation also arrives at conclusions different from those reached by mutual fund 
research.50  
Next to reporting on SRI strategies and asset pricing anomalies involving SRI 
returns, we concentrated on the relation between eco-efficiency and financial performance 
at the corporate level from 1997 to 2004. In Chapter 4, we reported that eco-efficiency 
relates positively to operating performance and market value. Moreover, our results 
suggest that the market’s valuation of environmental performance has been time variant, 
which may indicate that the market incorporates environmental information with a drift. 
Although environmental leaders initially did not sell at a premium relative to laggards, the 
valuation differential increased significantly over time. We tried to explain this upward 
pattern by providing evidence consistent with investors’ mispricing of environmental 
information: evidence on earnings surprises (measured by analysts forecast errors) suggests 
that a high degree of eco-efficiency is accompanied by larger positive (less negative) 
surprises. The results have implications for company managers, who evidently do not have 
to overcome a tradeoff between eco-efficiency and financial performance, and for 
investors, who can exploit environmental information for investment decisions.         
In Chapter 5, we singled out another common component of the CSR concept: 
human capital management (HCM). Using a new and global database that reports on four 
HCM systems for many countries around the world, we studied the economic 
                                                          
50 See Kempf and Osthoff (2006) and Lee and Faff (2006). 
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consequences of human capital management practices along several lines. Of the four 
alternative systems of human capital management that we examined, a “human capital 
development” system (involving a combination of skill gap management, employee 
appraisal and training, and quantitative assessment of HCM effectiveness) is positively 
associated with Tobin’s q and return on assets. Our results paint a weaker picture for talent 
attraction and retention systems, organizational learning systems, and disclosure quality 
concerning socially desirable labor practices, none of which are positively related to 
Tobin's q and ROA. While the results altogether indicate that certain human capital 
management criteria could be value relevant, we proceeded with examining the extent to 
which markets fully understand the value created by HCM. Specifically, we investigated 
the ability of the HCM indexes to explain stock returns and enhance portfolio performance, 
and we the examined the degree to which errors in analysts’ earnings expectations are 
attributable to HCM. The mixed results from these tests leave us with the conclusion that 
investors understand the value added by human capital management. 
In the last empirical study outlined in this dissertation, we provided evidence that 
social norms in the U.S. market translate into cross-sectional differences in firms’ cost of 
equity capital caused by differences in corporate social responsibility attributes. The 
implied cost of equity of laggards in environmental performance, governance, and the 
quality of products and services exceeds that of leaders significantly. Our findings several 
(not mutually-exclusive) hypotheses: (i) the view that investors with discriminatory tastes 
in favor of social responsibility affect risk sharing, and (ii) the notion that “rational” 
investors associate better performance along these three CSR dimensions with lower non-
diversifiable risk. By contrast, firms with better social performance (i.e., better records 
regarding diversity, employee relations, community involvement and human rights issues) 
have a higher cost of equity capital. One potential explanation for the latter observed cost-
of-capital effect is that rational investors do not welcome undertakings to improve 
corporate social performance because the associated costs do not outweigh the financial 
benefits. Overall, Chapter 6 contrasts with several studies in the SRI domain that 
theoretically argue against an association between CSR and the cost of capital. 
 
 
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Since associations between CSR and financial performance measures appear to be most 
pronounced once we disentangle corporate social responsibility, we believe this 
dissertation has laid the groundwork for more in-depth analysis of the CSR-financial 
performance link at disaggregated levels. The problem with too aggregate constructs is that 
they are contentious and their implementation depends a great deal on subjective beliefs. 
At the very least, future research is recommended to follow the more universal “ESG” 
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framework, which is now being embraced by a set of important institutional investors. 
With ESG, which stands for environmental, social, and corporate governance issues, 
important players in the financial industry are now following the view that (at least) three 
primary areas related to CSR should be made salient to investors in the form of so-called 
extra-financial factors.51 Several initiatives, such as the widely endorsed Enhanced 
Analytics Initiative (EAI), encourage sell-side and other research analysts to routinely 
incorporate such extra-financial factors into investment recommendations. 
As for the (extra-)financial information content of CSR, closely related financial 
measures should be collectively taken into account by future empirical research. Although 
there is a clear attractiveness of directly examining stock returns to determine this 
association, our studies make apparent the need for understanding multiple channels of 
transmission from CSR measures to corporate financial performance and, ultimately, to a 
firm’s stock market performance. For instance, CSR may influence operating performance 
and firm value, yet with no (abnormal) return effect so long as investors are not surprised 
by its economic gains or costs. The analytical approach we adopted in the foregoing 
chapters builds on that notion and provides researchers with an interesting framework for 
investigating the economic significance of SRI and CSR in greater detail.   
To conclude, the results of this thesis point out that at least some information 
related to CSR is indeed extra-financial. From a firm’s perspective, the decision to adopt a 
specific CSR policy can be consequential to cash flows and financing costs, both of which 
are important in the context of shareholder wealth maximization. Our findings also carry a 
policy recommendation for investment practitioners, suggesting that they benefit from 
factoring CSR information into security selection decisions. Specifically, CSR information 
appears relevant to traditional investors involved with managing investment risk and 
return. In light of our findings, we conclude that the economic relevance of SRI and CSR 
can be significant. 
                                                          
51 O’Loughlin and Thamotheram (2005) define extra-financial factors as those likely to have at least 
a long-term effect on business results but which hardly get integrated into investment decisions, 
regardless of whether they are part of the research process of analysts. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
 
In de afgelopen decennia zijn verschillende partijen in financiële markten, en met name 
institutionele beleggers, zich gaan roeren in de discussie over het maatschappelijk 
verantwoord besturen van de onderneming, ook wel bekend als duurzaam ondernemen, 
alsmede het toezicht daarop. Zo hebben bijvoorbeeld pensioenfondsen een fiduciaire 
verantwoordelijkheid om de belangen van deelnemers en andere belanghebbenden zo goed 
mogelijk te behartigen. Het is vervolgens de vraag of deze plicht ook een 
verantwoordelijkheid inhoudt om de maatschappelijke gevolgen van het beleggen in 
ondernemingen expliciet in beleggingsoverwegingen te betrekken.  
Hoewel deze partijen bij het vaststellen van de kwaliteit van de onderneming en 
haar verwachte financiële prestaties naast traditionele selectiecriteria, strategie, en 
management ook duurzaamheidsaspecten steeds meer in beschouwing nemen, worden er 
zowel binnen academische kringen als in de praktijk kanttekeningen geplaatst bij deze 
ontwikkeling. Zo twijfelen critici aan de geldigheid van de financiële onderbouwingen van 
duurzaam beleggen en duurzaam ondernemen. De eerste associatie bij veel sceptische 
beleggers is dat portefeuilles geconstrueerd op basis van sociale-, ethische- of 
milieufactoren bovenmatig onderhevig zijn aan beleggingsrestricties, ten nadele van het 
uiteindelijke financiële rendement. Op een soortgelijke wijze beschouwen critici duurzaam 
ondernemen als een kostbare activiteit zonder concrete positieve effecten op financiële 
bedrijfsprestaties.  
Aanhangers van duurzaam beleggen beargumenteren dat het merendeel van de 
markt de waarde van duurzaam ondernemen onderschat, zodat duurzame beleggers een 
informatievoordeel genieten ten opzichte van hun conventionele tegenhangers. Sommige 
hanteren de visie dat beleggers gericht op korte termijn rendementen de economische 
voordelen van duurzaam ondernemen, zoals reputatievoordelen, risicobeperkingen, en 
operationele efficiencyverbetering, over het hoofd zien omdat deze effecten zich meestal 
pas op de lange termijn manifesteren. Dit onderwaarderingsargument, ook bekend als 
“mispricing”, illustreert waarom sommige beleggers verwachten dat duurzame 
portefeuilles beter zullen renderen dan normale portefeuilles. 
In de discussie omtrent de relatie tussen duurzaamheid en de financiële prestaties 
van beleggers en ondernemingen is er tot op heden geen sprake van enige consensus. Deze 
dissertatie bundelt zes empirische studies die meer inzichten moeten bieden. De empirische 
studies geven antwoorden op vragen die relevant zijn voor zowel beleggers in 
ondernemingen als de ondernemingen zelf. Welke consequenties – in termen van 
beleggingsrendement en -risico -  heeft een beleid dat expliciet informatie op het gebied 
van duurzaamheid meeweegt in beleggingsbeslissingen? Hoe manifesteert duurzaam 
ondernemen zich in traditionele financiële maatstaven als winst, marktwaardering en de 
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kostenvoet van het vermogen? Zijn financiële markten in staat de meerwaarde van 
duurzaam ondernemen correct in te schatten, of bestaan er mogelijkheden voor beleggers 
om “mispricing” van duurzaamheidsinformatie uit te buiten? 
Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een uitgebreide analyse van de prestaties van - actief en passief 
beheerde - duurzame beleggingsfondsen. In de steekproef van maandelijkse rendementen, 
vanaf 1987 worden alle duurzame en conventionele fondsen in de Verenigde Staten, 
Canada, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Nederland, België en Zwitserland 
betrokken. Omdat duurzaam beleggen in verschillende landen inmiddels een aanzienlijke 
historie kent, biedt de studie in dit hoofdstuk de mogelijkheid om uitsluitsel te geven over 
de rendementen van duurzame fondsen op langere termijn. Om de prestatie van een fonds 
te meten maken we gebruik van verschillende performance attributie analyses die in staat 
zijn om de rendementseffecten van duurzaamheidsscreens te onderscheiden van bekende 
nevenfactoren, zoals het stijl- en risicoprofiel van het fonds. De resultaten leveren het 
vrijwel onomstotelijke bewijs dat beleggingsfondsen met het label “SRI”, “ethical” of 
“sustainable”, niet systematisch beter of slechter presteren dan hun conventionele 
tegenhangers. Tevens vinden we bewijs dat de prestatie van een duurzaam beleggingsfonds 
redelijk onafhankelijk is van het type duurzaamheidsscreen dat het fonds hanteert. Tot slot 
levert dit hoofdstuk bewijs dat de jaarlijkse rendementen op duurzame aandelenfondsen 
voorspelbaar zijn. Duurzame fondsen die in het recente jaar relatief slecht presteren blijven 
dat doen in het daaropvolgende jaar. Voor duurzame beleggers loont het dus om duurzame 
beleggingsfondsen met teleurstellende jaarcijfers systematisch te mijden. 
Het is opvallend dat de rendementen van duurzame beleggingen voornamelijk zijn 
getoetst met behulp van informatie over fondsen die louter handelen in aandelen. De 
inzichten die deze toetsen bieden zijn beperkt voor beleggers die een mix van aandelen en 
andere vermogenstitels beheren, zoals vastrentende waarden. Hoofdstuk 2 zet een eerste 
stap in de richting van duurzaam beleggen in obligaties. Hier wordt een blik geworpen op 
de prestaties van duurzame (investment-grade en high-yield) obligatiefondsen en 
mixfondsen (“balanced funds”) ten opzichte van de prestaties van hun conventionele 
tegenhangers. Uit maanddata over de periode 1987-2003 blijkt dat het voor risico 
gecorrigeerde rendement op duurzame obligatiefondsen niet significant verschilt van het 
rendement op conventionele fondsen. Het gemiddelde, voor risico gecorrigeerde, 
rendement op duurzame mixfondsen ligt ongeveer 1.3 procent hoger dan dat van 
conventionele mixfondsen.  
Hoewel duurzame beleggingsfondsen een goede indruk geven van in praktijk 
uitgevoerde duurzame beleggingsstrategieën, kent onderzoek naar dit soort fondsen haar 
beperkingen vanuit een academisch perspectief. Het feit dat duurzame en conventionele 
beleggingsfondsen aandelen selecteren uit een universum dat sterk overlappend is, maakt 
het moeilijk om verbanden te leggen tussen de duurzaamheidsprestaties van bedrijven en 
hun aandelenrendementen. Zo kan de vraag of de markt een risicopremie koppelt aan een 
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bepaald bedrijfsattribuut, bijvoorbeeld de duurzaamheidsprestaties van een onderneming, 
doorgaans concreter worden beantwoord door middel van onderzoek naar 
rendementsverschillen tussen niet-overlappende portefeuilles, bijvoorbeeld een duurzame 
en een niet-duurzame portefeuille. Op een soortgelijke wijze wordt onderzocht of de markt 
dit attribuut wellicht verkeerd prijst, wat voor actieve beleggers kansen biedt. 
Hoofdstuk 3 wijkt met concrete bedoelingen af van onderzoek naar 
beleggingsfondsen en richt zich op een specifieke dimensie binnen het concept 
duurzaamheid: eco-efficiency. Grofweg kunnen we de eco-efficiency van een bedrijf 
omschrijven als de mate waarin de onderneming competitieve kwaliteitsproducten en 
diensten kan leveren zonder daarbij de voorraad van grondstoffen en het ecologische 
systeem als geheel aan te tasten. Geïnspireerd door asset-pricing studies uit de traditionele 
financieringsliteratuur vergelijken we de rendementen van portefeuilles van 
ondernemingen die hoog scoren op het gebied van eco-efficiency met rendementen van 
portefeuilles die laag scoren. Het universum bestaat uit ondernemingen die periodiek 
worden gescreend door een bekende leverancier van duurzaamheidsinformatie voor 
institutionele beleggers. De meeste ondernemingen maken deel uit van bekende 
Amerikaanse aandelenindices.  
Uit de empirische toetsen in dit hoofdstuk blijkt dat aandelenportefeuilles van 
Amerikaanse ondernemingen met hoge scores op het gebied van eco-efficiency beter 
presteren dan portefeuilles van ondernemingen met lage scores. Het rendementsverschil 
tussen deze portefeuilles is significant na correctie voor marktrisico, beleggingsstijlen en 
sectoreffecten. Een best-in-class strategie gericht op het aankopen van aandelen van eco-
efficiënte  bedrijven, oftewel een “long” positie, leverde historisch een gecorrigeerd 
rendement op van meer dan 4 procent per jaar. Een strategie gericht op een “long” positie 
in bedrijven met hoge eco-efficiency scores and een “short” positie in bedrijven met lage 
scores leverde circa 6 procent op. Hoewel transactiekosten een dempend effect uitoefenen 
op de prestaties van dergelijke duurzame beleggingsstrategieën blijven de waargenomen 
rendementen zowel economisch als statistisch gezien significant in verschillende 
transactiekostenscenario’s.  
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft verdere inzichten in het concept van eco-efficiency door de 
resultaten op portefeuilleniveau te koppelen aan de waarde van eco-efficiency gemeten op 
bedrijfsniveau. Het hoofdstuk verbindt inzichten uit de managementliteratuur met de 
laatste stand van zaken op het gebied van performance- en risicometing uit de 
financieringsliteratuur. Vervolgens staan vier empirische vraagstukken centraal in dit 
hoofdstuk: is er een verband waar te nemen tussen de mate van eco-efficiency en de 
winstgevendheid van een bedrijf? Hoe wordt eco-efficiency op waarde geschat door 
financiële markten? Is er een tijdtrend waarneembaar in de mate waarop beleggers eco-
efficiency zien als een bron van (immateriële) ondernemingswaarde? Zijn beleggers in 
staat om de effecten van eco-efficiënt ondernemen te vertalen naar toekomstige 
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bedrijfswinsten? Op basis van de eco-efficiency scores van Amerikaanse bedrijven over de 
periode 1997-2004 stellen we vast dat bedrijven met een relatief hogere eco-efficiency 
score tevens relatief winstgevender zijn (in termen van rendement op assets) en hoger 
gewaard zijn (in termen van Tobin’s q).  
Op het eerste gezicht lijkt het laatstgenoemde positieve verband tussen eco-
efficiency en waardering in strijd met het in Hoofdstuk 3 waargenomen positieve 
abnormale rendement op een eco-efficiënte aandelenportefeuille. De traditionele financiële 
markttheorie voorspelt namelijk dat de markt een aandeel hoger waardeert wanneer het 
niet-diversifieerbare risico van dit aandeel lager is, zodat beleggers een lagere premie eisen 
voor het dragen van dit risico. Volgens de efficiënte markttheorie en de daarbij behorende 
marktevenwichtmodellen is het gerealiseerde aandelenrendement op de lange termijn 
conform het vereiste rendement.  
Om aan te tonen dat eco-efficiënte bedrijven niet alleen relatief hoger zijn 
gewaardeerd maar ook beter hebben gerendeerd, wijken we af van het idee dat de markt 
eco-efficiency op juiste waarde heeft geschat. Ten eerste blijkt dat de relatie tussen de eco-
efficiency van een bedrijf en de marktwaarde (Tobin’s q) van deze onderneming door de 
tijd heen is toegenomen. De toenemende waarde die beleggers toekennen aan eco-
efficiency is consistent met het historische rendementspatroon van eco-efficiënte 
portefeuilles. Ten tweede vinden we bewijs dat de markt positief verrast is door de 
winstresultaten die we kunnen associëren met een eco- efficiënte bedrijfsvoering. De 
uiteindelijk gerealiseerde winsten van ondernemingen die een eco-efficiënt beleid 
implementeren, blijken systematisch hoger dan de winstvoorspellingen van 
beleggingsanalisten. Wanneer we veronderstellen dat de verwachtingen van analisten 
representatief zijn voor die van de uiteindelijke beleggers, dan kunnen we concluderen dat 
deze positieve “earnings surprises” ten grondslag liggen aan de eerder genoemde positieve 
abnormale aandelenrendementen. 
Hoofstuk 5 past de in vorige hoofdstukken voorgestelde methoden toe om de 
meerwaarde van een alternatief concept binnen het containerbegrip duurzaamheid te 
toetsen: human capital management (HCM). Verschillende theorieën voorspellen dat de 
kosten verbonden aan het management van menselijk kapitaal in een organisatie in schril 
contrast staan met de baten, zoals een verbetering van de arbeidsproductiviteit van 
werknemers en operationele efficiency. Het is echter onduidelijk wat de (duurzame) 
belegger bereikt met het meewegen van informatie omtrent het human capital beleid van 
bedrijven, en welke vormen van HCM daadwerkelijk relevant zijn voor deze beleggers. 
Aan de hand van een unieke wereldwijde dataset met gegevens over de human capital 
systemen van meer dan 600 beursgenoteerde ondernemingen toetsen we de relatie tussen 
HCM en respectievelijk, return on assets, Tobin’s q, aandelenrendementen, en earnings 
surprises. De empirische resultaten duiden sterk op een positief verband tussen de mate van 
human capital development (m.a.w., de mate waarin het bedrijf gebruik maakt van training 
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en evaluatie van werknemers, skill-gap assessment uitvoert, en gebruik maakt van formele 
human resources succesmaatstaven) en de financiële prestaties van de onderneming. 
Bedrijven die hoog scoren op het gebied van human capital development genieten een 
relatief hogere winstgevendheid en hogere waardering in financiële markten. Opvallend is 
dat een talent attraction en retention systeem geen cross-sectioneel verband vertoont met de 
deze prestatiemaatstaven. Verder is, in tegenstelling tot de effecten van human capital 
management op winstgevendheid en marktwaardering, de relevantie van HCM informatie 
bij het genereren van abnormale beleggingsrendementen onduidelijk. In het algemeen 
geven de onderzoeksresultaten in dit hoofdstuk geen aanleiding te veronderstellen dat 
markten systematisch de waarde gecreëerd door human capital management onderschatten, 
hetgeen het behalen van buitengewone beleggingsrendementen mogelijk zou hebben 
gemaakt. 
Tot slot biedt Hoofdstuk 6 een onderzoek naar de relatie tussen duurzaamheid en 
het ex ante verwachte aandelenrendement, oftewel de kostenvoet van het eigen vermogen. 
Uit het empirische onderzoek naar meer dan 3000 bedrijven in de V.S. blijkt dat prestaties 
op het gebied van milieu, governance, alsmede de duurzaamheidsprestaties van producten 
en diensten van de onderneming negatief gecorreleerd zijn met de kostenvoet van het eigen 
vermogen. Om deze resultaten te verklaren kunnen we in verschillende richtingen 
redeneren.  
Doorgaans wordt verondersteld dat de duurzaamheidsprestatie van een 
onderneming alleen een relatie kan vertonen met het door beleggers vereiste rendement 
wanneer duurzaamheidsinformatie relevant is in het vaststellen van de premie voor het 
dragen van niet-diversifieerbaar risico. Hoe hoger dit risico, des te hoger het vereiste 
rendement. Een mogelijke verklaring zou dus kunnen schuilen in een risico-element 
verbonden aan de duurzaamheidskarakteristieken van het bedrijf, bijvoorbeeld risico ten 
gevolge van tabakswetgeving, milieuwetgeving, en juridische risico’s. In dit geval 
verdisconteert de markt duurzaamheid met dezelfde motieven als waarop het traditionele 
risicomaatstaven meeweegt in het “prijzen” van vermogenstitels. Tevens kunnen door 
beleggers toegepaste duurzaamheidfilters worden vergeleken met een boycot die 
“imperfecties” kan creëren in kapitaalmarkten.  Voorbeelden van imperfecties die 
consequenties kunnen hebben voor minder duurzame bedrijven zijn: (i) beperkte liquiditeit 
van aandelen, (ii) beperkte aandacht van analisten die doorgaans zorgen voor een adequate 
informatievoorziening omtrent een bedrijf (“neglect”), en (iii) een beperking van het aantal 
vermogensverschaffers, wat leidt tot een beperking van de optimale verdeling van het 
totale investeringsrisico (“risk sharing”).  De opportunity costs die deze fricties met zich 
meebrengen voor beleggers in minder duurzame bedrijven kunnen tot uitdrukking komen 
in de vermogenskostenvoet van deze bedrijven. 
De verschillende theoretische verklaringen worden ondersteund door onze 
empirische bevinding dat betere milieuprestaties, betere corporate governance, en betere 
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kwaliteit van producten en diensten gekoppeld kunnen worden aan een lagere risicopremie. 
Deze resultaten staan in contrast met onze observatie dat bedrijven die hoger scoren op het 
sociale vlak een hogere premie moeten betalen. De recentelijk geopperde stelling dat 
sociale aspecten van duurzaam ondernemen een “agency cost” kunnen zijn, waartegen 
beleggers zich mogelijk beschermen door een hogere premie te eisen, wordt wellicht 
ondersteund door dit resultaat. Omdat opvattingen over de kostenvoeteffecten van 
duurzaam ondernemen nog in de kinderschoenen staan kan vervolgonderzoek op dit gebied 
veel verhelderende inzichten bieden.  
Kortom, in het algemeen kunnen we concluderen dat verschillende aspecten van 
duurzaam ondernemen en duurzaam beleggen wel degelijk relevant zijn voor managers en 
beleggers die streven naar het behalen van een optimaal financieel resultaat. Het bekende 
tegenargument dat stelt dat rekening houden met duurzaamheidsthema’s een verslechtering 
van financieel rendement inhoudt kan deels naar het rijk der fabeltjes worden verwezen. 
Met de bevestiging dat duurzaamheidsinformatie gezien kan worden als “extra-financiële” 
informatie, die een belegger helpt bij het managen van risico en rendement, kan duurzaam 
beleggen de mainstreaming fase ingaan. Zo bieden onze resultaten voor beleggersanalisten 
een voor de hand liggende incentive om rekening te houden met extra-financiële 
informatie, gezien de betekenis ervan voor het creëren van toegevoegde waarde voor de 
belegger. Wanneer duurzaamheidsinzichten meer worden geïntegreerd in financiële 
research, zal duurzaam beleggen een veel omvangrijkere groep beleggers bereiken.  
Vervolgstudies kunnen aan de hand van de financiële maatstaven in deze thesis 
veel vernieuwende inzichten bieden in de extra-financiële waarde van 
duurzaamheidsthema’s, zowel op bedrijfsniveau als op beleggersniveau. Belangrijk is dat 
het thema duurzaamheid op een praktisch relevante en zo concreet mogelijke manier wordt 
belicht. Klaarblijkelijk is het essentieel dat inzichten in de meerwaarde van duurzaam 
beleggen en ondernemen geboden worden op een lager aggregatieniveau, waarbij het 
containerbegrip “duurzaamheid” word vermeden en specifiekere dimensies, zoals milieu, 
arbeid, en governance, nader worden getoetst. De noodzaak van disaggregeren kan ook 
worden teruggevonden in de beleggingscodes van diverse grote pensioenfondsen, die een 
duidelijke belangstelling voor de zogenoemde ESG (environmental, social, en governance) 
thema’s weerspiegelen. 
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The Economic Virtues of SRI and CSR
Financial markets and company managers are increasingly acknowledging
the concepts of socially responsible investing (SRI) and corporate social
responsibility (CSR), but not without reservations. These hesitations
are largely attributable to ongoing debates about a potential conflict
between social responsibility goals and the traditional financial objectives
of investors and companies. This thesis bundles six empirical studies
that deepen our understanding of the economic value of SRI and CSR.
Several empirical questions underlie these studies, such as: do CSR
practices improve a firm’s profitability? Do financial markets value
corporate social responsibility? Do SRI criteria constrain investment
portfolio optimization, or do they help investors in their hunt for
underpriced securities? This thesis shows that SRI and CSR can be
studied in new ways to answer these questions. We examine unique
SRI stock portfolios with superior return/risk profiles, and provide a
fresh look at strategies for investors in SRI mutual funds. By analyzing
a wide range of pathways that lead CSR to interrelated measures of
corporate financial performance, we further explain whether CSR carries
value-relevant information. Taken together, the six studies discuss the
channels of transmission from CSR to operating performance, the cost
of capital, firm value, analysts’ earnings expectations, and stock return.
The conclusions from this dissertation are that (i) integrating SRI criteria
into portfolio construction does not negatively affect investment per-
formance; (ii) investors can use information on firms’ eco-efficiency
to make investment decisions that improve the return/risk profile of
their portfolios; (iii) common CSR attributes, such as corporate environ-
mental responsibility, and human capital management, have a significant
association with traditional measures of corporate performance. We
recommend making CSR salient to investors in the form of extra-
financial information, with an emphasis on environmental, social, and
corporate governance themes.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
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its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-132-8 
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